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NATURAL RELIGION.

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NATURAL RELIGION.

FROM THE "APOLOGIE DES CHRISTENTHUMS"

OF

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EDITED,

WITH AN INTRODUCTION ON CERTAINTY,

BY

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"Deus ubique secretus est, ubique publicus, quem nulli licet ut est cognoscere, et quem nemo permittitur ignorare."—S. AUGUST. *in Ps.* lxxiv. *n.* 9.

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INTRODUCTION ON CERTAINTY.

By "Natural Religion" is meant the relation of man to God as taught by reason alone, apart from any supernatural source. How far such knowledge can be obtained with certainty has been long debated, and with very opposite results. "Regarding the gods," wrote Protagoras in the fifth century before Christ, "I know neither whether they exist or not. . . . There is much to prevent one attaining this knowledge—the obscurity of the subject and the shortness of human life." For these words and what followed, Protagoras was found guilty of impiety: his treatise was burnt, and he himself was sentenced to death.[1] At Athens, then, at least irreligion was accounted a crime, and atheism in any form an offence to be punished by the State. It is not so now. The modern professor of Agnosticism meets with very different treatment. His writings obtain a wide circulation, and he himself is regarded as a master in

[1] Stöckl, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, from which work the historical portion of this preface is chiefly drawn. The English excellent translation of the first volume of Stöckl, by J. A. Finlay, S.J., has been much used, and often verbally followed.

science, and his sceptical conclusions as the necessary product of patient research, logical exactness, and fearless love of truth.

How it is that, after nineteen centuries of Christianity, belief in God should have less hold on men's reason and conscience than it had before Christ came, may seem at first sight strange; but a brief consideration of the historical development of the old and new philosophies will perhaps best explain why they arrived at their respective results.

In the first period, then, of Greek philosophy, as far as it is manifested in history, men's minds were in an infantine state. They occupied themselves only with the investigation of external Nature. They were wholly interested, like children, in what their senses showed them in objects of sight and touch. But in its second epoch, under the guidance of Socrates and his followers, men turned from the contemplation of the world without to the consideration of themselves within. To aid him in his search for truth, which was now his object, the Greek philosopher possessed religious traditions, which, though corrupt, still showed traces of the primal revelation delivered to man. And within him dwelt his natural reason, obscured indeed by the fall, but yet essentially sound. With these two guides, he succeeded, after much labour, in defining and fixing the first principles of reason, which form the basis of all sound argument and the necessary laws of thought; and further, he had demonstrated and established as certain a considerable number of important natural

truths. Among these may be reckoned the objective reality of the external world, the essential and abiding difference between right and wrong, and the existence of a Creator who was at once the ruler and judge of mankind. No doubt these truths were intermixed with much error, and often succumbed to the attacks of materialism and scepticism, to which they were ever exposed. But the fragmentary knowledge he possessed, and the consciousness of his inability to attain to truth complete, alike quickened in the earnest heathen that longing for a revelation which in some passages of Plato read almost like the prayer of a saint.

Now, whatever of truth the ancient philosophy contained in any branch of human science or reasoning, the Fathers of the Church adopted and made their own. They did so not because theology, as St. Thomas says, "was of itself insufficient to prove its own doctrines, but because of the defect of our understanding, which is more easily led by the knowledge of the truth which it has acquired for itself to the knowledge of those truths which are above reason, and which theology imparts."[1] And thus the Church employed philosophy both to give expression to divine mysteries in human terms, to develop and illustrate them by human reasoning, and to defend the doctrines of faith against heretical attack. Science now became the handmaid of faith, and philosophy, illumined by revelation, acquired an unity and a comprehensiveness

[1] S. I., Qu. i. Art. 5.

unknown in any other system of thought. One and unchangeable were now its fundamental principles because guaranteed by the authority of faith. Universal the range of its inquiry, because, *omne scibile*, all sciences, human or divine, are but rays of the one eternal light. In so wide a field of thought controversies necessarily arose. Disputants fought till death over single propositions. New schools and new systems arose. Yet, amidst all the incessant strife, neither side ever forgot their essential agreement, not only in doctrines of faith, but in the first principles of human thought. Thus man advanced in knowledge from objects of sense to truths of reason, and from these by a strictly logical sequence, to God; and in the divine synthesis attained by faith, what human analysis had only collected after long labour, was at once perfected and confirmed.

The modern system has moved in an exactly opposite direction. It dates from the Reformation, and that movement is often spoken of as having given it birth. No Reformer's name, however, is to be found in any history of philosophy, for no Reformer based his teaching on logical proof. On the contrary, their chief reproach against the scholastics was the employment of human arguments in the matter of Divine truth. Luther's appeal to the Bible alone, Calvin's to predestination, Cranmer's to the royal supremacy, were all outside the domain of reason, and rested only on the teacher's *ipse dixit*, and on the secular power which supported him. The

"Divine simplicity of the new Gospel" had this advantage, that as it was not grounded on any logical argument, neither could it be upset thereby. The Reformers, then, so far from setting free human reason, gagged it and turned it out of court.

But what the Reformers never thought of doing directly they did indirectly originate, for they had laid down a principle which spread far beyond the sphere of religion. That principle—and it was their sole bond of internal connection—was one of destruction, a clean break with the past, with tradition or authority in any shape. And as the Reformers displayed their zeal by hewing and hacking to pieces every memorial of that past, whether in architecture, painting, or sculpture, as organ and antiphon which spoke of it were silenced, and all the noblest creations of human art were swept away, so was it in the intellectual world. All the learning, all the principles of knowledge, all that the master-minds of Paganism or Christianity had thought out, amassed, and made sure, was with one blow effaced. And thus, as in the sphere of revelation no authority was henceforth to be recognised as infallible in matters of faith, so in the domain of reason no principle, no fact, was to be admitted as certainly true.

Hence the new philosophy, being founded on this principle of universal negation, opens with Descartes' system of "scientific doubt;" which means that in the logical order of thought, doubt is prior to certainty, and that everything is to be assumed as doubtful till

it be proved true. On the subsequent products of this system, how it recoiled from idealism to materialism or sensationalism, from these back again to idealism, and then sank to absolute scepticism, we have neither time nor space to dwell. The present phase is similar to that under which it first appeared, and is termed Agnosticism, which its teachers explain as the doctrine that no man has a right to believe anything for which he cannot produce logical satisfactory evidence;[1] what is meant by "logic" or by "evidence" being studiously undetermined. Its practical outcome, however, is as follows, and it is well to contrast it with the results obtained by the older heathen philosophy. The external world, then, as we are now taught to regard it, is but a mass of phenomena, and of phenomena only manifested under conceptions of space and time, and viewed, therefore, apart from these conditions, may have no objective reality. Of our own being within we have again but fleeting phenomenal impressions; and whether these be the product of sense or intelligence, whether free or determined, we cannot tell. Morality is thus but a subjective sentiment, and right and wrong may change sides according as men are educated. How things came to be, what they are, and what their future, are all alike unknown, for we have no certain data of knowledge; nor, if we had, are we possessed of any certain principle by which to establish their truth.

[1] Cf. Huxley, *Agnosticism and Christianity*, *Nineteenth Century*, 148, June 1889.

Thus the wisdom of to-day is to doubt our senses, to doubt our reason, its dictates as expressed by conscience, and to doubt ourselves. And as God is only manifested to man through effects in the visible world without, and the laws of reason and conscience within, the modern philosopher, if questioned as to the existence of deity, can only reply, *Agnosco*, I know not. And if we consider that the same philosophy knows no law for human conduct above the human will, and that therefore every individual is logically free to do what he likes, and to gratify at once and to the full every impulse of his animal appetites, the wonder is *not* that Agnosticism has found acceptance in a fallen race, but that a single *credo* is ever heard.

Such, then, is a brief outline of the genesis of the two philosophies, and of the reasonings productive of their respective results. Let us now consider on what grounds Christian philosophy affirms the certainty of those natural truths which it is the province of Agnosticism to deny.[1] By certainty, then, we mean "a firm assent to any proposition, without fear of error." Thus certainty, like its contradictory doubt, is a subjective disposition of the mind, and must be distinguished from the motive or object which determines its assent.

Certainty is of two kinds, natural and philosophical. The certainty which all men possess, and on which

[1] The philosophical arguments which follow are taken mainly from the article on "Certainty" in Kleutgen, *Philosophie der Vorzeit*, vol. ii., rightly called by Stöckl "a classical work."

all alike practically act, and which is therefore called *natural*, is direct and simple, and is obtained before the mind has by any reflective process determined the motive of its assent. *Philosophic* certainty, on the contrary, is reflex and demonstrative, and is only obtained after the motive of assent has been explicitly determined. What Agnostics contend then is, that natural certainty, because it arises prior to proof, is necessarily untrustworthy; that it is the product of feeling or instinct, but not of reason and evidence.

The schoolmen, on the other hand, affirm that natural certainty is not only true and reasonable in itself, but that it is the sole basis of philosophic certainty and of all sound human reasonings.

They argue thus: All knowledge is the result of two factors—the faculty which knows, and the object known. This faculty, the mind, like the eye can only know or see objects which come within the range of its vision. Of objects beyond that range of itself it knows nothing, but of those within that range it can and does speak with certainty. Thus all knowledge is primarily objective, and, as we are constituted, is derived first from sense objects. This then is the force of the axiom, "Nihil in intellectu, nisi prius in sensu."

Again, since certainty excludes doubt, I can only be certain of that which is clearly, visibly, and unmistakably presented to my mind. What is doubtfully presented or seen in a haze can only beget a dubious or hesitating assent. The motive, then, of all certainty

is the objective infallible evidence of the truth or fact proposed.

Is, then, natural certainty possessed of this evidence? We have three sources of knowledge, which, taken in the order of their genesis, are our senses intellectual and external, intellectual ideas and our reasonings thereon, and the information which we accept on the information of others. These three kinds of knowledge, the senses, thought, and belief, have each their own natural certainty, viz., physical, metaphysical, moral; and of each kind of certainty the determining motive is the same, the infallible evidence of the truth proposed, and, in the case of faith, the infallible veracity of our informant. Yet—and this is most important—though we cannot form a certain assent without an infallible motive determining us thereto, we are often unable to state explicitly what that motive is. Thus we may be quite certain that a stone is hard without being able to give scientific or demonstrative proof of the fact; and it is this difficulty in demonstrating by argument or evidence the credibility of natural certainty, or, in other words, of converting natural into scientific certainty, which opens the door to doubt, and by reason of which the certainty of these three kinds of knowledge has been called in question. Thus we find the Materialists deny the certainty of ideas, *i.e.*, of any supersensible knowledge; the Idealists and Pantheists, that of matter; while the Sceptics pure and simple deny the certainty of mind and matter alike.

All truth, all certainty, then, can be denied. The point, therefore, is not what we can doubt, but what we ought not to doubt, or of what we ought to be certain, seeing the evidence in support.

It is assumed that we can be certain of something, if only for the reason that whoever affirms that nothing is certain, by his very affirmation—his certainty of his uncertainty—necessarily contradicts himself.

This possibility of forming certain assents arises from the reflective faculty (*principium reflexivum*) of our reason, by which we mean the power that the soul has of knowing itself, or of its consciousness of its own acts.

Now this self-consciousness is not obtained by the soul beholding itself in itself, or by direct sight of its essence. Were this so, the soul would never cease to know itself, and we should always see in our souls all the knowledge that we had ever acquired. The soul thus knows itself not immediately, but mediately by its acts or operation. Actual self-knowledge, therefore, means *that we feel that we feel, that we know that we know*, and therefore recognise ourselves as the cause or principle of these sentient or intelligent acts. Habitual self-knowledge [1] means that the soul always retains the power of knowing itself by its acts without any further medium, just as a man is said to speak French who, though not then actually speaking that language, can do so at once if he please.

[1] St. Thomas, *De Verit.*, Qu. x. Art. 8.

Our natural and certain self-consciousness testifies then to two important certainties. First, the certainty of our existence [1] obtained from the certainty of our acts; and secondly, the certainty that we are capable of knowing not only phenomena, but the realities or essences of things, since we have recognised ourselves as certainly existing through our consciousness of our acts.

But we know not only that we are, but what we are, and as we have obtained the fact of our being from the fact of our acts, so we can deduce the quality of our being from the quality of our acts. Now simple consciousness gives us the thought with its object, and this again clothed with all the accidents and phenomena of its concrete existence. But to know the quality of our thought, we must separate the act from the object, or the thought from the thing thought of, and then divest it of all that is merely phenomenal and accidental. Only by means of this abstraction can we distinguish our intellectual from our sense knowledge, and at the same time recognise the dependence of the former on the latter, and thereby learn the nature of our intellectual faculty. It is by this process of abstraction that our reason learns what things really are in their immutable, necessary, and perfect essences, apart from the changeable and contingent conditions of actual existence.

[1] "No one can assent to the thought that he is not, for in the very fact of thinking he perceives that he is" (*De Verit.*, Qu. x. Art. 12, &c.). Thus St. Thomas had expressed in his own sense the formula of Descartes.

Now it is by this same method of analysis and comparison that the certainty of our various kinds of knowledge is established. Take first our internal perceptions. We are conscious of a change of some kind, painful or pleasant, taking place within us; but certainty means more than a simple perception. It is a firm assent, and includes therefore a judgment; for we are only certain when we have decided that the senses report truly, *i.e.*, that the thing perceived—*the thing in us*, in the language of modern philosophy—really *is*. The senses then give us a likeness which enables us to see the object. But to form a judgment, we must compare one likeness with another, and further know their relation with the object represented. I feel a pain in my foot. If I have had the gout a few weeks previously, and on comparing the characteristics of my present sensation with those of my former attack, I find they coincide, then and then only I am certain that I am suffering from another attack of that malady. If I have never experienced any pain similar to what I now feel, I am uncertain as to its nature. Or, again, I may form a certain judgment by comparing the perception of one sense with that of another. I feel, for instance, on recovering from a surgical operation, a pain in my left hand, but my right hand tells me when I apply it to the spot that my left arm has been amputated. I therefore decide against my feeling, and am certain that it has no objective reality in that member. In both these cases, it is my rational self-knowledge or

reflective judgment on the evidence adduced which has attested the certainty of the nature and reality, or non-reality of my feelings.

This point is the more important as demonstrating further that even our external sense-perceptions obtain their certainty on a judgment of reason, and are therefore essentially different from the mere sense-perceptions of the brute. The latter, depending only on sense-faculties, instinctively regards the object presented to them as real. Thus, a scarecrow will protect a field of young wheat from birds for months together. Would a lay figure of a policeman similarly secure against burglars an otherwise unguarded jeweller's shop? Why not? The bird has the keener sight, but is guided only by sense, while the man, even in his sense-perception, acts on reason. He knows that self-movement is an essential characteristic of life. He compares the lay figure with its known living original, and as he finds that essential note wanting, he forms a certain judgment that the figure before him is lifeless. Thus, too, is it with ourselves. When our sense-perceptions are no longer guided by reason, that is, when they are no longer human but animal, as in sleep, we too, like the brute, instinctively determine the object presented to us as necessarily real. Hence the terror caused by images or situations, however impossible, which phantasy depicts in dreams. Yet the terror ceases the moment we awake, because with consciousness reason resumes its sway, compares the distressing image with the

objective realities of life, pronounces it a chimera, and dismisses it at once.

The natural certainty of our sense-knowledge is, then, determined by the objective evidence presented, and is therefore rational and logical. Now, as regards intellectual truths, which prescind from sense-experience, the same motive determines their certainty, and with even greater force. Why are we certain, and certain at once, that the whole is greater than one of its parts? Only because the objective evidence of this truth is at once apparent. The identity of the subject and predicate is unmistakable. We see the part within the periphery of the whole, and the converse proposition that a part is equal to or greater than its whole is unthinkable. Hence such truths are called self-evident, and the certainty begotten by them metaphysical, because it is determined by evidence superior to that furnished by the laws of physical nature, and is dependent solely on the connection of the ideas in themselves. Had extended matter with its whole and parts but a phenomenal existence, the proposition, "Totum majus est sua parte," would still be self-evidently true. Supreme in this class of metaphysical truths rank first principles. They are so called because they are demonstrated by no higher proof, but both prove themselves and form the basis of all demonstrative argument. Had we not these first undemonstrable truths, every argument would depend upon an infinite series of proofs, and no certain conclusion would be possible. Though undemonstrable in themselves, the truth of

these first principles is seen from the fact that the least deviation from them produces error.

These primal verities constitute the laws of thought, and it is important to observe that the mind is as completely subject to these laws as the body is to those of health. If a man contravenes the law of health and eats what is poisonous, he sickens or dies; and if he transgress the laws of thought and argues on a false premiss, he contradicts himself and commits intellectual suicide. There is no such thing, then, as absolute liberty of thought. Man is indeed free to think or not to think, and so far is subject to no compulsion. But if he does think, he is free neither as to the matter or manner of his thought; the matter being determined, as has been said, by the range of his intellect, the manner by the laws which govern it; and every man who thinks according to these laws obtains spontaneously a rational certainty both as to the objective reality of the external world and of his own thoughts and feelings within. The primal truths of our reason, then, are necessarily incapable of demonstration, and the Agnostic presumes on our ignorance in telling us to believe only what can be proved. We have evidence of the highest kind for these truths. But this evidence is not subject to proof, precisely because it is supreme, just as we have no light by which to test the solar rays save their own effulgence, or no measure of time but time itself. Philosophic inquiry adds nothing to our certainty of these truths, but only examines the ground on which

it rests in order to learn the nature of the mind, just as physicians examine the structure and operations of the bodily organs to determine the laws of health, but with no thought of modifying them.[1]

How far, then, does this natural certainty teach us the existence of God. We have dealt with two kinds of certain truths. First, those in which the motive of assent is immediately and self-evidently apparent, as that the whole is greater than the part. This kind is called an *à priori* truth, because we behold the effect in the cause and assent to the proposition on a conclusion derived from premises of which the truth is previously known. But the essence of God is inconceivable to the human mind and inaccessible to human sense. The fact, therefore, of His existence, is not self-evident to us, just as the idea of a part would not be self-evident to one who had no idea of a whole.

But we have considered another kind of certain truths, viz., those in which we have deduced not the effects from the cause, but the cause from the effects. Thus we have demonstrated with certainty the existence of the external world from its sensible phenomena, the existence of our soul from our consciousness of its operations, and thus, too, we demonstrate with certainty the existence of God from the world and ourselves, as the effects of His power. For the same law of reasoning which teaches us that we are, teaches us also that we must have had a cause, and, secondly, that that cause could not have been ourselves. For

[1] Cf. *Natural Religion*, p. 7.

we began to be but a few years since, and before that time were not. We could not, then, at the same time and in the same way both have existed as our cause and not existed as the effect produced. As this is true of ourselves, so is it also of all things around us. All that we see is subject to change, has its beginning and end, and is created and contingent, and therefore implies the existence of some being distinct from this world who is its cause, and is itself unchangeable, unmoved, and necessary; and this Being is God. God is therefore our Creator and Sovereign Lord, and to Him we owe all.

Now all practical truths which are naturally and certainly known, beget duties which must be as certainly fulfilled, and the obligation of discharging these natural duties with certainty is recognised by the common sense of mankind. Thus a physician who uses doubtful remedies, the cashier who pays in doubtful coin, the writer who publishes a doubtful report injurious to another's character, all these, if proved to have acted with a doubt, are severally condemned as guilty of manslaughter, fraud, and libel; and with justice, for every man has a right that his life and goods and character should not be imperilled by the doubtful, and therefore dangerous, action of others. But our duties to God of faith and worship are more certain than those we owe to any creature. For man may forfeit his rights to his life, character, or property, and his rights are therefore relative, dependent, and contingent; but God's rights are absolute, because He

is God, and these rights are manifested with absolute certainty to every human being. For the proof which we have given of the being of God is so manifest, that it appears, though not immediately yet spontaneously,[1] to all who do not offer violence to their common sense. Not to recognise this truth or to doubt the certainty of God's existence is an inexcusable sin.[2] So spoke the Apostle to the heathen world of his time; so spoke the inspired sage to the idolaters around him a thousand years before;[3] so speaks the Church in our own days;[4] for the evidence on which this truth rests is unchangeable. It follows *per ea quæ facta sunt*, from those things which are made and from the necessary law of reason that an effect must have its cause. No discovery in science, no advance in Biblical criticism, no dictum of modern thought can in the least degree lessen the force of a proof the denial of which necessarily implies the denial of a self-evident truth.

But it is said, Surely an Agnostic can be perfectly sincere. If he really have intellectual difficulties which he cannot conscientiously overcome, he must be considered an honest doubter. The objection is founded on a misapprehension of what conscience

[1] "Dei cognitio nobis innata dicitur esse, in quantum per principia nobis innata de facili percipere possumus Deum esse" (Opusc. 70, Super. Boeth. de Trin.).

[2] Rom. i. 19–20. [3] Wisd. i. 13.

[4] "Si quis dixerit, Deum unum et verum, Creatorem et Dominum nostrum per ea quae facta sunt, naturali rationis humanæ lumine certo cognosci non posse, Anathema sit" (Vat. Conc. Can. i.).

means. Conscience is not the law of morals, but our application of that law to ourselves, just as the eye is not the light, but the means by which we see the light and what it contains. And as the eye by ill-usage may become colour-blind and see all things indistinctly, so conscience by repeated evil acts may be so warped or strained as to utter only dubious or false judgments. Now, the habitual sinner of any kind acts, as a rule, with a false conscience; for since a habit implies promptitude, ease, and pleasure in the acts performed, no evil habit could be formed till conscience had been made an accomplice. Thus the usual justification for continuance in any habit of sin is that the offender did not see his guilt, or in his special circumstances is excused from wrong; and it is precisely this ignorance which makes such sin so heinous; because the sinner did not know what he ought to have known, because he doubted where he ought to be certain. His ignorance, though of the mind, was also of the will. It was voluntary and culpable, because only begotten by voluntary contempt for the supreme and certain law of morals, which was naturally and certainly in possession. So is it with the Agnostic. Not to assent to the fact of God's existence is an act of the intellect, but its motive principle is in the will, which, for some self-interest, refuses to recognise an evident truth, and therefore sins in that refusal. And thus Agnosticism or Atheism is not a sin of frailty or of ignorance, but a crime of the most heinous malice possible in human

act.[1] As homicide is the most grievous sin man can commit against his fellow, because it assails his actual substance, so infidelity is the most grievous sin against the whole law of morals, because it directly attacks the life and Being of God. An infidel—for his reason is still sound—may be honest, true, kind, and just in his dealings with his fellow-creatures, just as a man with heart disease[2] may be healthy in his other organs. But the principle of life is vitiated, where the heart is affected, and the principle of morals is gone, where God is denied.[3]

The truth of God's existence is then attested by the certainty of our sense-knowledge and by the laws of reason, which affirm certainly that we owe our being to Him. But we have, as has been said, another channel of information, namely, belief, or what we accept on the authority of others; and here again the truth of God's existence is attested with moral certainty by the universal consent of mankind. Now the certainty of belief rests on the same motive as the certainty of sense or thought, viz., the infallible evidence adduced. But there is this difference, that while the certainty of sense or thought rests on the evidence of the truth itself, that of faith is determined by the evident veracity of the speaker. But it is not on that account the less

[1] "Quia per infidelitatis peccatum homines magis a Deo separantur quam per cætera; ideo maximum eorum peccatum est, quæ contingunt in morum perversitate" (S. II., ii. q. x. conc.).

[2] S. I. ii. q. lxxiii., a. 3. conc.

[3] The proposition, "That all the acts of an infidel are sins," was condemned by Pius V., but is, of course, still a Calvinist formula.

an assent of reason. Every assent of certainty not immediately proved is the product of three factors: the determining infallible motive of the assent (*objectum formale, ratio motiva*); the rule or measure which defines the matter assented to (*in faith, regula fidei*); the matter thus defined (*objectum materiale*). Thus, in sense-knowledge I am certain that a figure in the distance is the friend I expect; the motive of my certainty is the objective evidence of the identity of the figure seen with that of my friend; the rule is the application of my ideal friend to the likeness impressed; the matter is the judgment obtained therefrom, viz., the certainty that the notes of my ideal friend and of the figure before me coincide. In other words, the certainty that he is my friend. Now as regards the universal testimony of mankind to the existence of God, we do not believe such testimony because all men say it, but because what all men say is true. The infallible motive of our assent is the objective veracity of that testimony; the rule is the fact of their testimony; the matter what that testimony contains. Such a consent furnishes a maximum of evidence, for the confession of a Deity is opposed to every evil desire of fallen man, and yet is universally heard. Atheists, indeed, appear in larger or smaller numbers in every age, but only to confirm as exceptions the truth they deny, as monsters or abortions in the physical order prove by their abnormal deformity the true type of the species.

Our natural certainty of God's existence, whether

obtained from sense, thought, or belief, *i.e.*, physical, metaphysical, or moral, is then in each case rational and trustworthy, and proportionately infallible. But it may be asked, Is not man fallible, and infallibility proper to God alone? Theologians reply that God alone is essentially infallible, for He alone contains the sum of all perfections, yet that He communicates His perfections to creatures under ordained conditions and in a limited degree. Though creatures of themselves are nothing, to all He communicates being; to some life, vegetative and sensitive; to others, intelligence. And further, He endows each kind of being with what is necessary for its preservation, development, and perfection. And thus, as He has endowed man with a cognitive faculty, he has accorded to him also the power of knowing certain truths infallibly,[1] without which the gift of knowledge would be in vain. These truths are the first principles which immediately command our assent, and those conclusions which so necessarily flow therefrom that their denial involves the contradiction of a self-evident truth. To this class belong the existence of God and the primary precepts of the Decalogue. And the power of recognising these truths is obtained prior to learning or argument from the reflected light of the Divine image in the soul, the gift of reason proper to every man. But to apply these truths to practice we need

[1] Intellectus circa illas propositiones errare non potest, quae statim cognoscuntur, cognita terminorum quidditate ; sicut accidit circa prima principia ex quibus accidit infallibilitas veritatis secundum certitudinem scientiae circa conclusiones (S. I., q. lxxxv. a. 6).

experimental knowledge, which depends for its value on our power of observation, analysis, and comparison, and on a series of arguments, physical and metaphysical, in any one of which fallacies may occur. What clearness of thought, accuracy of expression, exhaustive comparison, one correct definition implies! And further are needed moral qualities of a high order, calmness, reflection, modest estimation of one's own powers, impartiality, and sustained application. If, then, a man commences his investigation, hampered and weighted with passion, prejudice, false principles, and corrupt examples, can we wonder that he fails to find the truth? Consider how he opens his inquiry in the matter of religion, the relation of God and man. God, conceived by him, is too often a deity at once capricious, vindictive, irrational, and unjust, who creates man to damn him, that He may then dwell with complacency on his tortures; and man, as now drawn in lineal descent from his ape-ancestors, is alike bereft of human intelligence or the instinct of the brute. For a creature thus placed midway between spirit and matter, with a mind enveloped in a mist of ignorance impenetrable and universal, a will enslaved by passions more degrading than the beasts, making for a destiny alike irrevocable and unknown, what hope is left? If every human being be truly this, and there be but the God of Calvin above and Darwinian man below, then, though there be no hell in eternity, there is at least one on earth. And it is into this abyss of doubt and despair that men and

women, young men and maidens, are drifting daily. They may be moral, as the world calls it, and even pious, but they have contracted a habit of glib and flippant reasoning; they have formed a vitiated taste for paradox and sophistry, and they have lost, with the love of truth, the power of discerning it. And all this, again, is due, not to any consciously evil purpose, but to the practice of imbibing any "nostrum" placed within reach if it be only labelled "science," or is compounded of modern thought.

The disease, as we have said, is by no means new. Of the Sophists we are told that they disbelieved in the reality of being, and consequently in the possibility of attaining to any objective truth. They professed to be foremost in historical learning and physical science, and they displayed brilliant powers of oratory. This skill in rhetoric they employed to represent things most diverse as identical, to substitute expediency for virtue, and any new fallacy for truth. In a democratic age, as theirs was, when every man wanted to be a philosopher, an orator, or a politician, these teachers became very popular, for they went from city to city advertising themselves as professional thinkers, and offering their knowledge for sale.

Yet for all this, Socrates did not cease to uphold the cause of truth. To the boastful Sophist, with his brilliant paradoxes, he opposed his plain common sense and his "irony," by which he at once adopted and refuted their fallacies, while he taught reverence for the morality they despised by insisting on the prin-

ciple that knowledge and virtue are one.[1] We believe that the same remedies avail in all times. Error is only permitted for the clearer manifestation of truth. But to be preserved from its snares certain principles must be adhered to, of which a few are subjoined.

1. The seeker of truth must believe in its enduring and immutable reality, and that its possession alone gives value to life. He must hold in contempt and hatred all false reasoning, however specious, which would rob him of natural certainty and the truths it teaches. "*Qui sophistice loquitur odibilis est,*" Eccl. xxxvii. He must abhor and reject scepticism or sophistry in any form; for once within the soul, it will poison every well-spring of knowledge or faith. Of the Agnostics of his time St. Augustine says: "As regards this uncertainty about everything which Varro alleges to be the special characteristic of the New Academy, the City of God thoroughly detests such doubt as madness." And he gives as his reason that our mind, within its limits, is possessed of most absolute certainty, and that the evidence of the senses and the testimony of credible witnesses are alike to be believed.[2]

2. It is of primary importance in distinguishing truth from falsehood to define clearly the meaning of the terms employed. This process alone has disposed of many modern shibboleths. What does "natural selection" mean? Is it cause or effect? If the former, is it an intelligent creator distinct from the

[1] *Cf.* Stöchl, *History of Philosophy*, Finlay's trans., pp. 57, 58, 64, 65.
[2] *De Civ. Dei*, xix. 18.

visible universe, or blind chance coincident with it? Or is it both, as with Spinoza, *natura naturans* as cause, *natura naturata* as effect? Again, what is the meaning of mind, matter, force, and life? What sense does the professor of Agnosticism attach to truth, goodness, morality?

3. As every science has its own proper object and its own method of proof, that method only must be applied to objects within that science or to sciences subordinated thereto. This principle is ignored by materialists, who deny the existence of an *immaterial* soul, because its existence cannot be proved by material or physical tests.

4. Physical science treats only of extended matter, and its demonstrations are confined to physical proof. Cause, effect, inference, or assumption are alike beyond its sphere. "Of the origin and destiny of Nature," Tyndall says, "science knows nothing. Who or what made the sun and gave his rays their alleged power? Who or what made and bestowed upon the ultimate particles of matter their wondrous power of interaction, science does not know." [1]

5. Any proposition not purely speculative is capable of practical application, and its truth can be tried by that test. Hume said of scepticism that "all human life must perish were its principles universally and steadily to prevail." [2] The same holds good proportionately of all false teaching.

[1] *Fragments of Science*, 5th edit., p. 456.
[2] *Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, sect. xii. p. 2.

6. And lastly, though natural religion rests upon the surest basis of reason, yet seeing the difficulty men experience in understanding the force of demonstrative argument, or in recognising with certainty what is most evidently proved; and seeing further the doubts begotten by the conflicting theories of those who are reputed wise,[1] therefore God has provided for all a safe means of knowing what is needed for salvation. And as, by the help of grace, the weakest souls can observe the moral law and walk secure from grave sin, so by means of revelation all, whatever their unfitness for study or the pressing nature of their occupations, may attain with certainty to divine truth. But to obtain this illumination from above, the inquirer must pray, like the blind man by the wayside, who more and more cried out, "Lord, that I may see."[2] The light may be long in rising, for God's ways are not as ours, but the Church teaches that it will be granted to all who pray earnestly, and place no obstacle to its reception. And when the ray of God's truth enters the soul, doubt and uncertainty disappear and the convictions of faith succeed.

There was one who had long but vainly sought truth and certainty in the contending schools of philosophy, yet always believed that God would give him light. At length his hope was granted, and when Justin—for it was he—stood upon trial for the faith

[1] *Contra Gent.*, lib. i. c. 4.
[2] Luc. xviii. 39–41.

he had now confessed, "Do you think," said the Prefect, "that by dying you will enter heaven and be rewarded by God?" His life was in the balance. "I do not think," he replied, "I know;" and he only repeated the Apostle's words, "Scio cui credidi et certus sum,"—"I know in whom I have believed, and I am certain."[1]

[1] 2 Tim. i. 22.

EDITOR'S PREFACE.

THE *Apologie des Christenthums* consists of five volumes, of which the first two are entitled "Evidences of Christianity," the remaining three "Dogmas of Christianity." An English translation of the whole work was in preparation under the editorship of the Rev. F. Dalgairns, of the London Oratory, in 1874, but his death and other circumstances prevented its publication. "Natural Religion," the present version of the first volume of the "Evidences of Christianity," is from the sixth German edition (Wurzburg, 1885), and has been much curtailed. From the first the *Apologie* abounded in quotations, which the author's wide and varied learning readily supplied, and which increased in number with every subsequent edition. Whatever then seemed, at least in its English form, redundant either in quotation or in argument, has been omitted, and, as a consequence, several passages have been transposed and recast. The Editor was emboldened to take these liberties as his similar treatment of Dr. Hettinger's work on Dante met with the author's complete approval.

All matter in appendices has been incorporated in their respective chapters, and new titles have been given to Chapters VI., VII., and IX. Two dissertations, one on Darwinism, expanding further the arguments given in Chapter VII., and another on Hartmann's Philosophy of the Unconscious, have been omitted. The references to Aristotle are to Didot's edition, Paris, and frequently do not tally with those of Becker. The footnotes have been translated, with the exception of a few quotations from Goethe in verse.

The author's constructive arguments are based on the teaching of the schools, and he follows St. Thomas throughout. At the same time he arranges his matter in his own way, as will be seen in the chapter On God, where the moral argument from history comes first, and the order of the metaphysical arguments is transposed, that from movement being placed third, instead of first, as with St. Thomas. As infidelity in Germany has found expression in its only two logical products Materialism and Pantheism, against these the author directs his attack, and he deals but incidentally with Agnosticism, the less offensive *alias* assumed by atheism with us. The Editor has therefore prefixed to this version a short introduction on the nature of certainty, its motive and rule, drawn from approved authorities.

A defence of religion based on arguments unsound or inconclusive, or ignoring the sceptical objections of the day, may only suggest new doubt, and do more harm than good. We believe the present work

to be safe from this peril.[1] Composed under the fire of German infidel criticism, the *Apologie* has obtained a wide circulation in nearly every European country, and has secured its author's fame as one of the first theologians and controversialists of Germany. His knowledge of natural science, as shown especially in his examination of the evolutionary theory, gives his book a special value. It is hoped that "Natural Religion" may help to enforce the fact that the only enemy to belief is falsehood, and that truth, wherever found, every fact in science, every argument in reason, every event in history, if seen as they really are in themselves, their relations, and their consequences, confirm the faith.

The translation is by the same hands as Dr. Hettinger's work on Dante, and has been prepared with the same pains and accuracy. To his fellow-workers, and to all who have assisted him in the translation, revision, or censorship of the volume, the Editor begs to offer his most grateful thanks. He himself is alone responsible for whatever defects its pages may contain.

Whilst this version was preparing for press the author of the *Apologie* reached the term of his pilgrimage. For over forty years he has lived, toiled, and fought with one object—to destroy falsehood and to defend the cause of truth. His pages testify not only to his learning as a professor, but to the higher insight into spiritual things

[1] *Cf.* the admirable preface to the French translation of the *Apologie* by J. B. Jeannin, 1869.

proper to a priest. Some pages of his, especially those which treat of Christian dogmas, display an unction and a sacred fire which come only from above. Nor is this surprising, since we learn that for the forty-four years of his priesthood he offered the adorable Sacrifice day by day. Gifted and learned yet single-minded, humble and warm-hearted, Franz von Hettinger stood out to do battle for the faith like some well-appointed knight of old, and he died lance in hand, as the knight of old hoped to die, for God and His Church. Our loss is then, we trust, his gain, for they that are learned as he was "shall shine as the brightness of the firmament, and they that instruct many to justice, as stars for all eternity" (Dan. xii. 3).

AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

THE following conferences were addressed primarily to the students of the University of Wurzburg, and some of them were also delivered to large audiences of educated laity. Their purpose is to show the agreement of Christian faith with all that is true in the domain of reason, to correct erroneous theories, and to heal the wounds which error causes in souls. The apologist of every age, however diverse the minds or the needs of each period, has always the same task—to give a calm, clear statement of theories and facts, and to employ such a mode of expression that, without loss of scientific exactness, his matter may be, as far as possible, intelligible and interesting to the general reader. Such, then, has been the author's aim. He has preferred to establish principles on a solid basis rather than to answer every possible objection; for when principles are firmly fixed, error, whatever its guise, is powerless to deceive. How far he has succeeded competent critics must decide. To some his work will seem meagre and inadequate, to others too scholastic. The author can only plead that for long years he has devoted himself to his task as a

sacred duty, and one dear to his heart. "Demonstratio Christiana," or "Evidences of Christianity," as the heading of the first division of this work (the two first volumes) is named, is a title familiar to theologians, and no other could be found more brief or expressive. May, then, this book go forth to the world, and the blessing of God go with it. If it help to confirm but one believer in the joy of the faith, or to strengthen conviction in one soul tempted with doubt, the author will be amply rewarded.

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NATURAL RELIGION.

CHAPTER I.

DOUBT IN RELIGION.

FACE to face, nineteen centuries since, stood two men, representing each those antagonistic principles which in this world of ours are necessarily and ever in conflict. These two were Christ and Pilate, and in them were confronted, visibly and directly, as never before or since, light and darkness, truth and falsehood, right and wrong, hope and despair. Adjured to say who He was, Christ replied, "I came to give testimony to the truth." With the half-sceptical rejoinder, "What is truth?"[1] Pilate went away. Doubtless, like most men of his age, he had discarded the fantastic forms of mythology, and the conflicting and contradictory systems of philosophy then prevailing. Perchance the word "Truth" recalled days when he had striven and hoped for its possession, but now that hope was past. Of what use, then, this inquiry? Could a

Christ and Pilate.

[1] John xviii. 38.

poor Galilean criminal succeed where the sages of Greece and the masters of antiquity had failed?[1] Yet Christ still stands before men giving testimony to the truth. In spite of the world's unceasing ridicule, contempt, and antagonism, Christianity exists, and with an existence which cannot be ignored. Merely as a human system it is unrivalled, both in the power and extent of its sway. In every line of human thought its claims are found, and by every human soul these claims must be accepted or denied. And on the Church, as on its Founder, the same conflicting judgments are passed: "Some said, He is a good man, and others said, No, but He seduceth the people."[2]

Faith and doubt.

On the one hand, clear, definite faith; on the other, scepticism no less decided. The fanatical hatred of Christianity, which with the disciples of Voltaire was the mark of a true philosopher, may perhaps now be comparatively rare,[3] yet indifference and unbelief are widely spread. Many persons,

[1] "Veri nihil omnia ficta," says Scipio's friend, the poet Lucilius, speaking of the gods (*Fragment. ex Sat.*, lib. 20). Not only poets like Lucilius, Virgil, Ovid, and Horace, but also statesmen, such as Cæsar and Cato, were agreed that death ended all things (*Sallust. Catilin.*, 51, *et seq.*). Before their time Lucretius had already shaken the belief in the gods, of whose existence, according to Cicero also, philosophy offered nothing but probabilities (*Quæst. Tusculan.*, I. 9; *De Invent.*, I. 29).

[2] John vii. 12.

[3] "Thus," M. Renan says, "the generation after the Revolution showed by their return to the interior life, that they felt both the need of faith in themselves and of communion in faith with others; . . . and that, rather than remain in a system of negation which had become intolerable, they would make trial of the very doctrines which their fathers had overthrown" (*L'Étude d'Histoire Religieuse*, Preface; Paris, 1859).

whose minds are thus affected, shrink from open hostility to religion from a feeling inexplicable to themselves, which yet verifies Tertullian's saying that "the soul of man is Christian by nature;"[1] but Christians in the true sense, outspoken in profession, undoubting in faith, are the few. It is commonly admitted, indeed, and with a show of impartiality, that the Church has had a mighty influence in the development both of society and individuals, and has inspired the most perfect ideals of poetry and art; but the divine origin of Christianity, on which the whole fabric rests—the necessary and uncompromising issues of her teaching both in theory and practice—all these are, by the world at large, utterly ignored. To most men the Church presents but a great enigma in the world's history, and nothing more. Thus they too exclaim, "What is truth?" This uncertainty on the supreme problem of life cripples the best energies of man and

Christianity still doubted.

[1] *De Testimonio Animæ*, Cap. V. "These testimonies of the soul are as simple as they are true, as trite as they are simple, as common as they are trite, as natural as they are common, as divine as they are natural" (Cf. *Apolog.*, 17; *C. Marc.*, I. 10). "With the majority of mankind," says Renan again, "the established religion practically assumes the worship of the Ideal." But religion is not, as Schleiermacher pretends, a mere sentiment unconnected with definite thoughts, for since man is essentially one being, his feelings and thoughts are inseparable, and a religious system which is not based on reason cannot satisfy the affections. So said Goethe in his youth:—

"Wer Wissenschaft und Kunst besitzt,
Hat auch Religion;
Wer jene beiden nicht besitzt,
Der habe Religion."

depresses and paralyses the soul. It could not be otherwise. Earnest convictions can alone rouse man to heroic deeds. Doubt can destroy, but it has no power to create or renew.[1] And where the disease spreads, whether in individuals or masses, there succeed darkness, desolation, and death.

The causes of doubt.

The object, then, of this introductory chapter is to inquire into the causes of doubt. Since, as Goethe says, "there is but one supreme theme in the world's[2] history, viz., the conflict between faith and unbelief," and since, after nigh two thousand years of this conflict, the Church remains still quickened with immortality,[3] how can she be other than divine?

The primary cause of religious doubt lies in the false and one-sided views which prevail, both as to the

[1] "All epochs," says Goethe, "in which faith is dominant are brilliant, elevating, and pregnant for the present and the future. Those, on the contrary, which are under the sway of a miserable scepticism dazzle for a moment, but are soon forgotten, because worthless in the knowledge which bears no fruit. Unbelief belongs to weak, shallow, retrograding and narrow minds" (*Farbenlehre*, II. p. 163). Thiers once said—"If I had the gift of faith in my hands, I would pour it over my country. For my part, I prefer a hundred times a nation with faith to one without. The former has more enthusiasm for enterprise, more heroism in defending its greatness" (*Dupanloup contre Renan*, 1864).

[2] Westöstlichen Divan.

[3] "We guard our faith, which is delivered to us by the Church, and which, being ever renewed by the Spirit of God as a priceless treasure in a good vessel, itself renews the vessel in which it is contained. For that divine gift has been committed to the Church for the quickening of the body, so that all her members, in receiving it, are quickened thereby, and in it is communicated fellowship with Christ; that is, the Holy Spirit,—the pledge of immortality" (*Irenæus adv. Hæres*, III. 24)

nature and the needs of man's intellect, and of the true modes of acquiring knowledge. With the seed of faith, first nurtured in the child's mind by a pious mother or revered teacher, are developed the accompanying graces of purity, hope, and joy. The child becomes a youth. He is told that he is intellectual; he believes it already, and has no mean idea of his intellectual powers. But such gifts must not be thrown away. A mind such as his should be content only, like that of Faust, to probe and master the whole realm of truth. Eager then to learn, but with a mind wholly untrained, he hears that a truly scientific student accepts as true only what can be proved, and proved to him.[1] The universal consent of past ages, the concurring weight of all authority, the examples of the greatest geniuses, the sacred nature of the propositions themselves, are to go for naught. The youth's individual judgment is to decide on all subjects by the evidence submitted to it. Does Goethe[2] declare that nature

Scientific inquiry does not begin with doubt.

[1] "For if we refuse to accept, nay, reject as false, everything of which doubt can be entertained, the denial of the existence of God, of the heavens, of bodies, can we see, soon follow" (*Princip. Philos.*, P. I. n. 7). "As regards my own earlier tenets, I felt clear that I could consistently efface them all from my mind" (Descartes, *Dissert. de Methodo*, n. 3).

[2] "Therefore myself to magic I give,
In hope, through spirit, voice, and might,
Secrets now veiled to bring to light.
That I no more, with aching brow,
Need speak of what I nothing know.
That I the voice may recognise
That binds creation's inmost energies,

herself is replete with mysteries even in the full light of day. Was it Pascal's experience that the further man advances in every science, the deeper is the abyss which he finds unexplored before him? It matters not. The doctrine of negation stimulates and flatters the young man's pride. He adopts it as his own, and starts with the principle that doubt is the first step in the path of knowledge.

Now, every lawful endeavour to advance in knowledge is to be recommended, but that this advance must begin with doubt is a principle which, as regards any science, natural or revealed, is altogether false.[1]

The difference between the scholar and the rustic is

Her vital powers, her embryo seeds survey,
And fling the trade in empty words away."
(Faust's dialogue in the opening scene, *Swanwich Trans*).

[1] Of the proposition that we have no right in philosophy to make any assumption whatever, and that we ought to begin with a universal doubt, Cardinal Newman says: "This, however, is, of all assumptions, the greatest, and to forbid them is to forbid it. Doubt itself is a positive state, and implies a definite habit of mind, and thereby necessarily involves a system of principles and doctrines of its own. Again, if nothing is to be assumed, what is our very method of reasoning but an assumption? And what our nature itself? The very sense of pleasure and pain which is one of the most intimate portions of ourselves, inevitably translates itself into intellectual assumptions. Of the two, I would rather have to maintain that we ought to begin with believing everything that is offered to our acceptance than that it is our duty to doubt of everything. This, indeed, seems the true way of learning. In that case, we soon discover and discard what is contradictory and error, having always some portion of truth in it, and the truth having a reality which error has not, we may expect that, when there is an honest purpose and fair talents, we shall somehow make our way forward, the error falling off from the mind, and the truth developing and occupying it" (*Grammar of Assent*, p. 376).

not that the convictions of the former have been reconstructed on a basis of doubt, while those of the latter have never wavered. What education gives is merely this—the power to bring to light and to demonstrate by scientific method the evidence for those great verities, religious and moral, which the mass of men hold as true *immediately;* not, indeed, without sufficient motive, but prior to any reflective process. "Certainty," Balmes truly says, "does not originate in reflection; it is the spontaneous product of man's nature, and is annexed to the direct act of the intellectual and sensitive faculties. . . . He who created all things out of nothing has provided them with all that is necessary for the exercise of their respective faculties, and one of the first necessities of an intelligent being is certainty of some truths. . . . Philosophy simply examines the grounds of certainty in order, solely, to know more thoroughly the human mind, without changing anything in practice. Just as astronomers observe the orbits of the stars, and determine the laws they obey, without therefore presuming to modify them. If, on the contrary, philosophers were only to accept what can be absolutely proved, and refused to admit all that is as yet incapable of demonstration, certainty would be unattainable. For those first principles which are the basis of all evidence are themselves incapable of proof." [1]

Certainty prior to proof.

[1] *Fundamental Philosophy*, I. ch. 3. This explains why the great philosophers, alike Pagan and Christian, Aristotle, St. Augustine, and St. Thomas, used in only a restricted sense Descartes' axiom, "Cogito ergo sum." St. Augustine especially (*Civit. Dei.*, II. 26; *Soliloq.*,

All sound reasoning depends, then, not on doubt, but on certainty as its basis; that is, the certitude of its first principles. And just as the attempt of Hermes to build a system of theology on the groundwork of doubt proved an absolute failure, so the *à priori* application of doubt to rational truths ends only in scepticism. "The theory," says Kühn, "that the mind must proceed from doubt to truth and certainty is unsound, repugnant to the nature of the intellect, and arbitrarily frustrates the craving for truth. The results are Idealism and Pantheism, partial truth, imperfect in itself, and known only to a learned few; not the whole truth itself, or that which is accepted as true because so attested by the convictions of mankind. Either truth is certain in itself, and objectively true to me, or it is the purely subjective product of my own mind, dependent for its certainty solely on my own consciousness."[1] But to resume our theme.

"Scientific doubt" irrational.

The first subject of our youth's investigation will probably be religion, and the teaching he has received therefrom. The field is large, for Christianity includes the principles of all true metaphysics, a com-

II. 1), and St. Thomas (I. xix. a. 2) repeatedly declare the incontestable certainty of the primitive fact of self-consciousness. "Nullius potest cogitare, se non esse cum assensu," he says (*De Ver.*, 2 I. Art. 9, and Art. 12 *ad* 7), "in hoc enim, quod cogitat, percipit se esse." But they rightly employ it as a relative, not an absolute thesis, and as an argument with sceptics. The truth of Descartes' axiom depends upon the truth and certainty of our intellectual operations, without which no logic, and therefore no conclusion, no "cogito ergo sum," is possible.

[1] Kühn, *Dogmatik*, II. 296.

plete system of ethics, and the history of man from his beginning. The youth starts without, perhaps, any aversion to religion, simply, as he says, to remove doubt, and to build up anew his faith. And he expects religion to solve for him at once every problem of science and unveil the wonders of Creation.

But he is disappointed. Universal knowledge, the Church replies, is not attainable by the slow steps of logic, nor by any creature, still less by man, who, embedded in matter, is the lowest of intellectual beings.[1] The perfect comprehension of all things is proper to God alone, who sees all at once and in Himself. Man must wait, then, for the vision of the Eternal to obtain the clear sight of truth. The purpose of religion, moreover, is not primarily to instruct man in natural science, but to teach him by faith mysteries concerning God and things divine. Now, mystery to the man of mature thought is both the natural limitation of the human intellect and the authentic seal of a divine religion, an impress of an infinite Intelligence, which men may worship but can never sound. A well-trained mind knows, further, that, as the Divine Wisdom proportions means to their end, a revelation from on high is not given in vain. Its purpose, therefore, must be to disclose, not what we could naturally see or understand, but, on the contrary, what is

Mysteries undemonstrable, but reasonably credible.

[1] "The perfection of the universe required that there should be diverse grades in things. But, according to the order of nature, human souls are undoubtedly the lowest among intellectual substances" (S. I., q. 89, a. 1).

beyond our comprehension. To a shallow inquirer, however, all that is beyond reason is at once contrary thereto. The incomprehensible is necessarily impossible, and our youth rejects as unworthy of his intelligence the mysteries proposed to him. This temptation is the more subtle because it enlists in antagonism to the faith man's best and noblest craving—his thirst for truth.

St. Augustine, in his youth, was vanquished by this snare. "You know," he says in his letter to Honoratus, "that we surrendered ourselves to these people (the Manichees) for no other reason than this, that they proclaimed their emancipation from the heavy yoke of faith, and promised to lead their followers to God, and to deliver them from every error by the way of science alone. What else induced me to despise the religion implanted in my heart from my earliest childhood by my parents, and to hear and follow these people with ardour? Naught but their teaching, that we are frightened by superstition, and that faith is demanded of us before our reason is enlightened; whilst they demanded faith of no one, but began by discussing and reasoning out the truth. Was it wonderful that the heart, especially of a youth yearning after truth, should be captivated by such promises? Moreover, when I came across these people, who despised as nursery tales the truths of religion, I was already made proud and forward by the disputations in the schools of certain learned men, and burned with desire to see and

Plausibility of rationalism.

possess, unveiled and clear, the truth they promised me."[1]

Nor must we forget the influence of prevailing theories on the mind of a youth. "The education of classic times," says Montesquieu,[2] "had one great advantage over ours—it never contradicted itself. Epaminondas, in his later days, spoke, heard, saw, and did the same things as at the commencement of his education. But in the present day we receive three different and conflicting educations—from our parents, our teachers, and the world, which last upsets all previous ideas." The higher instruction of a boy is now usually limited to those branches of knowledge which will best qualify him to fill, as early as possible, a good position in life. Hence the preference given to the study of physical science, and the exclusion of all subjects which do not in some way serve that end. The result is, that for the deeper study of metaphysical truths, of the origin and end of all things, neither taste nor ability remain, and science, in its true and older sense, is no more. The consequences of this one-sided direction of education are thus admitted by a distinguished scientist. "The natural sciences," says Wagner,[3] "can never form the basis of true intellectual culture, nor satisfy the higher aspirations of the soul; consequently the people who make them their chief study become

Modern system of education.

Deteriorating effect of the exclusive study of natural science.

[1] *De Util. Credendi.*, C. I.

[2] *Esprit des Lois*, p. 206; *Edit. Firnim. Didot.*

[3] *Der Kampf um die Seele von Standpunkt der Wissenschaft; Göttingen*, 1857.

stunted alike in heart and intellect, and are imbued with a gross materialism, and worship only the golden calf. This fetichism, now so prevalent both in science and practical life, springs from the deification of matter and the eager pursuit of riches and ease." Men, indeed, whose only realities are reckoned by number, weight, and measure, have already adopted the principles of materialism both in theory and practice.

Superficially viewed, the experimental sciences wear, indeed, the garb of a philosophy very pleasing to human pride and self-sufficiency. The uniformity of the laws by which the world is governed, the facility with which they find expression in mathematical formulas, render physical science all-sufficient for the student who cares not to look beyond the surface. To him, all subjects incapable of mathematical or physical proof—time and eternity, free-will and justification—are unworthy of scientific attention, which is limited only to what is *positive*, that is, material and tangible. Thus he ceases to inquire at the very point where scientific reflection truly begins; where the uniformity of the law points to the existence of a lawgiver, and the fixed continuity of phenomena to some first cause. "But one in a thousand," says Lessing, "perseveres with reflective thought when the process becomes laborious." Many renounce faith for science, not because they go too far, but because they stop short in their search for truth. "Truth," says Hamann, "is not to be gauged by the facility with which it is grasped. There are facts of a higher order,

for which the elements of this world offer no point of comparison." The exclusive study, then, of the natural sciences obscures the mind, not because the inquirer seeks his own interests in opposition to the truth, but because he thus becomes absorbed in mere temporal interests, and forgets those higher aims in which man's earthly welfare is really identified; or, again, because he prefers his personal ends to those which, being universal, necessarily include his own.[1]

Balmes remarks:—"The refusal to admit any fact because it is extraordinary is no sure sign of the philosophic mind. To the theist who admits the fact of creation, revelation should present no logical difficulty. That the God who made man should speak to him has nothing in it extraordinary. The second miracle is but a sequel to the first. Nor does the negation of the sceptic exclude what is extraordinary. If man were not created, whence was he? How was the human race propagated, or man's mind developed? Natural selection, proceeding from the lowest grades of living organisms, by reptiles or aquatic monsters, and again through apes, to a Newton, Bossuet, Leibnitz, is most extraordinary, and simply without a parallel. Whatever theory we adopt, the origin of the world, and the laws which govern it, are enshrouded in mystery."[2] And if from earth we lift our eyes above, the same truths meet us. Gaze upwards at

Mysteries unsolved by scepticism.

[1] Fechner, *Die drei Motive und Gründe des Glaubens*, p. 113, 1863.
[2] Balmes' Letter to a Doubter.

the starlit heavens; tell the countless ages through which those stars have shone; measure the boundless space in which, with unceasing regularity, the planets describe their orbits; say what unknown systems lie beyond them, hidden to sight, and then realise your own insignificance. Viewed only by reason, your very individuality seems lost, when measured by the universe. How irrational, then, is any system of thought which rejects all that transcends our reason! "Show me a system," said Rousseau, "which is without mystery." [1]

A false idea of progress.

Further, our young man hears unceasingly the demand for constant and universal progress.[2] This cry, though just and legitimate in itself, is often used, on the pretext of social, civil, or religious

[1] Rousseau, *Lettre à M.*

[2] In the first centuries Vincent of Lerins had already gauged and described, in the following eloquent words, the conditions and nature of true progress:—"Is there, then, to be no progress in the Church of God? God forbid! Only, it must be progress, not alteration in the faith. The idea of progress is *growth in identity*—alteration means a change from one thing to another. May the whole Church, and each one of the faithful, grow in wisdom and knowledge; not altering, but advancing in the same doctrine, mind, and faith. The doctrines of the divine philosophy of Christianity may be developed, defined, and perfected, but they cannot be altered, diminished, or mutilated without sin. They may, indeed, gain additional proof, light, and definiteness, but to do so they must retain their fulness, integrity, and essence." These words were adopted and confirmed by the Brief of Pope Pius IX., 17th March 1856, to the Bishops of Austria. *Cf.* also St. Thom. in I. *Ethic*, lib. ii., and S. II. ii. 2, i. *a.* 10; *Suarez de Fide*, Disp. II. sec. vi. 14. History testifies that to Christianity first and solely is due the freedom of the human race, for it is only among Christian nations that the idea of the freedom, dignity, and personal destiny of man is fully realised and carried into practice.

freedom, to cover an attack on every principle of faith. Can we wonder that, beset by so much prejudice, positive religion should become ever more discredited, or that a youth thus perplexed should cast it from him as a fable of his childhood, though the loss leave a life-long pain? Not a few, doubtless, pass safely through the fires of doubt, and now treasure their faith as a priceless jewel; but how many are perpetually tossed on the sea of scepticism, driven hither and thither by every wind of doctrine, without any definite knowledge of God, of themselves, or any fixed purpose in life? Again, there are many by nature good and noble, who have gone astray solely through misdirected study, and of these we need not despair. The angels in "Faust" sing:—

> "Whoever
> Strives forward with unswerving will,
> Him can we aye deliver."

And this but expresses the Church's teaching that grace never fails those who do what lies in their power.[1]

But, alas! faith is exposed to moral as well as intellectual temptation. Hatred of self-knowledge, shrinking from honest inquiry, the multiform distractions of life, the daily pressing routine of professional pursuits, indifference to higher things,—all these beget a mass of false ideas,

Moral causes of doubt.

[1] "Facienti quod in se est, Deus non denegat gratiam." This, of course, does not mean that any mere natural endeavour can merit a supernatural reward, but that God gives to all sufficient grace for faith and salvation, if man, on his part, place no impediment to the divine call (*Suar.*, P. I. lib. iv., cap. xii.–xv.).

prejudice, and a state of ignorance regarding higher truths which cannot be excused. Add to these the mental dissipation which follows so much modern reading. "Superficial culture," says a German writer,[1] "or a mere smattering of knowledge, to the neglect of all real study, is the more to be dreaded, now that the field of knowledge is so wide, and that so much more is expected from educated persons, for in the very attempt to master all subjects, nothing is thoroughly learnt. The ultimate product of this shallow learning is a contempt for all higher knowledge or loftier aims, with its unfailing companion, gross and unrestrained immorality." But not only the frivolous and superficial live solely for the present. The avowed aim of modern political economy, and of every scheme of popular education, is the material prosperity of the masses; how so to increase the enjoyments and lessen the miseries of life that each individual may spend his few short years in ease and comfort. Amid the strife of political parties these principles are common to all, though the Communist alone carries them to their logical development. Happiness, says a well-known Socialist, is the end of man; but he alone is happy who is able to satisfy his wants, and to convert this satisfaction into enjoyment. The measure of happiness, then, depends upon the measure of enjoyment,

Mental dissipation.

Love of material enjoyment.

[1] Beckers:—"Ueber das Bedürfniss einer zeitgemässen Regelung der allgemeinen Studien an Deutschlands Hoch-Schulen" (München, 1862).

and this, again, upon the multiplicity of wants. The more a man wants, the more he will be tempted to produce, and the more, again, will he spend on his enjoyments. This reciprocity is the root of all progress in natural life, and this theory has done more to uplift old Europe from its hinges than all the theories of the politicians of the Revolution."[1] Now, we have no thought of depreciating the value, in its proper place, of material science, or of the triumphs it has, in modern times, achieved. Dante says, with truth, that human art, which includes all industries and inventions, is "second in descent from God."[2] As nature expresses the divine exemplar, art, in turn, imitates nature. But natural science must be subordinate to man's spiritual life, as means to an end. "Riches are to virtue," says Bacon, "what baggage is to the army."[3] The Church, the State, and commerce form one scheme, and as divine works are ever ordered in harmony, its several parts can never be mutually opposed. That sound industrial progress and the healthy legitimate enjoyment of life are perfectly compatible with the highest spiritual aims was fully seen in the Middle Ages. There grew

Industries and arts in the Middle Ages.

[1] Radowitz, *Gesprache aus der Gegenwart in Staat und Kirche*, p. 125.

[2] *Hell*, xi. 103.

[3] St. Thomas would have the sovereign seek for riches, but not make the happiness of his people consist therein (*De Regim. Princip.*, ii. 7). Adam Smith, whatever the value of his writings under other aspects, was the first to treat economical questions entirely apart from morality. *Cf.* Schulze, *Lehrbuch der National-Oekonomie*, p. 185; Contzen, *Thomas von Aquin, als volkswrithschaftlicher Schriftsteller*, p. 14.

up then under the shadow of mighty cathedrals, those centres of commerce, each a very forest of towers and spires, of palaces, with whose magnificence the residences of no modern millionaires can compare. And all those marvels of mediæval art, of which only a few memorials remain, were not wrought by the toil of an overcrowded, destitute poor, as is now too often the case. On the contrary, Guicciardini, a trustworthy contemporary historian, relates that in Flanders, then at the height of its commercial splendour, the humblest, as well as the highest, shared in its prosperity. The great works thus achieved in the ages of faith, with most imperfect means, prove that Christianity, far from stifling, fosters that spirit of practical masculine enterprise which spurs man on to master the material world around him and make it minister to his will.[1] It is not, therefore, the legitimate but the exclusive pursuit of natural science which is prejudicial to faith. "By no means," says Lord Bacon, "do physical causes lead men from God. On the contrary, those very philosophers who are engaged in explaining them find they can only do so by referring all at last to Divine Providence.[2]

But, once more, earnest, laborious search is needed for the acquisition of truth. "Religion," says Pascal, "is so stupendous a reality, that those who will not take the trouble to study its obscu-

Indifferentism.

[1] *Cf.* Reichensperger, *Deutschlands nächste Aufgabe*, p. 73; Mascher, *Das deutsche Gewerbewesen*, 1866, p. 278.

[2] *De Augment. Scient.*

rities are justly deprived of its benefits.[1] As man must eat his bread by the sweat of his brow, so only can he obtain food for his soul. The wisest men of every age have insisted on this truth. Bacon, who coined the axiom, "Knowledge is power,"[2] says also, "It is an assured truth, and a conclusion of experience, that a little or superficial knowledge of philosophy may incline the mind of man to atheism; but a further proceeding therein doth bring the mind back again to religion, for in the entrance of philosophy, when the second causes, which are next unto the senses, do offer themselves to the mind, if it dwell and stay there it may induce some oblivion of the highest cause; but when a man passeth on farther and seeth the dependence of causes and the works of Providence, then, according to the allegory of the poets, he will easily believe that the highest link of nature's chain must needs be tied to the foot of Jupiter's chair."[3] Niebuhr confirms this truth as regards historic, and Meyer[4] as regards mechanical, science: both sciences, thoroughly studied, lead men to God.

If this be so, how do so many men lose their early faith? Have they tried to guard it by accurate learning, sober reflection, solid studies in philosophy and history, so that they may, as the Apostle says, *give a reason for*

[1] *Pensées sur la Religion*, P. 2, Art. 17.

[2] *Novum Organum*, Aphor. iii. "Scientia et potentia idem coinciduut."

[3] *Advancement in Learning*, i. 3.

[4] The discoverer of the theory of mechanical heat. *Vortrag auf der Versammlung Deutscher Naturforscher*, 1869.

the hope that is in them.[1] Have they, above all, a self-sacrificing love of truth? No; more numerous than we should imagine are those who have neither taste nor capacity for serious reading or thought, or earnestness of any kind. Yet, of these, not one, however shallow, ignorant, or slothful, but will declare, from the lofty vantage-ground of scientific impartiality, "that all religions are equally true, that religion consists in the fulfilment of our duty," and this without a thought of what truth and duty really mean. "And yet this very indifference," Manzoni truly says, "is by many regarded as a mark of learning and advanced culture, and as the most formidable enemy of religion, which it is finally to overthrow. But the truth is exactly the reverse. Indifference was the earliest enemy of Christianity. To the mass of mankind, from the first, the new religion was not worth a second thought. When the apostles proclaimed those doctrines which were to enlighten and satisfy the greatest intellects, and to civilise and transform the world, their hearers thought them "full of new wine."[2] Again, when, on the Areopagus, St. Paul taught the poorest woman a philosophy higher than that of any classic sage, the reply was, "We will hear thee again on this matter."[3] They believed, but other things claimed their attention of far more importance than God and

[1] 1 Peter iii. 18.

[2] "Others mocking said, These men are full of new wine" (Acts ii. 13).

[3] "Some indeed mocked, but others said, We will hear thee again on this matter" (Acts xvii. 32).

man, the soul and its salvation. So, too, Festus interrupted the same Apostle's message of redemption with the cry, "Paul, thou art beside thyself; much learning hath made thee mad."[1] Thus now, as at first, indifference confronts Christianity, for it was never promised that the Church should destroy all her enemies, but "that they should never prevail against her."[2] And so we find the Fathers, in every age, complaining of this callousness. Tertullian, in the third century, says, "We only ask not to be condemned unheard;"[3] and St. Cyril of Alexandria witnesses to the same temper of mind two hundred years later. "A crude and uncultured mind," he says, "glories in unbelief, and rejects as false all that it cannot understand; thus, the grossest ignorance goes hand in hand with boundless self-conceit."[4]

A third cause of religious doubt is the passions, however specious may be their disguise. We do not mean by this that faith is given only to those in whom the flesh is perfectly subjugated to the spirit—that complete dominion follows and does not precede possession of the truth. "It is the truth which shall make you free."[5] But though not yet free from the slavery of the lower appetites, the soul which would find the truth must desire earnestly this

The Passions.

[1] "And Paul said, I am not mad, most excellent Festus, but I speak the words of truth and soberness" (Acts xxvi. 24, 25).

[2] *Osservazione sulla morale Cattolica*, Prato, 1841.

[3] "Hoc unum gestit, ne ignorata damnetur" (*Apol.* i.).

[4] In *Joan*, vi. 53.

[5] John viii. 32.

freedom, and strive to obtain it. The whole man, body and soul, must work for that one end. "The truth of God is not to be detained in injustice."[1] "Every one that doeth evil hateth the light, and cometh not to the light, that his works may not be reproved."[2] It was at the thought of justice, chastity, and judgment to come that Felix hesitated and dismissed the Apostle for a more convenient season.[3] Even those who have once possessed the truth may, St. Paul tells us, by the loss of a good conscience, make shipwreck concerning the faith.[4] "And this is a just saying," is the comment of St. Chrysostom, "that life and doctrine should correspond. Hence many have even fallen back into idolatry. For they strive, at all costs, to convince themselves that what religion teaches is false, lest they should be condemned by fear of the future."[5] If, then, we would seek the cause of ancient Paganism, with its monstrous idolatries and cruelties, or of modern incredulity in any form, we find the same principle too often holds good. *Intellectual errors result from moral defects.* Nor is it difficult to see why this is. The soul of man is one and indivisible, and the intellect and will are but diverse faculties of this one indivisible soul. By reason, then, of the living personal unity from which they spring, they mutually interpenetrate and complete each

Moral defects and intellectual error.

Influence of the will on the reason.

[1] Rom. i. 18. [2] John iii. 20.
[3] Acts xxiv. 25. [4] 1 Tim. i. 19.
[5] Hom. v. 1, *in Epist.* 1 *ad Timoth.*

other. As one speck of dust obscures the sight, so one disordered affection will influence and pervert the judgment. And this the more powerfully because its action is so often unperceived. A modern writer truly observes: "In all human science and knowledge the will is the immediate and principal agent. For it is the will which finally determines the intelligence, and which, by its own power, can reject any conclusion, whether necessary or deduced. If I *will* not to understand, not to accept a self-evident truth, nor to recognise my own individual well-being and nature as measured by this standard, I shall end by understanding nothing."[1]

Of this power of prejudice to warp the judgment, Hobbes had before remarked,[2] that if men had any interests at stake, they would doubt and deny the axioms of Euclid. Or as another writer puts it: "If the proposition that the three angles of a triangle equalled two right angles involved any moral obligation, its truth would soon be called in question."[3]

It matters not, then, that the Christian religion corresponds to the primary dictates of our conscience,

[1] Ulrici, *Grundprincip der Philosophie*, i. 73.

[2] *Système de la Nature*, i. 4.

[3] De Bonald, *Démonstration Philosophique*. So, too, Lord Bacon: "The human intellect is not a dry light, but receives a tincture from the will and the affections; hence it generates knowledge according to its wishes, for what a man would rather was true, that he more easily believes" (*Novum Organum*, i. 49).

> "As the man is, so is his God;
> Therefore is God so often mocked"
>
> (Goethe, *Zahme Xenien*, iv.).

that it alone satisfies every need of our nature, or that its divine origin rests on evidence more certain than that of any historic fact.[1] All this fails to persuade a perverse will.[2]

Doubt and faith incompatible.

It must be remembered that in all questions, whether of theory or practice, it is far easier to raise difficulties than to solve them. When a man has once deliberately entertained a doubt, however often his present objections be met, others will immediately arise. In the case of faith, the sceptic, by his voluntary doubt, has already accepted a brief against revelation.[3] And he will always attach more weight to his own arguments than

[1] "Do you venture to assert that the Gospel history is an invention? It has nothing of that character. The inventor would be more wonderful than the hero himself. There is less evidence for the history of Socrates, of which no one doubts, than for that of Jesus Christ" (Rousseau, *Emile*, iv.).

[2] Hence St. Thomas says that the will, as agent, moves all the faculties of the soul to their respective acts; and that, thus, if the will be considered in relation to its object, the good, taken generally (*in communi*), and the intellect as a special faculty, with its act and object the truth, as a special good; then, thus considered, the will is higher than the intellect, and can move it" (S. I. 9. lxxxiv. *a.* 2).

[3] ["And so, again, when a man has become a Catholic, were he to set about following out a doubt which has occurred to him, he has already disbelieved. I have not to warn him against losing his faith; he is not merely in danger of losing it, he has lost it; he fell from grace at the moment when he deliberately entertained and pursued his doubt. No one can determine to doubt what he is sure of; but if he is not sure that the Church is from God, he does not believe it. It is not I who forbid him to doubt; he has taken the matter into his own hands when he determined on asking for leave; he has begun, not ended, in unbelief; his very wish, his purpose, is his sin. I do not make it so; it is such from the very state of the case"] (Newman, *Discourses to Mixed Congregations*, sixth edition).

to those of his opponent, simply because they are his own. He is defending his own reasonings. He has weighed them more attentively, and values them most. Facts in detail, which are incontestable, he admits, but his preconception, like a concave mirror, distorts his view of the whole. Thus the doubter will admit the genesis of Christianity, but he will deny the doctrines it teaches; and as these are not, like a proposition of Euclid, capable of mathematical demonstration, he can always, if so willed, withhold his assent. Nor, again, in this matter of religion, is any one free from bias. The cry, so often repeated, that the evidences of Christianity are to be examined with absolute impartiality has no real sense. The teaching of faith embraces and penetrates man's whole being, and gives a new and determined bent to his future life. Such a subject can never be treated with *complete indifference*.

Impartiality in religion impossible.

As a witness to this important truth, we will quote Strauss, who, be it remembered, based his qualification as a critic of the Gospels especially on his impartiality. In his *Leben Jesu* he says:[1] "In writing the annals of the rulers of ancient Ninive, or of the Pharaos of Egypt, we have a purely historic interest, but Christianity is a living power, and the question of its origin is so intimately bound up with our actual interests that a man must be devoid of sense who regards it as a mere matter of history." Again, Dr. Döllinger tells us how some historians, from mere

[1] 1864, p. 13.

prejudice, impute motives and pervert facts; while others, from their moral sense alone, see through these misrepresentations and clearly discern the truth. "This," he continues, "shows that all knowledge must be based on morals, or, at least, has its moral side; otherwise, even in the discernment of good and evil, intellectual persons would have an unfair advantage over the unlearned and poor. But this is not so; for, by a law as wise as it is just, man cannot grasp with his intellect truths which his heart rejects, since, in hardening his will, he hardens also his understanding against the truth."[1] Hence is confirmed the teaching of St. Augustine[2] and of Suarez, that "*all error is, in a certain sense, founded on sin.*"[3] "It is certain," says Döllinger again, "that, in its moral aspect, error is not something involuntary, nor an accident, nor a necessity, but a *personal choice* and act, and which, even when derived from others, still remains the free product of our individual mind and will. The immediate cause of error is, indeed, in the darkening of the understanding, but its root lies in corruption of the will and its revolt from God. For we repeat, to make it

[1] *Irrthum, Zweifel, Wahrheit, eine Rede*, p. 33. Munich, 1845.

[2] "As to the source of deceit, the objects themselves do not deceive us, for they only present to the senses that appearance which each bears according to its appointed degree of fairness; neither do the senses deceive us, for they merely make known to the mind, which rules within, those impressions which the bodily dispositions of each have enabled them to receive. No; sin alone deceives the soul when, after deserting and despising the truth, it seeks to find what is true" (*De Vera Religione*, c. xxxv.).

[3] Suarez, *Metaphys.*, Disp. ix. sect. 2.

quite clear, the source of error is not ignorance but self-deceit, that deceit which leads us to imagine that we can judge of things of which we know either little or nothing, and generally to form our decisions on insufficient grounds."[1]

Truth, then, being the object of the intellect, and certainty the normal state of the soul, doubt can only be a transitory condition, and should urge man to attain to that certainty for which he naturally craves. As regards the Christian faith, its proofs are evidently credible, and within the grasp of all.[2] Therefore the man who remains voluntarily in a state of doubt in this matter does an outrage to his rational nature. Hence the proposition is condemned that "an infidel refusing to believe is not to be held guilty of infidelity if he follow a somewhat probable opinion." Such a state of mind is wrong, because a man, in a matter of such importance, is bound to be certain.[3] Hence, again, one who has faith is bound not

A habit of doubt immoral.

[1] Döllinger, *ad loc. cit.*, p. 21. "The will," he continues, "is always the root of all the errors of the intellect. When a man judges of that he does not know he deceives himself; this ignorance is voluntary, and therefore sinful, since it is the result of sloth, carelessness, and indifference to the truth. But the perverse will is also guilty when a man stifles the pure ideas which things present to him, that is, as they really are, and follows the false illusions of the senses or imagination. The chief sources of our errors are, then, to be found in the will. Indeed, we never discover the moral character of an error until we have overcome and rejected it; then its connection with our inclinations and faults is plain."

[2] "Christianity rests on most certain proofs, and suited to the intelligence of all" (*Vat. Concil. de Fide.*, iii., of the evidences of Christianity).

[3] "Ab infidelitate excusabitur infidelis non credens, ductus opinione

to admit a doubt, because doubt is incompatible with the certainty which faith demands, and which man is naturally and morally bound to obtain.[1] Even Goethe saw this, for he says,[2] "It is impossible to remain tranquilly in a state of doubt; for doubt itself spurs the mind to more energetic inquiry, to deeper and more complete examination of the subject, till in the end certitude is obtained, the true goal of the soul, in which man finds perfect rest." Many, of course, must pass through a state of doubt or negation before they reach the truth; the moral guilt begins with the voluntary acquiescence in that state, and the deliberate preference of the ease and pleasures of life to the earnest search for truth. Without presuming to judge any individual case, there are only two alternatives: a man either desires to know the truth, or he dreads to do so. In proportion to his moral declension, he hates the truth, which condemns him, and strives to silence its reproaches. But he who fears not its voice receives with its

Earnest inquiry finds truth.

minus probabili" (Prop. 4). [A "less probable" opinion is one which has a true and solid probability, but is of less weight than the opposite opinion. It must not, however, be concluded from this that a more probable opinion is a sufficient motive for an assent of faith. In a matter of such gravity, as is said in the text, the inquirer is bound to proceed till certainty be attained.]

[1] "Assensus fidei supernaturalis et utilis ad salutem stat cum notitia solum probabili revelationis, imo cum formidine, qua quis formidet, ne non sit locutus Deus" (Prop. 21). These propositions were condemned by Innocent XI., May 2, 1679. On the evident credibility of the mysteries of faith, *cf.* Suarez, Tom. ix., Tract i., Disp. iv. sect. 3.

[2] Eckerman's *Gespräche*, i. p. 350.

accents light from above, and advances with rapid, unwearying step, till he attain to truth complete.

Why did the Greek philosophy attain, under Socrates, so high a position? Why did that science, which, before his time and with his contemporaries the Sophists, served only for an intellectual pastime or rhetorical display, acquire with him suddenly reality and force? Because in all his speculations he never lost sight of the moral element. His ideal and his aim were a higher morality, the practice of virtue in daily life. "Socrates," says Cicero,[1] "first called down wisdom from heaven, established it in the cities, and introduced it even into private houses. He, further, began the inquiry as to life and manners, and as to things good and evil."[2] For the attainment of Christian truth and of faith in revelation this inward purity is above all necessary, and the words of Rousseau have their full meaning: "My son, so keep thy soul that thou mayest always desire there be a God, and thou wilt never doubt His existence."

But the return of the soul to faith and truth is the work, not of man, but of God. His grace sweetly but irresistibly overcomes the rebellious soul, "makes known what was hidden, and pleasant what did not please." "This," continues St. Augustine, "is the light which enlightens our darkness, and the sweetness by which our land bears

But grace needed.

[1] *Tuscul.*, v. 4.

[2] Cf. Aristot., *Metaph.*, i. 6; Schwegler, *Geschichte der Griechischen Philosophie.*

fruit."[1] Every conversion is a new birth, which needs indeed the co-operation of man, but is begun and completed by God.[2] How else can be explained the miraculous conversions which have continued from that of Saul the persecutor down to the present time? But grace works by external guidance, as well as by interior inspiration. In the world's history are seen the three horsemen of the Apocalypse, on the red, white, and pale-coloured steeds—war, famine, and pestilence; and in the life of individuals are found three corresponding scourges—sorrow, oppression, and suffering. Now, the sorrow, which under Divine guidance leads to the truth, springs from disappointment with the world, its vanities and falsehoods, and from the void

It comes with sorrow and trial.

[1] St. Aug.: "Ut innotescat, quod latebat, et suave fiat quod non delectabat" (*De Peccatorum Meritis*, I. ii. xvii.). "Lux qua illuminantur tenebræ, et suavitas, qua dat fructum suum terra nostra" (*Ibid.*, cap. xix.).

[2] "If any one say that, without the prevenient inspiration and aid of the Holy Spirit, man can believe, hope, love, or repent, as he ought, . . . let him be anathema" (*Concil. Trent.*, Sess. vi. Can. 2). "Has the Church," says St. Augustine, "ever ceased to pray that her enemies and infidels might have the gift of faith? But if she asked this of God, believing it to be in her gift, her prayers would be, not sincere, but perfunctory, which God forbid. For who could sincerely implore and desire to receive from God, what he believed he could obtain for himself, without God?" (*De Dono Persev*, c. xxiii.). The Council of Trent teaches also thus expressly the co-operation of man in the work of faith and justification: "If any one say that the free-will of man, being moved by God, in no way co-operates by its assent to hear God's impulse and calls, by which man disposes and prepares himself to obtain the grace of justification, and that he cannot, if he would, refuse this grace, but that, like a mere lifeless thing, he does nothing whatever, and remains purely passive, . . . let him be anathema" (Sess. vi. Can. 4).

they leave. The oppression of a troubled conscience, and the galling tyranny of a sinful habit make man cry for grace and pardon. The suffering unto God is found in that home-sickness, that feeling of loneliness and desertion, which prompts the soul even amid every worldly pleasure to thirst for some Heart to which it can sacrifice itself entirely, and therein find rest.

To sum up—we have assigned as three causes of doubt, a false idea of the nature and object of science; secondly, indifference; and thirdly, the passions. We have treated them separately, but in actual life they often combine, and then the wound they cause is deeper and the conflict more severe. It is easy to doubt; to do so needs not argument; a simple "no" suffices. It is tempting thus to assume a show of learning, or to make a smart hit. "I have known men of the Revolution," says De Tocqueville, "who strove to make amends for their servility to the lowest official by their blasphemy against God."[1] All this may do well enough in the days of youth or health, but how is it as life declines? "When we think of what is obtained in exchange for the wisdom of Christ, we are reminded of the king who, Sancho Panza tells us, sold his kingdom for a flock of geese."[2] "Gebt mir grosse Gedanken"—"Give me great thoughts," said the dying Herder. In that hour when our very being is undone faith and certainty can alone give the strength we need. Of all systems Christianity alone

Faith alone sustains in death.

[1] *L'Ancien Régime de la Revolution.*

[2] Schelling, *Vorrede zu Steffens nachgelassenen Schriften.*

offers that certainty, and in the sorrows of life "alone has taught men to wipe away a tear." [1] To the doubter of to-day, then, we would say, in the words of Plato: "Neither you nor your companions are the first who have entertained ideas such as yours about the Deity. In every age there have been those, whether few or many, who have suffered from the same malady as yourselves. And since I have had dealings with many such, I can safely assure you that I never knew any one who, though he denied the Deity in his youth, persevered in this denial in old age. What may be the true doctrine, if you have patience and take time, you will discover; meanwhile, do not presume to blaspheme the gods." [2]

[1] Montalembert, *Vie de Ste. Elizabeth de Hongrie.*
[2] *De Legg.*, x. p. 888.

CHAPTER II.

THE THREE ORDERS OF TRUTH.[1]

In the preceding chapter we have considered the cause of that habit of doubt which, in every age and under the most varied forms, has opposed Christian truth. We have further seen that though doubt is in itself but a mental defect, and of no scientific importance, yet that its influence is great, both as flattering the vanity of little minds, and offering an escape from the labour of serious thought and a specious justification for a self-indulgent life. We now propose to investigate more closely the great questions of truth and certainty. As the very nature of the mind proves the possibility of its attaining certainty in the three orders of truth, viz., sensible, intellectual, and religious knowledge, so the mind can, by its nature, equally reject the three corresponding forms of doubt, viz., scepticism, materialism, and rationalism.

That our desire for knowledge is innate and irresistible was taught by Aristotle of old, and is practically confirmed by each individual experience. It is, indeed, the intellect which is divine in man.[1]

[1] Plato, *De Republica*, x. p. 611.

As the material sun enlightens us without, so God, the intellectual Sun, illumines us within, since the innate light of reason is an illumination from God Himself.[1] Now, the intellect, like every other faculty, has its corresponding object, for which it has been created, and in which alone it can find its perfection and rest. The object, then, which actuates, feeds, and sustains the intellect, which alone can satisfy its needs, is truth. The bread of the spirit is truth, and while a lie kills the soul,[2] truth is its life, its strength, and its peace.

Truth object of the intellect.

What, then, is truth, and what is true? "I will give my definition," says St. Augustine, "and I have no fear of its being rejected for its brevity: 'Verum mihi videtur esse id quod est'—'Truth seems to me to be that which is.'"[3] "Falseness," he says again, "begins when that which is not is believed to be."[4] Therefore, so long and so surely as a thing is, it is true. Can the mind, then, find the truth? Can it know what is? Or is its thirst never to be quenched? Man was created for the truth, and seeks its light. He loves it better than the body in which he dwells, better, indeed, than life itself.[5] The flowers absorb the sunbeam, the eye drinks in the light: man alone, some say, must live in darkness, and know no break of day. True, then, the old world poet's words:—

Misery of scepticism.

[1] S. I., II., Qu. cix. Art. 1. [2] Wisdom, i. 11. [3] *Soliloq.*, ii. 8.

[4] *De Vera Religione*, c. xxxvi.: "Cui illud manifestum est, falsitatem esse, qua id putatur esse, quod non est."

[5] St. Augustine, *De Mendac.*, c. vii.

"Wretched mortal! For of all that breathe
And walk upon the earth, or creep, is naught
More wretched than th' unhappy race of man."[1]

True, too, the despairing accents of the Roman sceptic:[2] "Man is a being full of contradictions, and the most unfortunate. Other creatures know no wants beyond their assigned limits. Man's needs and desires are unsatiable. His very nature is a lie, the deepest misery joined to the loftiest pretensions. Amid so many and so great evils, the power of self-destruction is his best gift." It was the thought that nothing could be known which burnt into the heart of Faust;[3] and he only echoes the words of Seneca, who says, "Unless I could attain to a knowledge of truth, it were not worth being born. For why should I rejoice in being numbered among the living, if my only aim be to stuff this decaying, languishing, and miserable body, and my only end in life to serve an invalid?"[4]

Never generally accepted.

Hence scepticism, or the doctrine of absolute universal doubt, has ever been repudiated by mankind as a whole. And it is in the universal conscience of mankind that we see what the human mind really thinks.[5] When it has found a partial acceptance, as during the decline of Greece,

[1] Homer's *Iliad*, xvii. 446; translated by Earl of Derby. Cf. *Odyss.*, xviii. 130.

[2] Plinius, *Hist. Natur.*, ii. 7.

[3] "Das wir nichts wissen können
Das will mir schier das Herz verbrennen."

[4] *Quæst. Natur. Præf.*

[5] What is commonly affirmed by all cannot possibly be entirely false,

or when the Roman Empire was falling to pieces of its own corruption, scepticism has been a symptom of political decay, internal weakness,[1] or an inevitable reaction against Pantheistic doctrines, such as that which marked the commencement of the present century. For both in theory and practice scepticism is necessarily self-destructive. In theory, since it both affirms that ideas are determined by external impressions, and, at the same time, questions the existence of the objects which produce those impressions, and correspond to them. As to practice, no sceptics, however bold in theory, ever put their principles to actual test. Hume, who doubted the existence of external objects, writes as follows:—"A Stoic or Epicurean displays[2] principles which may not only be durable, but which have an effect on conduct and behaviour. But a Pyrrhonian (or sceptic) cannot expect that his philosophy will have any constant influence on the mind, or, if it had, that its influence would be beneficial to society. On the contrary, he must acknowledge, if he acknow-

Absolutely impracticable.

for a false opinion is a certain infirmity of the intellect. But an infirmity is an accidental quality (*per accidens est*), and cannot possibly be always and in all (St. Thom. Aq., *Contra Gentes*, ii. 34). Thus Catholicity, the "quod semper, quod ubique, quod in omnibus creditum est" of St. Vincent Lerins, is the criterion of truth in the sphere of reason, as of revelation.

[1] *Cf.* Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen.*

[2] Pyrrhus, one of the earliest sceptics, excused himself for running away from a mad dog by saying, "It is difficult utterly to renounce one's human nature" (Cf. *Diogen. Laert.*, xi. 66). ["Berkeley and I," said Hume, "both deny existence of bodies, but we eat our dinners like other people."]

ledges anything, that all human life must perish were his principles universally and steadily to prevail. All discourse, all action, would immediately cease, and remain in a total lethargy, till the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their miserable existence. It is true so fatal an error is very little to be dreaded. Nature is always too strong for principle, and though a Pyrrhonian may throw himself and others into momentary amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings, the first and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same in every point of action and speculation, with the philosophers of every other sect, or with those who never concerned themselves in any philosophical researches." [1]

Claim to omniscience a cause of scepticism.

One cause of the evil, and one which, to a certain extent, has justified its spread, has been that exaggerated dogmatism which, with equal falseness, lays claim to universal knowledge. The man who would know everything ends by knowing nothing. As the heights of knowledge are beyond his powers, he despairs of attaining even what is within his reach. Both extremes are alike false—that man knows nothing, or that he knows all. He can attain to knowledge which is positive and certain, for "what would an understanding be which understood naught?" [2] But his knowledge is finite and conditional, and, like the intellect itself, necessarily

[1] Hume, *Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, Sect. xii. p. 2.
[2] Jacobi.

limited in all its operations. Knowledge is perfect when the object known is fully and completely presented to the knowing mind, so that no portion of it remains hid. The idea of the object then adequately corresponds to the object itself. Thus we know just so far as we can distinguish what is true from what is false, and no further. But this power of discrimination depends again upon the action of external objects, and the impressions they produce. This limit may be extended, but never broken through. The mind itself is conscious of this. The highest and the lowest —God and the atom—are alike beyond the comprehension of the most penetrating intellect, because in each is that which is never presented to the sense or intelligence. "These questions," says Humboldt, "about the mysterious operations of nature or the primal creative action can never be solved. They lie in regions beyond our reach. Such researches are like those theories about the moon, three-sevenths of whose surface are, and must remain, entirely hidden from us, unless some hitherto unknown means of investigation bring them to sight." [1]

And yet, though man's knowledge is thus limited, how great is its extent! A mere speck upon the earth's surface, he now weighs this terrestrial sphere, and measures its height, its breadth, and depth. Astronomy classifies the stars which revolve in space — calculates their orbits, and subjects to its formulas the mechanism of the heavens. Geology

[1] Humboldt, *Cosmos*, i. p. 164.

descends into the bowels of the earth, and penetrates into the mysteries of its origin and formation. Natural Philosophy determines the laws which govern the movements and changes of the material world. Chemistry shows the elements by whose combination or separation bodies either exist or disappear, fixes with mathematical precision their constituent parts, and creates a microcosm in the laboratory of art.[1] Physiology reveals the formative process of organism, and the continuity of their fundamental types, from the lowest up to the highest, that of the human body. The application and connection of the natural sciences, and in particular by recent discoveries in chemistry, physics, and anatomy, have opened a new era to medicine. Owing to this rapid development of experimental science, the powers of nature have become in a marvellous way the servants of man, who has appropriated their treasures, and subjected half the world's area to his sway. Though his life passes like a shadow, his glance embraces all time. The pages of history reveal to him the whole course of the human race, marshal before his eyes the people of buried ages, and recall to life the old world cities of the dead. Comparative philology gives him an insight into the structure of language, and by showing the wonderful relations existing between its various families, discovers for him in one common root the mother-tongue of man. Guided by these affinities, he traces the pedigree and

Extent of natural science limited.

[1] Humphrey Davy, *Last Days of a Philosopher.*

kinship of the nations of the earth, follows their migrations from the remotest East to the shores of the Mediterranean, and anticipates their subsequent fate.

Such are some of the marvellous results of experimental science. And yet man is not satisfied. Science reveals to him only what space and time discover, and of them he knows only part. But were the world revealed with all it contains to him, his knowledge would be still unsatisfied. He asks not only what exists, but how. He would learn the first principles and the cause of things; if there be aught imperishable, eternal, necessarily true, what may be the purpose of all things, and above all, of himself. Who knows this can alone, says the sage,[1] call himself, with truth, a learned man. Thus Plato[2] compares sense-knowledge to the impression produced by objects seen only in shadow, and that obscurely; intellectual knowledge to the sight of those same objects viewed in themselves, and by the clear light of day. And to obtain this intellectual knowledge man must look within. He must, as the Delphic motto ran, "know himself;" or as St. Augustine puts it more completely: "To learn the truth he must go, not abroad, but re-enter into himself, where truth resides."[3] Here, within himself, he finds a second and a higher world—the world of the spirit, the realm of

Therefore insufficient, as not giving first principles, which are fixed by the intellect in itself.

[1] Aristotle, *Anal. Post.*, ii. 11.
[2] *De Republica*, vii. p. 514.
[3] *De Vera Relig.*, c. xxxix.

thought. Compared to that vast kingdom, this visible world is but a small fraction; for, as has been said by teachers old and new: "One thought of the thinking mind is greater than all besides."[1]

Thus the examination of the material world and its forces leads us to investigate the mind itself, the nature of its operations, and the laws which govern them. And these laws are certain of themselves, and their certainty is attested not by mere feeling, nor "by an act of faith of the reason,"[2] but by their own immediate evidence. That they are undemonstrable is the effect not of deficient but of superabundant light. It is the result of their manifest clearness and certainty. Hence Aristotle said[3] that the desire to prove first principles showed a want of philosophic training. Reason did not frame these laws, but is so absolutely subject to them in all its operations that the least departure therefrom at once produces error. The mind, in fact, is no more free from the laws of reason than the body from those of health. The thesis that absolute freedom of thought can coexist with actual objective truth is a contradiction in terms. How can

Hence physical science leads man to metaphysical.

[1] "All corporeal substances, the firmament, the earth, and the kingdoms thereof, equal not the value of the least spiritual being; for the spirit knows all these other things and itself as well, while bodies know nothing" (Pascal, *Pensées*, ii., Art. 10). Hegel repeats this thought which Aristotle had long since uttered. So St. Thomas: "Every bodily creature, however immense, must be inferior to man, by reason of his intellect" (ii. Dist. 1. Qu. ii. Art. 3).

[2] Thus Jacobi, Works, vol. ii. pp. 20–59, vol. iii. pp. 32–35.

[3] *Metaphysics*, iv. 4.

truth exist objectively and independently of the mind, and the mind itself be free to think what it will of that truth? Man is indeed free to think or not to think, and so far he is subject to no compulsion. But if he does think, he is not free either as to the matter or manner of his thought.[1] For it is the evidence, the innate necessity to think this and not that, which constitutes the ultimate guarantee of truth, and which determines his mental conception, as necessarily as the visible object does the action of his sight. Arbitrary selection in thought, beyond and contrary to the laws of the mind, is simply voluntary error, a deliberate wilful trespass, the result of momentary caprice, or of the sophistry of passion. The reign of law is universal, and just as the harmony, the cosmos, of the visible world results from its unvarying obedience in its every part to the laws which govern it, so is it with the world of spirit. By conformity to law alone can the intellect attain to its perfection, which is beatitude through the truth. Outside this kingdom of law are found naught but falsehood, error, and delusion.

Laws of thought fixed, certain, though undemonstrable.

Absolute liberty of thought absurd.

Now, when the mind looks in upon itself what does it discover? According to some, the mind is an absolute void. Thought is but a purely passive effect, a mere copy of sensible impressions, or the product of

[1] [The matter being limited by the extent of his knowledge; the manner in which that knowledge is acquired being determined by the laws of the mind.]

molecular combinations. According to others the mind has an active faculty of its own, which, when informed and quickened by sense impressions, can develop therefrom certain general principles and fundamental ideas, which form the basis of every science, of all intellectual, moral, and social life.

We hold the latter view, and on these grounds. "The mind," as St. Thomas says, "has its essence innate in itself."[1] In other words, reason, because it is reason, when actuated by external objects, begets immediately and necessarily, with thought, the ideas of being and existence, of truth and goodness, of duty and right, of cause and effect, of the finite and infinite. We call these ideas necessary, for no man would be considered sane who denied them, and because our utterance does not create them in the mind of the hearer, nor introduce them as new, but only gives him the opportunity of eliciting them in himself; that is, we simply awaken thoughts which lie dormant as in germ within him.

Hence arise first principles.

[1] *De Mente*, Art. 6: "Essentia ipsa sibi (menti) innata est." Again he says: "There pre-exist in us certain seeds of knowledge, namely, the first conceptions of the intellect. From these universal principles all principles are deduced. When, then, the mind is led from these universal ideas to recognise particular existing objects, which before were only known in potentiality and under the universal idea, then is a man said to acquire knowledge. . . . Knowledge, therefore, pre-exists in the learner in a faculty not purely passive but active" (St. Thom. *Quæst. de Magistr.*, Art. 1). *Cf.* St. Augustine, *De Magistr.*, 11: "We judge the truth of what we understand under universal ideas, not by the word which sounds without, but by the mind which commands within, though the words perhaps prompt us to form the judgment."

Moreover, while the experimental sciences are the privilege and possession of the few, these primary ideas are the common privilege of all men, even of the most simple and ignorant, on attaining the use of reason. On the knowledge of them are based the laws of human conduct and of all true human life. Thus, while the sciences so called form the professor, these ideas make the sage.

Second kind of doubt, materialism.

We now come to the second kind of doubt, that of sensualism or materialism. The materialist does not, like the sceptic, deny the certainty of all knowledge, but he admits only as certain what is obtained by the sense perception—all else is transcendental, and belongs not to science but to faith. And faith here means not a certitude founded on a real objective basis, but an opinion, a sentiment, a fancy, which every one may form as he pleases, for its truth is absolutely incapable of proof.[1]

Now, the worthlessness of materialism can be seen

[1] Virchow, *Archiv für patholog. Studien*, ii. p. 9: "The knowledge of the naturalist does not extend beyond bodies and their properties. All beyond he terms transcendental, and regards as an aberration of the intellect." Moleschott, *Kreislauf des Lebens*, p. 387: "I have already shown in my second letter that beyond the relations of the material world towards our senses we can grasp nothing." So also Erzolbe, Büchner, and others. These doctrines were rife in the last century, and are borrowed *in globo* from the writings of such authors as Locke, *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, London, 1690; Condillac, *Essai sur l'Origine des Connaissances Humaines*, Amsterdam, 1746; De la Mettraie, *L'Histoire Naturelle de l'Âme*, à La Haye, 1745; and *L'Homme Machine, l'Homme Plant*, à Leyde, 1749; Diderot, D'Alembert, and the other writers in the *Encyclopœdia;* Baron von Holbach, author of the *Système de la Nature*, London, 1770; Helvetius, and others.

at once, if we consider that the exclusion of all but sense knowledge would be fatal to every science, the experimental included. For every science is based on certain universal and *necessary* ideas, such as those we have mentioned,—being, existence, means and end, cause and effect, all which can neither be seen, nor perceived by the senses. How can the idea of truth or the law of adequate reason be visibly represented or measured, since of every mathematical measure or equation it is itself the determining standard? Again, what would nature be to us, stripped of its order, law, relations? Yet all these are supersensuous ideas. Our senses, devoid of intelligence, would perceive objects only as accidental and particular phenomena, and would have no notion of their purport, importance, mutual relations, or of the universe, considered as a whole. The very notion of law would be lost, nor could we form a conception of what it meant.[1] So, too, says St. Augustine,[2] "The idea of unity is attained by reason, not by the senses; for whatever the senses grasp is not one, but necessarily

Contradicted by the immaterial ideas recognised in every science.

[1] "Some," says St. Augustine (Epistle lvi. in Ps. 41), "refuse to admit that our thoughts have any other origin than the perceptions of our senses; as if we had not countless thoughts, for which no sensible images exist, such as the idea of truth itself. But if such persons have never reflected upon truth, how can they dispute about it? Or, if they do so reflect, can they tell me under what sensible image truth can be represented? Can they, *e.g.*, describe the colour of wisdom? We can indeed reflect on the idea of justice, but we cannot hear or smell or touch it. There is, then, something which the mind perceives, not by the senses, but by itself.

[2] *De Liber. Arbitr.*, ii. 8.

multiple." Thus it is the mind which diffuses light over all nature, or, rather, perceives the light diffused; in other words, the objective reason,[1] which in nature is represented to us.

Most important, again, and entirely supersensuous, is the law of morals. "Two things," says Kant,[2] "excite my admiration, the starry heavens above me and the voice of conscience within." Goodness, duty, and justice are not the dreams of an overwrought brain, nor scholastic subtleties, nor worn-out delusions. Necessarily and involuntarily these ideas enter into our mental operations, and force us to decide on the actions of others, and on our own as good or bad. Thus, if any great crime has been committed, we at once ask, "Where? who? when? how?" and at once pass sentence on the moral character of the deed.[3]

And by moral ideas which are supersensuous.

[1] *i.e.*, the divine idea or design.

[2] *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft.*

[3] "On hearing of a murder we at once ask, 'When, where, by whom, and wherefore?' This shows that your mind is guided by the universal and necessary principles of time and space, of causation and of the first cause. If love or ambition be the alleged motive of the act, we at once imagine the murderer a lover or an ambitious man, showing that in our mind an act demands an agent, and any phenomenon a substance, that is, an actual and real subject. Again, if the accused denied his identity, and represented that since the commission of the crime his personality had changed, we should proclaim him as an impostor or mad, thus showing that we regard person and being as necessarily unchangeable. If the accused urged in his defence that this murder was to promote his own happiness; that, as to his victim, his life was so miserable he was glad to be rid of it; that the country was no loser, since, instead of two useless citizens, it had now gained one useful subject; that the human race would

Moral ideas.

For every thought of the mind is guided by these first principles, which are both the constituents and tests of its very being. "If the laws of our reason," says Œrstedt, "did not exist in nature, we should vainly attempt to impose them on her; and if the laws of nature did not exist in our reason, we should never be able to comprehend them."[1] When, then, a champion of materialism[2] affirms that science is not concerned with the origin or purpose of this visible universe, but only with what exists, he misapprehends not only the supreme end of all science, but the very nature of the mind itself, since the very knowledge which he ignores can alone satisfy its needs.[3] These ideas,

First principles, intellectual and moral, lead to the knowledge of God.

not become extinct by the loss of one individual, &c.; we simply reply, that this murder, however useful to its author, was none the less unjust, and in spite of every plea, utterly unjustifiable" (V. Cousin, *Du Vrai, du Beau et du Bien*, p. 24, Paris, 1853). "In a higher light," says Bossuet, "we see the invariable moral laws, and that some things are our bounden duty. . . . Thus, a right-thinking man is satisfied that the rights of property, and the police and their duties should be regulated by the civil code; but he himself listens to the inviolable law of his conscience, which tells him that he must not wrong any one. The man who sees these truths, judges himself by them, and when he violates them is self-condemned; or, rather, these truths are his judges, for they do not bend to human judgments, but man's judgment must bend to them" (*Traité de la Connaissance de Dieu*, ch. iv.).

[1] "Why is it that the same laws are found in being and in thought, in the mind and in nature, and are united in the intelligence? Because these laws have a higher common cause, an original reason, which is also primordial force—in a word, which is *God*" (*The Soul in Nature*, i. p. 41).

[2] Büchner, *Macrocosmos*.

[3] "He alone is properly called wise who makes the purpose of the universe his study, ... since it is the office of the wise man

then, few in number, but important beyond measure, are alone required to conduct man to the higher realm, that of rational knowledge, the science of the mind. And in this science the idea of truth necessarily leads to the recognition of a first and primal truth, and the idea of the good to the conception of one infinite, absolute, and supreme good; and this first truth and first good we find in God.

Thus the knowledge of God is possible to every man, and all men see Him. "We see Him everywhere."[1] We hear Him;[2] we feel after Him.[3] Nor can He be ignored without grave personal guilt; for the necessary operations of the mind lead logically to the knowledge of His existence.[4] As the eye, says Plato,[5] sees first the light, and then the sun its source, so the mental vision opens first to the truth; and, secondly, to the Fontal Truth, the sun of the spiritual world, to God. Now, this recognition of God as the Primal Truth and

Knowledge of God in nature points to a revelation.

to consider things in their highest causes" (St. Thom., *Cont. Gent.*, i. 1). *Cf.* Aristotle, *Metaphys.*, i. 1. 15; *Anal Post.*, ii. 11; *Metaphys.*, i. 1. 25; Plato, *Sympos.*, p. 211.

[1] "All men see Him; every one beholdeth afar off" (Job xxxvi. 25).

[2] "The heavens show forth the glory of God, and the firmament declareth the work of His hands" (Ps. xviii. 1).

[3] "God hath made of one, all mankind, . . . that they should seek God, if happily they may feel after Him, or find Him: although He be not far from every one us: for in Him we live and move" (Acts xvii. 26).

[4] "We are said to see all things in God, and to judge of all things by Him, inasmuch as we know and judge of all things seen by the participation of His light" (St. Thom. Aqu., S. I., Qu. xii. Art. 11).

[5] *De Repub.*, vii. p. 508.

the first essential Right constitutes in man the basis of religion, and religion is thus the final utterance of science and the perfection of human reason. Still, the knowledge of God, thus gained by creatures from reason alone, is limited and insufficient for the cravings of the human soul, and it would know more. Nor is this desire unlawful. An intellectual being, whose knowledge is only finite, relative, and conditional, is intended by its very nature to seek for the fulness of truth. But its very effort to advance exposes it also to the danger of deception. God alone is infallible. And the history of science, which is also that of the human mind, shows us that while man is ever sinking deep shafts for knowledge, he works in obscurity, and seldom brings to light truth unmixed with error. "We know in part only, and see through a glass in a dark manner."[1] What Socrates taught still holds true: "He is the wisest of men[2] who accounts his wisdom as naught." Thus confession of his ignorance is the conclusion at which man arrives, after searching for absolute knowledge either by investigation of nature or by philosophy. We have learnt, indeed, that God exists, but what is He in His nature, in His hidden inner life, and what our own immortality? God alone can tell us these things. Has He then ever spoken? Has the Divine Word ever appeared, for whom Plato longed, that he might thereby cross as in a trusty vessel the stormy sea of life?

[1] 1 Cor. xiii. 9, 12; Aristotle, *Metaphys.*, ii. 1. 3.
[2] Plato, *Apolog. Socrat.*, p. 21, &c.

The idea of such a communication between the Creator and the creature is neither inconceivable nor impossible. If He who is the absolute reason awakens our first thoughts by the principles He has implanted in our intellectual nature, cannot He also speak a higher word, and thereby complete and perfect that first utterance?[1] Again, if we, as intelligent beings, hold mutual converse by articulate speech, why should not He also, the Creator Himself, address us through the same medium, either externally and audibly, such as we speak to Him, or immediately and interiorly by secret illumination, or new infused ideas?

A revelation not improbable.

And it is just at this point where reason ends that faith begins. But faith is not a purely subjective conviction, nor an arbitrary opinion, nor the effect of credulity or religious sentiment, nor a creature of the phantasy, but, as Pascal says, the highest intellectual act. The process is this. Having learnt by experience its own finite capacity, and being logically and certainly convinced that a revelation exists, reason, because it is reason, assents freely, from the triumphant force of truth alone, to what that revelation contains.[2]

[1] Even supposing that between man and man no immediate influence of one soul upon another was possible, this would by no means exclude the possibility of an immediate Divine influence upon the soul. For the idea of God implies not only the possibility, but the fact of such an operation (Ulrici, *Gott und die Natur*, p. 614; Leipzig, 1862).

[2] In every assent of faith the formal motive (*objectum formale ratio motiva*) is the infallible testimony of God speaking. The rule of faith (*regula fidei*) is the creeds based on Holy Scripture and

"The Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth." [1] Here, then, is a second knowledge of God, above what reason could teach, imparted by the Divine Truth itself. Its realisation. He has made Himself known and descended on us, not by visible demonstration, but by the spoken Word, in which we are to believe.[2] And faith, again, in the Word prepares the soul for the third and supreme degree of knowledge, when, not by symbols or shadows or partial revelation, but face to face, we gaze on the essential Truth, God Himself. And in Him, thus seen, every desire for knowledge is, as Plato said, fully satisfied.

"Man," says Maine de Biran,[3] "has a threefold life. First, the animal or organised life; secondly, the free and rational; thirdly, the spiritual, derived from a higher source. The second, or the life of reason, is bestowed on man in order to raise him to the third,

tradition. The matter (*objectum materiale*) is the doctrines they contain.

[1] John i. 14.

[2] St. Thomas thus sums up the threefold ascent of man to God. First, by the natural light through creatures to the knowledge of Him. Secondly, by faith in the revelation which the Divine Truth itself, transcending all human reason, brought down to us. Thirdly, when the mind is raised to the perfect intuition of what revelation contains (*Contr. Gent.*, iv. 1). By the discursive knowledge of reason man thus ascends from effects to their first cause, and God is thus recognised as the supreme ideal of Wisdom, Omnipotence, Holiness, Perfection. The intuitive knowledge of God, on the other hand, is not an ideal of Him obtained by inductive reasoning, but is the immediate clear manifestation of the Godhead, seen, not in signs or through faith, but as He is in Himself.

[3] *Sa Vie et ses Pensées, par E. Naville*, Dec. 1821, Sept. 1823.

which is above the life both of sense and of reason. True philosophy recognises this third and higher life, which ennobles all man's spiritual powers; but to this he cannot attain save by the Holy Spirit. In that higher life man finds a wisdom transcending all human science, and his human nature perfected beyond all human means." We thus distinguish a threefold light and a threefold life of man on earth—the light of the body and the life of sense: the light of reason and the intellectual life: the light of grace and the life of faith by which the just man liveth;[1] and for all who lead this life we can pray, "Lux perpetua luceat eis," for it leads to the light of glory.

Why unattained by heathens.

Even the heathen philosophers had a presentiment of this supreme and immediate knowledge. Plato speaks of the longing of the soul to penetrate into the essence of things, and of its never resting until it discovers the self-existent and essential Good, the source of all truth.[2] "The philosophers" (Platonists), says St. Augustine,[3] "apprehended the invisible, immutable, and immaterial Essence of the Divine Nature, but they despised the way which leads to it; for Christ crucified, who is Himself the Way, seemed to them folly. Thus they could not enter into the inner sanctuary of peace, even God Himself, though they discerned His light from afar." In order to reach that sanctuary and to gaze on that light

[1] Rom. i. 17.
[2] *De Repub.*, vii. pp. 515-532; *Phadr.*, p. 27.
[3] *Epist.*, cxx. 1.

three things are needed: Faith, by which man believes in the truth of the Vision he seeks; Hope, by which he trusts finally to attain to sight; Charity, by which he daily unites himself to God now unseen. At length to faith and hope succeed sight and possession. He gazes on the eternal truth unveiled. Reason performs the highest possible intellectual act, and is perfected thereby. The soul has attained beatitude in the Vision of God.

Thus faith in Jesus Christ is the necessary complement of all philosophy; but faith is not opposed to science,[1] for truth can never contradict itself. On the contrary, faith recognises in the secular sciences symbols of ideas derived from God, while the sciences themselves find their real value and higher symbolism in revealed truth. By enlisting into its service the highest powers of the intellect, faith has enabled science to render important service to revelation, and at the same time has created a sublime science for herself. For science, by demonstrating certain fundamental truths,[2] such as the existence of God

Faith and science.

[1] "Although faith be above reason, yet there can never be found any real strife or variance between them, for they both spring from the one and the same fount of immutable truth, the great and good God, and therefore mutually assist each other" (Prop. i., *Sacr. Congreg., Indic., d.* 11., Jan. 1855); *Conc. Vatic. Constit. Dogm. De Fid. Cath.*, cap. iv.

[2] *Preambula Fidei*, cf. Propp. S. C. 11., Jan. 1855, Prop. ii.:— "Arguments from reason can prove with certainty the existence of God, the spirituality of the soul, and the liberty of man. Faith comes after revelation, and therefore cannot be suitably urged to prove the existence of God against the atheist, or the spirituality or liberty of the rational soul against the adherent of naturalism or

and the immortality of the soul, prepares the way for faith, and, again, by historical investigation and philosophical argument establishes the existence of revealed faith. To science are due the definition and principles of logic and ontology by which theology has formulated in human terms the mysteries of faith. Lastly, it is this science which, by presenting in one complete system the doctrines of religion, has defended them against rationalistic attack. "And although the reason," says St. Thomas,[1] "gains but an imperfect insight into these truths of revelation, it should not for that abandon the endeavour; for the mind profits greatly by the least advance in the knowledge of matters so important and so sublime." For

fatalism." Prop. iv.:—"The use of reason precedes faith and leads man to faith with the aid of revelation and of grace."

[1] S. I., Qu. i. Art. 5. "The Christian, while maintaining his faith as undoubtingly as possible, ought always to seek the reasons for it" (cf. *Anselm adv. Roscel.*, L. ii.). "In a threefold manner, corresponding to three classes of men, the reasoning method helps to promote faith. There are the adversaries of the faith—those whose faith is perfect, and those whose faith is weak. Use of logical discourse helps first to confound our adversaries. Hence, St. Augustine says against those garrulous disputants whose conceit exceeds their wit, that Catholic reasonings and fitting parallels serve both to defend and assert the faith. Secondly, it strengthens the weak. As God nourishes the charity of the weak by temporal benefits, so He confirms the faith of the weak by probable arguments. For if they found any lack of reasons in support of the faith, and an abundance of objections against it, not one of them would hold out. Thirdly, this method offers great delight to the perfect. For in the understanding of what it firmly holds by faith the soul experiences wonderful joy. Hence Bernard's saying, 'The greatest pleasure the mind can have is understanding what it already believes'" (*Bonav. in* 1 *Sentent. Prœm., Quæst.* ii.).

Their mutual assistance.

the same reason, the Fathers regarded pre-Christian philosophy as a preparation for the faith. Clement of Alexandria[1] says that philosophy was to the Greeks what the law was to the Hebrews, a pedagogue leading them to Christ. And Origen says:[2] "As, according to the teaching of the Greeks, the whole circle of sciences, geometry, music, grammar, rhetoric, and astronomy, are a preparation for philosophy, so Greek philosophy itself is a preparation for Christianity." Thus his biographer, St. Gregory Thaumaturgus,[3] relates that he urged his disciples to study the collective wisdom of the ancients, both Greek and barbarian.

While the ancient religions possessed various mythologies, theology, the science of faith, is the creation of Christianity alone, which, as the one absolute truth, fears nothing, ignores nothing, and makes all its own. Theology alone gathers up all that is true—the acquisitions of man's intellect, in nature and history, in matter and spirit, in the starry heavens, in the dust of earth. Theology alone uses metaphysical science, all laws of ethics, to demonstrate, illustrate, and establish the truths of faith. St. Francis used to collect and preserve every piece of paper with writing on it, for he said, "Of these letters, my son, God's glorious name is spelt, *Fili, literæ sunt, ex quibus componitur glorississimum nomen Dei.*"[4] Thus

Grandeur of theology.

[1] *Stromat.*, vii. 3.
[2] *Epist. ad Gregor.*, i.
[3] *Panegyric in Origen*, p. 67.
[4] *Vita di San Francesco Thoma di Celano.*

all science is an alphabet which God employs to write His name upon the mind of man, as legibly as He has inscribed it by the stars on the heavens.

But all these natural arguments for supernatural truth are denied by rationalism, which is the third degree of unbelieving doubt. Against the sceptic, the rationalist maintains, indeed, the certainity of sense knowledge, and against the materialist the existence of supersensible truth; but nature is to him the sole and adequate revelation, and human reason the one source of knowledge. His axiom is, "Reason includes all things; beyond it there is nothing"[1] Thus, if the rationalist

Third kind of doubt rationalism.

[1] Schelling, *Zeitschrift für speculative Physik*, ii. 2. The words are true of divine, but false of human reason. Rationalism has appeared within the Church in our own days. The following is an extract from the Brief "Gravissimus," Pius IX., December 11, 1862, against the errors of Froschammer, who held that all dogmas of faith, as well as natural verities, if once proposed as objects of knowledge, could be proved by reason. "True and sound philosophy holds a very exalted position. Its office is diligently to search out truth, to teach carefully and correctly human reason, which, though obscured by the fall of the first man, is by no means extinct. To it belong the perception, the right comprehension and explanation, of all that which is the object of rational knowledge, and of numerous truths; thus philosophy demonstrates a number of those verities which the faith proposes for our belief; for example, the existence of God, His nature, His attributes, and demonstrates, justifies, and defends these by arguments based on premisses of reason. Thus it prepares the way for a more correct adhesion of faith to these dogmas, and even those which are known to us only at first by faith are made, in a manner, intelligible by the aid of philosophy. Such is the function, such the subject matter, of the austere and most beautiful science of true philosophy. . . . But in such a matter of most grave importance we can never permit all things to be rashly confounded, or that reason

Condemnation of Froschammer.

seems to admit a revelation as possible or necessary, he means only the promulgation of those truths which lie within the limit and gauge of human thought.[1]

This system has assumed many varied forms. But whether in the wild theories of Pantheism, which construct, *à priori*, a God, a universe, and a history of its own fancy, or in the *rationalismus vulgaris*, the

should lay hold of and disturb matters belonging to faith. For most certain and manifest are the limits beyond which reason can never lawfully pass." On the same matter are the following propositions condemned by the Syllabus, December 8, 1864:—"III. Human reason, without any regard whatever to God, is the one judge of truth and falsehood, of good and evil; it is a law to itself, and suffices by its natural strength for providing for the good of men and people. IV. All the truths of religion flow from the natural force of human reason; hence reason is the chief rule by which man can and ought to arrive at the knowledge of every kind of truth. . . . VI. The faith of Christ is opposed to human reason, and a divine revelation profits naught, but even thwarts man's perfection. . . . VIII. Since human reason is in all things equal to religion, theological science must be treated on the same basis as other philosophical subjects."

[1] "A religion may be natural in substance, and yet, in the form of its first manifestation, revealed; that is, if it be such that man might and ought to have arrived at the knowledge of it by reason alone. The revelation of such a religion at a certain place and period may be wisely ordained and highly beneficial to the human race. But when the religion thus introduced is once established, its truth must be demonstrable to the reason of all men" (Kant, *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der menschlichen Vernunft*, iv. p. 184). A Catholic, on the contrary, assents to the fact of a revealed religion, partly indeed upon reason; that is, from its external evidence or historic facts (*e.g.*, that there is a Church bearing the four notes of the creed, one holy, Catholic, apostolic). These form the motives of credibility. But his assent to what that revelation teaches, or his motive of faith, is based solely on belief in the veracity of God speaking, revealed dogmas being necessarily above reason's domain.

vulgar and narrow-minded negation of everything, which Goethe[1] likens to the Indian king who denied the existence of ice because he had not seen it, rationalism is opposed alike to science and truth. It is a philosophy which confounds the subjective consciousness of the individual with the absolute reason, in which "the part[2] measures the whole; the drop contains the ocean, the finite spans the infinite." The rationalists then have no right to their name, and they err, as Schelling says, if they imagine that we blame them for freethinking. Our complaint is that by freedom of thought they mean freedom *not* to think, and that of their so-called freedom they make an unwarrantable use. History has long shown that a speedy Nemesis overtakes reason, which thus rebels against faith and depends solely on its own light. In our own times the German Pantheists boasted that they had wrested from the Deity His attribute of omniscience, and had seated themselves on the throne of God.[3] Yet within a very few years these men

Rationalistic religion.

Leads to Pantheism,

[1] Vide *Faust*, p. 2.

[2] Leibnitz, *Discours Préliminaire sur la Conformité de la Foi avec la Raison*, p. 46.

[3] The left wing of the Hegelian school were pure Pantheists, and looked on God and man as one and the same being. Thus, Strauss, a prominent teacher of this party, writes: "Seeing where philosophy has now brought us, how, we ask, could the Spirit renounce His right and judgment over that which He recognises as His own offspring, and efface the recollection of all which He, as the unconscious mind of nature, has Himself created? Could He forget completely and past recall, how He ordered the relations of the stars, formed the earths and metals, ordained the organic structure of plants and animals? Could

were forced to confess their boast a delusion, and to see their vaunted science succumb to absolute scepticism or to a degrading materialism [1] which denied the very existence of reason and reduced man to the level of a brute. Could confession of intellectual impotency be more complete than is contained in the following words of Fichte, a champion of rationalism ?—"There is nothing lasting either within me or outside me, but everywhere ceaseless change. I know nothing whatever of any other being, and nothing of myself. There is no being. I myself know absolutely nothing, and I am nothing. Images exist. They alone *are*, and they know themselves after the nature of images—images which flit by, without there being anything before which they flit; images which by images depend upon images; which represent nothing, and are without meaning and without end. I myself am one of these images; indeed I am not even this, but merely a confused image of these images. All reality becomes a mysterious dream: without life as the object, or intellect as the subject of this dream: a dream which itself depends solely upon a dream. Sight is a dream, thought, the source of all being and of all reality, which I imagine to

or to scepticism.

any part of that which He, as a conscious human mind, brought forth become so hardened as to be impenetrable even to its Maker?" (*Glaubenslehre*, i. 350).

[1] "The 'soul' is a collective term for the various nerve functions in the higher animals: man, like the beast, is a mere machine, his intellect the result of a certain bodily organisation" (Vogt, *Bilder aus dem Thierleben*).

myself of my own being, my powers, my destiny, is the dream of this dream."[1] It was to these, his blinded contemporaries, that Goethe addressed in bitter irony the following lines:—

> "Useless your labour, fruitless your pain,
> Though swift your course you run in vain,
> Clutch, and tear the heavy veil,
> Life's secrets it will ne'er reveal.
> The mysteries of life, of the night, of the day,
> Hast thou read them yet? Canst thou tell them, say?
> Ask it of Heaven, bid the grave give light,
> Heaven is silent; the grave shines bright.
> A flash for a moment enlightens the grave:
> A moment only—there is nought to save.
> Above, below, whatever may seem,
> You wander and wander from dream to dream"
>
> (*Zauberflöte*, p. ii.).

Thus also the eighteenth century, which, having deified the human intellect, styled itself the philosophic age, fitly closed its cycle with the worship of a courtesan as the goddess of reason, the guillotine and its victims as its altar and its sacrifice.

But, asked Rousseau in words worthy of his shallow and frivolous mind, "How can I commit a crime in worshipping God according to the light of nature? By my reason I can obtain a fitting conception of God. What need then of a revelation? Why am I to be bound by the obligation of faith?"[2] To which we

[1] *Ueber die Bestimmung des Menschen*, ii.

[2] Rousseau, *Emile*, T. iii. p. 122. So also Tindal and the Deists of the last century. Long since St. Thomas had proposed their objection (*Summ. Theo.*, II. ii., Qu. ii. Art. 3). Faith in aught beyond the truths of reason seems unnecessary for salvation, since what

answer: First, that it is not for the created mind to limit the absolute mind in its plans and operations with regard to man, nor to dictate the nature of its revelations. Secondly, that revelation and faith have from the beginning been the primal source of the

naturally belongs to anything would appear to be sufficient for its perfection. To which he answers, that man's end is not merely natural, but supernatural, and therefore only to be attained by supernatural means. His argument may be summarised as follows :—Two things concur to perfect inferior natures —their own action, and the action on them of a superior nature. Thus water tends by its own movement to the centre of the earth, but owing to the influences received from the moon, it ebbs and flows on the surface of the earth. Now, while the lower creatures participate in the Divine goodness in one particular quality only, as, for instance, Being, in the case of inanimate things, or vegetative life in plants, or the sense-knowledge of particular things, as in animals, reasonable creatures know Good and Being not only as determined in this or that object, but as universal ideas, and are thus in immediate relation with the cause of all Being. Their perfection then consists not only in that which is proper to their own nature, but also in that which belongs to them by the supernatural participation in the Divine goodness. Man's final beatitude consists, then, in the supernatural vision of God, to which he cannot attain unless he be instructed by God as a disciple by his Master, according to the words of St. John vi. 45: "Every one that hath heard of the Father and hath learned cometh to Me." And as man does not acquire this science immediately, but successively, in conformity to his nature, he must first believe as a disciple in God, as his teacher, before he can see Him face to face. (Were man not created for a supernatural end, he would arrive at a natural beatitude by the knowledge and love of God as the author of nature only. See Suarez, iv., *Disp.* xv., xvi., *Summa.*) In recent times this objection has been again condemned. "As if philosophy, which is wholly engaged in investigating natural truth, ought to reject those things which the supreme and most merciful God, the author of all nature and of all things in it, has deigned, of His singular beneficence and mercy, to make known, in order that men may attain true happiness and salvation" (cf. *Encycl. Pius IX., l. c.*).

Why natural religion is insufficient for man.

religion and moral life of the nations of the world. The life of a nation, its government and customs, are based upon traditions and find their roots in an historical past. The religion of rationalism has no consecration of the past, nor is it even the product of actual real life. It is but a cold and dead formula, and can never urge man to heroism in virtue, nor sustain him against the assaults of passion. Philosophy and intellectual culture cannot save a nation. The Greeks fell into sensualism and frivolity, into mental and political decrepitude. Even when their art reached its zenith, when it shone forth in all its power and glory, the great problems of life and life's sufferings were only masked, nor could the mightiest genius solve or soothe them. The eyes of the idol were still closed. The spirit was still nature's slave. Hence the sense of pain which mars the harmonies of Greek poetry, and breaks out discordantly in the Greek chorus. Its echo is heard even in the bacchanalian mirth of Aristophanes, and the experienced eye can detect this feeling of sadness even in their plastic models.[1]

Effect of rationalism.

We have now, as we proposed, examined the three forms of doubt—scepticism, the doubt absolute, or the negation of all truth; materialism or sensualism, the negation of intellectual truth; naturalism or rationalism, the negation of religious or revealed truth.[2] On

[1] Schnaase, *Kunstgeschichte*, ii. p. 353.

[2] "Since man in his whole being depends upon God as his Creator and Lord, and the created reason is altogether subject to the un-

the other hand, we have endeavoured to demonstrate the certainty of human knowledge, and of the existence of the truth in and for the mind of man. Truth in its triple order is his possession, the truth of sense-knowledge through the operation of the senses; the truth of intellectual knowledge through the operation of the reason and of thought; the truth of religious knowledge through faith in the Triune God, Who has revealed Himself to us.

It remains, indeed, a strange phenomenon, seeing the importance of truth and the strength of the evidence in its support, that it should be found by so few. Want of earnestness is too often the reason. "Many men consume their time," says De Lamenais, "in stringing together phrases and

Earnestness needed for faith.

created truth, we are bound to render a full obedience of intellect and will to God when He makes a revelation to us" (*Vat. Conc.*, chap. iii., *De Fide*). Canon I. *De Fide* runs thus:—"If any one shall say that human reason is so independent that faith cannot be imposed on it by God's command, anathema sit." "And not only can faith and right reason never be really at variance, but they lend to each other a mutual support, since right reason demonstrates the foundations of faith, and, illuminated by its light, cultivates the science of divine things; while faith liberates and defends reason from error and enriches it with abundant knowledge. Wherefore the Church is so far from being opposed to the action of human arts and sciences that in many ways it assists and promotes them. For she neither ignores nor despises the advantages which human life derives from them, but rather confesses that, in so far as they proceed from God, the Lord of all knowledge, if they are rightly handled, they lead us to God by the help of His grace. Neither, truly, does she forbid that each of these sciences, in its own sphere, should employ its own principles and peculiar method, but she carefully watches lest, by withstanding divine doctrine, they assimilate errors, or, transgressing their proper limits, should encroach upon and disturb the things which are of faith" (chap. iv., *De Fide*).

in working out relations of numbers or the properties of matter, and therewith completely occupy their mighty minds. Speak not of God to that famous chemist. He is absorbed in analysing a new acid. When his discovery is perfected he may perchance care to hear of Him who created the universe and all that it contains. That author is writing a poem, play, or romance, on which his fame depends: leave him alone, for time presses. How intolerable the loss to mankind if death came before he had given the finishing touch to his work! True, he is ignorant of his own nature, of his place in creation or his future. He knows not whether there be a God or a truth, a heaven or a hell, but long since he has decided not to concern himself about these matters. He feels no disquiet; he does not give them a thought. They are not certain, he says, and he acts as though they were certainly but idle dreams."

Indifference the result of worldliness.

To such as these the words of St. John may well be applied: "Thou hast the name of being alive, but thou art dead" (*Apoc.* iii. 1). To all who fix their end in self and here, whether their aim be ambition or gain, these words of the dying Socrates apply: "Men of Athens, I love and respect you; yet I will obey God rather than man; and whilst I breathe, I shall not cease, whenever we meet, to exhort and admonish each one of you, according to my custom. My good man, art thou not ashamed, that, intent upon amassing riches, honour, and fame, thou carest not for understanding or truth, or the ennobling of thy soul?

Why dost thou not fear? And I shall continue thus to question and reproach him who esteems slightly what is most precious, and prizes highly that which is of little worth. Here my sole occupation is to persuade you not to labour more diligently for your bodies than for your souls, for man does not gain virtue from riches, but riches, and all other good things, both for the individual and the State, are the fruit of virtue." [1]

But, once more, if truth is to be found, the heart as well as the mind must search for it. "He that doth the truth cometh to the light." [2] A rebellious will blinds the reason. "Unless we seek for truth with all the powers of our soul," says St. Augustine, "we shall never find it. But if we seek the truth as it wills to be sought, it will not long be hidden from our eyes." "Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you. The love of truth asks, love seeks, love knocks." [3]

Truth must be sought for.

[1] *Apolog. Socrates*, xvii.
[2] John iii. 21.
[3] *De Moribus Eccles.*, i. 31.

CHAPTER III.

GOD, HIS EXISTENCE AND ESSENCE.

THE youngest child readily pronounces the name of God, and understands its meaning more easily than that of any mathematical formula or axiom of logic. Why is this? Because the idea of a Supreme Being is natural to the human mind, and is spontaneously awakened with the first beginnings of consciousness.

The idea of God connatural to man.

The child's belief in God is, then, the assent of unclouded human nature, and the spoken word only expresses the interior aspiration of the soul for the Infinite, its instinctive sense of the Divine.[1]

The idea of God, then, presents itself at the begin-

[1] [Since, according to the teaching of the Scholastics, all our intellectual knowledge is derived primarily by abstraction from sense objects, we have no innate or intuitive knowledge of God properly so called.] "Our knowledge of Him is only said to be innate in so far as, by principles of thought which are innate, we easily perceive that He is" (St. Thom., *Opusc.* 70, *Super Boeth de Trin*). Cf. *Bonavent. Itinerar Ment.*, c. i. *ssq.*, *et in* I. *Dist. qu.* i. *sqq.* The Fathers call man *θεοδίδακτος*, on account of his immanent knowledge of God, in the sense explained (Thomassin, *Dogm. Theol. De Deo*, L. i. c. 3 *sqq.*). Thus in the *Constit. Apostol.*, viii. 12, it is said: "Thou hast given man an innate law, *νόμον ἔμφυτον*, so that he may have within and by himself the seeds of the knowledge of God." *ὅπως οἴκοθεν καὶ παρ' ἑαυτοῦ ἔχου τα σπέρματα τῆς θεωγνωσίος.*

ning of life, and, like a rainbow of peace, spans our whole existence. The stream of time flows on, successive generations appear and pass, but the idea of God remains; and the word, "I am the Lord thy God,"[1] finds a response in every human breast.

To apprehend more clearly the evidence for the Being of God, let us consider it as manifested—

1. In the history of the past.
2. In nature around us.
3. In the reason within us.

Three proofs of God's existence— 1. History. 2. Nature. 3. Mind.

In every portion of the inhabited globe, every human tongue, however poor and rude, still has one word which means God. Thus, the reply of Cicero, spoken more than two thousand years ago, still holds good: "No people is without faith in a God, although they may be ignorant of His nature."[2] And the discovery of new worlds and new races has only confirmed its truth. The sentiment of religion is, then, universal. Is it therefore true? May it not be founded on a delusion? The idea is inconceivable. In the fundamental questions of life mankind, as a whole, is never deceived.[3] Its voice is the voice of nature, and the language of truth, for nature is truth.

The idea of God found in all races.

[1] Deut. v. 6.

[2] *De Legg.*, i. 24. *Cf.* Aristotle, *De Cœlo*, i. 3.

[3] No one man has succeeded in deceiving all men; neither has the universal voice of mankind ever deceived any man. "Nemo omnes, neminem omnes fefellerunt," says Pliny the younger (*Panegyr. Traj. n.* 62).

But was not religion, then, the invention of priests or statesman?[1] Strange, indeed, were this the case. The deepest feelings of the heart cannot be invented. Nor could priests have existed before religion began; on the contrary, it was religion, realised and felt, as history shows us, which called for their service. The fact that law-givers like Midas, Solon, Lycurgus, and Numa recognise religion as no less necessary for the stability of the civil order, than patriotism, honour, and the like, proves that religious belief is a living power deeply rooted in the soul of man. Moreover, history, while it relates the origin of the various arts and professions, down from the time of Tubalcain, never records the invention of religion. "When the Rationalist," says Lotze, "traces back the origin of the State to a primitive compact, made in the assembly of its first citizens, and that of language to a mutual agreement for the use of certain sounds, as the best means of intercommunication; when he ascribes the code of morals partly to the universal recognition of certain rules of conduct, which were gradually found to be useful, partly to the teaching of instructors; finally, when he

Not invented by priests or law-givers,

[1] This hypothesis finds its fitting counterpart in the equally absurd theory of Hobbes and Rousseau, that the State originated in a "social contract." Both history and reason show that man has never lived but in community; to live alone he must be God or brute. "If religion be a mere human invention," says Lactantius (*De Ira. Dei.*, c. x), "and we are deceived in believing in God, then the sages of antiquity were deceived; and great must have been the power of lying, which could deceive not only the unlearned, but impose on Socrates and Plato and the leaders of the first schools."

attributes the rise of religion to man's natural tendency to superstition, a tendency artfully played upon by priestcraft, the Rationalist thereby assumes as his primary cause an organised combination, which was itself only possible in an already advanced stage of civilisation." [1]

May not, however, religion owe its birth to the awe produced by the wonders of nature? [2] But, firstly, this fear, which man shares with the brute creation, is purely material and wholly distinct from religious fear, which is founded on reverence, and includes hope, love, and thanksgiving. Secondly, if the consciousness of God did not pre-exist in the soul, how could it be evolved by the phenomena of nature? [3] The most powerful impression of a sensible cause could never produce of itself a supersensible effect. Unquestionably the gigantic forces and awful catastrophes of nature do awaken and intensify the religious sentiment, but they do so simply because that sentiment is inherent in the

nor based on fear of natural portents.

[1] *Microcosmos*, iii. p. 54.

[2] Thus an anonymous writer in Petronius: "Fear first made Gods to be." So also Raynal, Hume, H. Voss, in the last century; and in this, Vogt and Strauss (*Der alte und neue Glaube*, p. 95, 6th Edition, 1873).

[3] "By calling God Lord, Master, Father, man shows that his idea of God is not the result of fear. It is also noticeable that music, poetry, dancing, and the other arts have always been employed in Divine worship, and so inseparable is the idea of rejoicing from that of a festival that the word "feast" is everywhere synonymous with a religious solemnity" (De Maistre, *Soirées de S. Petersburg*). "If thou art a God," said the Scythians to Alexander, "thou must show it by doing good, not evil" (*Quint. Curtius*, vii. 8).

human mind. And herein we understand how men came to worship nature; how in myth and fable the elements became gods and goddesses, as man saw embodied in them his innate idea of the Divine. This is so even in fetichism, the most debased form of religion, which worships a separate deity in each external object, without connection or unity. In these early stages of development, where man scarce reflects and his imagination is actuated almost entirely by outward impressions, he seeks the Divine in the immediate objects around him. The rationalist theory, then, is founded upon the completely false assumption that man's primitive state was savage,[1] his religion polytheistic, and that he has advanced therefrom by a necessary law of development to civilisation and belief in God. Were this so, were man by nature savage and destined to advance from barbarism to civilisation, he would display a constant *natural* tendency to progress, whereas the exact contrary is the fact. The nearer man approaches to the savage state, the more hopeless is his intellectual stagnation. The wandering tribes which were found scattered on the confines of the ancient world have not advanced one step towards civilisation. The natives of those shores

The savage not the natural man.

[1] No trace of man in this pretended state of nature has ever been found: the lowest type of savage displays, on the contrary, the vices most opposed to natural development—polygamy, drunkenness, impurity — and before any contact with European races, numerous diseases and a gradually decreasing population. Rousseau's ideal men of nature (*retournons à la nature*), like the gorilla-man of to-day, are pure figments of the imagination (*Cf.* Waitz, *Anthropol.*, i. p. 160; p. 336, *et passim*).

visited by Nearchos, an admiral of Alexander the Great, are now what they were two thousand years ago. It is the same with the savages described by Agatharcides more than a century before the Christian era, and by Knight Bruce in our own day. Ages have passed over these populations without any sign of progress, inventions, or improvement.[1]

But man degraded and chastised.

But, further, not only is the savage indifferent to civilisation, he shows a deliberate preference for barbarism. "He sees," says De Maistre,[2] "our arts, laws, refinement, enjoyments of all kinds, and our incontestable superiority, which would excite envy in minds susceptible of such a feeling; but to him civilisation offers no attractions, and he ever returns to his like. If, then, the savage of to-day, who can compare—as he often can—the two states, remains immovable in his own, what

[1] Benjamin Constant *chez* Deschamps, *Le Christ et les Antichrists.*

[2] *Soirées de S. Petersburg*, ii. p. 17. "As to the usual empirical explanations of the origin of religion," remarks Schelling, "some ascribe the first idea of God to fear, gratitude, or other emotions of the soul, and see in it a mere psychological phenomenon; others ascribe it to priestcraft; but all fail to explain how any man could have conceived the idea of constituting himself the lawgiver of a nation, or of making use of religion to inspire terror, unless he derived these ideas from a source external and prior to himself. Among the many false and inane works of recent times, these so-called histories of the primitive race of man are pre-eminent; for their theories of the original condition of man are based upon the accounts of travellers, and their descriptions of the characteristics of savage tribes, in which these savages play the principal part. There is, then, no phase of barbarism which has not originated in a debased civilisation. Man, in his pure natural state, believed in God; nor was this belief founded on a myth" (*Vorlesungen über die Methode des Academischen Studiums*, p. 167).

possible ground is there for supposing that he should have deliberately issued therefrom to adopt a condition of life of which he was wholly ignorant? Society, then, is as ancient as man, and the savages can only be man degraded and chastised. Indeed, the fact seems manifest to any man of common sense, not bent on sophistry." "The grand fable of God and the life to come," says a recent philosophical writer,[1] "would never have been so widely spread or firmly maintained had it been but a fable." Truth and error are alike transmitted from age to age, but with this difference, that, while there is no limit to the spread of truth, error inevitably finds its term. Thus propagation serves the cause of truth, but is fatal to that of error. No doctrine can endure unless it be based on realities and correspond to the true need of man. In proportion, therefore, to its duration and spread, error necessarily comes into acuter conflict with the nature of things, and as its baneful consequences are more fully realised, the more certain becomes its doom. Hence we see false systems expire in succession, while truth, strengthened and confirmed by the benefits it confers, ever wins new conquests. Thus the efficaciousness of a principle proves its existence, though the principle be in itself undemonstrable, and its nature seldom if ever fully understood. Now belief in the existence of God is diffused throughout the nations of the world, as every

Propagation spreads truth and destroys error.

[1] Fechner, *Die drei Motive und Gründe des Glaubens*, p. 62; Leipzig, 1863.

page of history proves. We trace the descent of this belief from primitive times, and watch its unbroken course through subsequent ages. Thus seen, it everywhere appears as a natural growth, not only among races capable of the highest civilisation, but amongst the most debased savages; and this belief gains more than it loses with every advance in civilisation, and every stage in the development of human nature. Amid the strife of conflicting opinions this fundamental belief maintains its supremacy, and remains ever the one universal bond of union among human beings. The vitality, then, of this belief, its absolute independence of space and time, are a clear proof of its truth.

Let us now consider some of the alleged instances of races wholly without religion. According to Burmeister,[1] among the Coroados, the early rulers of Rio de Janeiro, there is no sign that the need of religion was ever felt. The South American savage has no religious notions; he submits to be baptized, without understanding what it means. Haskarl relates that among the aborigines of Australia the idea of a Creator or moral Governor of the world is unknown, and all attempts to instruct them in this truth end in a senseless jargon of words, or come to a dead stop. But of what weight are these isolated instances? As to the facts, the observations of travellers are often so superficial, and their accounts so uncertain, that they may reasonably be questioned from more than one

Alleged instances of atheist races.

[1] Quoted by Büchner, *Force and Matter*, p. 185.

point of view.[1] Again, European inquirers often judge of these races by their own religious standard, which has nothing in common with that of savages. Religion in the savage usually takes the form of fear of evil spirits.[2] Thus Waitz writes: "It is true that belief in God in the sense of civilised nations is not found among all peoples, that is, belief in higher beings who dispose of all things here below at their will. But if we understand by religious belief the conviction of the existence of mysterious, and for the most part unseen, powers whose will is able to interfere in manifold ways with the course of nature, so that man's destiny depends upon their favour, we may then safely conclude that every nation has some kind of religion. But among races in the lowest grade of civilisation religion is little more than a general belief in spirits, although we must not overlook the religious element, which it undoubtedly contains."[3] Tylor tells us that, "judging from the mass of evidence before

Where found, the result is degradation.

[1] In his *Philosophy of Mythology* Schelling singles out Azara's testimony as exceptionally worthy of credit. The "Savants" of the last century travelled in quest of a race of atheists, which has not yet been discovered. The saying of Artemidorus, the learned author of the *Treaty of Dreams*, still holds good: "There exists no nation without God; some honour Him in one way, some in another" (Ὀνειροκριτικῶν, i. 9).

[2] *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, i. p. 324: "We always find some kind of priestcraft or witchcraft, some belief in the influence of evil spirits, and in the power of their fetiches" (*Ibid.*, i. p. 322, *sq.*). On the natives of New Holland see Quatrefages, *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1860, p. 829; 1861, p. 354. *Cf.* Ausland, 1862, p. 471, on the Andaman islanders, supposed formerly to have no religion.

[3] *Anthropologie der Naturvölker*, i. 324.

us, we are forced to admit that the belief in spiritual beings is universal among the lower types of humanity; whilst the contrary assertion is based on modern sources more or less untrustworthy. For the statement that there are races without religion rests upon testimony often misapplied, and never conclusive. Such alleged instances resemble the stories of tribes yet undiscoverd who are said to be without language, and to be ignorant of the use of fire. That there are races without religion is still more incredible, and both statements are equally destitute of the proofs we have a right to demand for conditions so exceptional."[1] So also Max Müller: "The real point to settle before we adopt one or other views (the religion or irreligion of savages) is what kind of authority can be deduced from those whose opinions we quote: did they really know the language, and did they know it, not only sufficiently well to converse on ordinary subjects, but to enter into a friendly and unreserved conversation on topics on which even highly educated people are so apt to misunderstand each other? We want informants, in fact, like Dr. Callaway and Dr. Bleek, men who are both scholars and philosophers. Savages are shy and silent in the presence of white men, and they have a superstitious reluctance against mentioning even the names of their gods and heroes. Not many years ago it was supposed, on good authority, that the Zulus had no religious ideas at all; at present our very Bishops (Protestant) have been silenced by their theological

[1] *Primitive Culture*, i. p. 378.

inquiries."[1] We are justified, then, in saying that as yet we have no reliable evidence of any single nation utterly devoid of religious sentiment. And, further, that in those isolated groups which are wholly irreligious their reasoning faculty is absolutely undeveloped, and that their condition simply amounts to brutish.[2] This degradation of man to a state of brutishness and imbecility is the characteristic effect of atheism, whether found among isolated savage tribes or individuals of a civilised race.

When, therefore, the atheist says, "Give me proof of your God," we simply reply, "Man from the beginning has known God, and faith in God is his normal possession.[3] Do you disprove this natural right of his, and show that his faith has been one long delusion." The owner of an immemorial inheritance has not to prove his title; it is for his opponent to disprove it. And this atheism cannot do, although it may, and does, question the evidence of history, common sense, and philosophy for the existence of God.

Theism, then, is in possession.

But let us ask, "Have we these proofs of the existence of God? or are they hard to find? I cannot see God, and yet everywhere I behold Him;

[1] *Lectures on the Science of Religion*, 1873, p. 53.

[2] According to Azara, the races without religion have only an external resemblance to man, and, like the beasts of the field, are without social organisation.

[3] One of its earliest advocates (Cabanis) acknowledges that atheism contradicts our most direct impressions and the universal voice of mankind (*Lettre sur les Causes Premières. Publié par Bérard*).

wherever I go, I walk in His presence, for 'He left not Himself without testimony.'"[1] The whole creation silently but eloquently declares the presence of an invisible Being. Proof from nature. "That we are obliged to prove the existence of God," says Möhler, "is a sign that the Divine Image is miserably obscured in us, but that we can prove it shows that it is not obliterated."[2] "That which is known of God is manifest in them," says the Apostle, "for God hath manifested it unto them. For the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being manifested by the things that are made; His Eternal Power also and Divinity, so that they are inexcusable."[3]

[1] Acts Ap. xiv. 16.

[2] *Gesammelte Aufsätze*, ii. p. 154.

[3] Rom. i. 19 *sq.* That the Apostle is here speaking of the natural evidence of God is manifest. First, the words, "For the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen," are an universal affirmation, and cannot without violence be restricted to signify only a primitive revelation. Secondly, the Apostle here contrasts the law of Moses and the Jews' transgressions of their positive revelation with the natural law of the heathen and their offences against the same (Rom. i. 21–23; ii. 12–15). This law, being written in their hearts, was to them the deepest and surest sign of their intellectual nature. Thirdly, the Apostle refers to Wisdom xiii. 1 *sq.* (as proved by the identity of many of his expressions), a passage which treats also of the knowledge of God to be gained through the contemplation of nature alone, apart from revelation. In fact, were this not so, the heathen, with his false notions of God and nature, would have been guiltless of sin in denying Him, and, for the same reason, he could never have attained to faith; for known truth can alone correct error. Ulrici well says that "Kant's theory that the existence of God is incapable of proof has become widely spread, both among believers and unbelievers. Even theologians (Protestant) concur in this view, and imagine that by so doing they serve the faith which they pro-

Now, how does nature witness to the existence of God? In three ways. First, the visible world exists; therefore there is One by and through Whom it exists: that is, God. Secondly, in the visible world there is movement, activity, and life; therefore there exists One, from Whom all movement and life first proceeded: that is, God. Thirdly, in the visible world there is order; therefore there is One Who has designed and Who regulates this order, and this Being is God.

First Cause.

Let us examine in detail this triple proof. There is a God, from Whom the visible world and all things in it proceed. The visible things around us, and we ourselves, exist. Whence are we? Whence are they? We do not proceed from ourselves, for it is not long since we began to exist. Had we proceeded from ourselves, our existence must have been, not contingent, nor in time, but necessary and eternal. Nor do the visible things around us exist of themselves; for if man is not self-existent, still less are they, for they are of a lower grade than the human intellect; they spring up and disappear. Thus all which exists derives its being,

Creatures not self-created, demand a Creator.

fess to teach. Modern theology, in so readily abandoning the proofs of God's existence, not only renounces its claims to be considered a science, but uproots the very foundations of the faith, and of the religion, to which it belongs. Such writers do not reflect that faith founded *upon* authority presupposes faith *in* authority, and that faith without solid foundation becomes a mere arbitrary subjective assent" (*Gott und die Natur*, Leipzig, 1862, Pref.). *Cf.* St. Thomas, *Comment in Epist. Pauli ad. Rom.*, ch. i. sect. vi. Cf. *Conc. Vatic. Constit. Dogm. de Fide Cath.*, cap i. can. 1.

not from itself, but from another, Whose Being originates, not in any other, but in Himself; Who is therefore unconditional and independent of all others; that is, the absolute, essential, and supreme Being. And this Being is God.[1]

To express the same idea in another form. There are beings who may or may not exist; that is to say, possible and contingent beings: therefore there is a Being Who always exists, and always must have existed; that is, a necessary Being. For if a being for whom existence or non-existence is possible *de facto* exists, there must be a cause for his existence. But he does not possess this cause in himself, since, as a merely possible being, his non-existence is equally possible. Therefore the cause of his existence must be found in Another—in a necessary absolute Being, Who by His essence always exists, outside of and above the world; that is, above the totality of these conditional beings, as an absolute, unconditional Being, governing and limiting all alike.[2]

Beings contingent presuppose an absolute Being.

But may there not have been an endless series of

[1] In reply to Kant's objection to this argument, Hegel well says: "If, as Kant maintains, thought never gets beyond the region of the senses, we must first understand how it came there. . . . Unless we think of reason and the ideas belonging to it as independent of the material world and self-subsistent, reason has no meaning" (*Works*, xii. p. 377). St. Thomas, *Cont. Gent.*, i. c. 12, both states and refutes this objection.

[2] *Cf.* St. Thomas, S. I. Qu. ii. Art. 3.

beings, each of which determines the other, and thus each in turn gives and receives life?[1]

This objection, however cleverly disguised under philosophical garb or poetic images, contains a radical contradiction and absurdity. For this imaginary unending series, being augmented by each newly created being, gives us an infinity of mere finite beings; in other words, a positive total obtained by the addition of zeros. But the objection, apart from its essential unsoundness, simply evades, and does not solve the question. Aristotle says[2] that in an enumeration of causes we cannot go back to an endless series, and must therefore necessarily admit One First, Superior Cause, without Whom we cannot conceive any intermediate causes. For in this imaginary series of determined and determining causes, none can claim to be the sufficient cause of another, but each is simply an intermediate cause. If this be true of the individuals, it is equally true of the entire series, for the fact of their sequence does not change their nature as merely intermediate causes. Such a sequence is like a chain whose first link is suspended in air, and yet must sustain the weight of the whole. We must, then, admit one independent Supreme Cause, from Whom the whole series proceeds, and upon Whom it rests; that is God. Moreover, according to the above hypothesis,

An infinite series of creatures

is a contradiction in terms.

[1] See Moleschott's *Kreislauf des Lebens*, where this objection is stated.

[2] *Metaphys.*, ii. 2.

we should have to assume as many sequences as there are organic beings each one only producing its like.[1]

But the history of the earth and of man alike disprove the theory of a past without beginning. "We admit with Deluc," says Saussure,[2] "that the actual condition of our terrestrial globe is not as ancient as some philosophers had imagined." "Deluc's works have enlightened me as to a fact," says Dolomien,[3] "which I am prepared to defend, and which appears to me unassailable, a fact attested by every page of history and by the phenomena of nature, that the existing condition of our continent is by no means ancient." "If geology proves anything," says Cuvier,[4] "it is that the surface of our globe was the theatre of a great and sudden revolution, not more than five or six thousand years ago." "Philosophers," says Liebig,[5] "have affirmed that life has had no *beginning;* that it has existed from all eternity. But scientific research has proved that at a certain period the temperature of the earth made organic life impossible, since at 78°

Disproved also by natural phenomena,

and by history of man.

[1] Czolbe actually maintains this absurdity. According to him, all species of crystals, animals, and plants are eternal (*Neue Darstellung des Sensualismus*, p. 150 *ss.*).

[2] *Voyage des Alpes*, s. 625.

[3] *Journal de Physique*, i. p. 42; Paris, 1792.

[4] *Discours sur les Révolutions du Globe*, p. 342. Among recent authors *cf.* Burmeister, *Geschichte der Schöpfung*, p. 270 *ss.* He distinguishes three periods: man only appears in the third and last (the diluvium). See also Quenstedt, *Epochen der Natur*, p. 61; *Sonst und Jetzt*, p. 235 *ss.*

[5] *Gazette d'Augsburg*, No. 24.

(212° F.) of heat the blood becomes coagulated. This shows that organic life upon earth had a beginning." Lucretius himself, the poet of atheism, could not but testify to the recent origin of the human race. He thus speaks:—

"Yet grant this heaven, this earth the heaven surrounds,
Time ne'er produced, eternal of themselves.
Whence, ere the Theban war and fate of Troy,
Have earlier bards no earlier actions sung?
Whence fell each chief unhonoured? and his deeds
Shut from the tablet of immortal fame?"
(*De Natura Rerum*, v. 338).

Historic certainty commences, indeed, among all nations at the same period; that is, about the eighth century before our era,[1] and we can trace historically the first beginnings of the arts and sciences, which have been gradually developed to their present perfection. These facts are incompatible with an endless series of human beings in the past; that is, with the eternity of the human race.[2]

[1] In his *Discours sur les Révolutions du Globe*, Cuvier asks, "Can it be mere chance that tradition places the origin of the Assyrian, Indian, and Chinese Empires at the same date, about 2000 years before Christ, or forty centuries before our own time? Would the ideas of nations who have so little in common be likely to agree on this point if it were not true?" (Du Maistre, *Soirées de St. Petersburg*, i. 90). "The Pentateuch," says Rénan, "records primitive facts which bring us very near to the origin of the human race" (*Histoire du Peuple d'Israel*). According to Cuvier, "it is the oldest book in the world" (*Ibid.*, 6th Edition, p. 171).

[2] Aristotle's opinion, that every art and science had been countless times discovered and lost again, rests on no objective grounds, but is the necessary consequence of his erroneous view of a time without beginning or end (*Metaphys.*, xii. 8; *De Cœlo*, i. 3; *Polit.*

Let us pass on to the second proof. The universe exists, not as a dead, inert mass, but instinct with movement, activity, and life. The vast orbits of the heavenly bodies, the crystals forming secretly in the earth's depth, the butterfly fluttering in the sunshine, the lion prowling in the forest, the worm crawling in the dust, the current of thought in the human intellect, all this is movement, and movement not self-caused, but received. As the will raises the arm to sling the stone which thus hits the mark, so through the universe a current of mechanical movement, of organic and intellectual life, flows constantly, and necessarily proceeding from some first mover which is itself unmoved.[1] A hundred trucks on a rail, impelled by a movement successively communicated from the first, necessarily presuppose a hand and will as cause of the original impulse; and though the hand were

First Mover.

vii. 18). The antiquity ascribed to the earth, especially in the chronology of Eastern nations, is a mythical invention, to express the duration of their imaginary gods. So Lücken tells us (*Die Traditionen des Menschengeschlechts*), and he has with him the ancient historians, who all considered this chronology unreliable (Cicero *De Divin.*, i. 19; *Diodorus*, i. 26; Macrobius, *Saturn*, i.). Real astronomical observations were for the first time made by Ptolemy B.C. 721 (Humboldt, *Kosmos*, ii. p. 196). The antiquity of the Nile valley cannot extend beyond B.C. 2960. Luxor or Thebes in Upper Egypt must have been built about B.C. 1400. This result comes from calculations founded on the ascertained rise in the level of the ground, caused by the yearly deposits of the Nile floods.

[1] The ancients define movement as "actus entis in potentia, quatenus est ens in potentia" (*Cf.* Aristotle, *Physic.*, iii. 1.; St. Thom., in iii. *Physic.*, L. ii.; S. Joan., *Damascen. Dialect*, c. lxi.). We understand by "movement" not merely change of place, but in the sense of modern natural science, which affirms the "unity of the forces of nature."

unseen, we should not therefore doubt its existence.[1] Who then is the Origin and Source of all that lives and moves in the universe? God, for God is Life, Life itself, essential energy, essential mind.[2] "How," says Aristotle,[3] "can anything be set in motion without the existence of a motive power? Therefore God, Who is supreme, pure Spirit, does exist."[4]

[1] De Maistre, *Soirées de St. Petersburg*, i. 286.

[2] *Actus purus.*

[3] *Metaphys.*, iv. 6. Clarke, the disciple of Newton, speaking of the attraction on which depends all movement of the heavenly bodies—"It may be the effect of an impulse, which is certainly not material; but is that of an immaterial cause" (*Physique de Rohault*, Latin translation by Clarke, II. c. xi. 15). "The only Being," says Cauchy (*Comptes rendus Hebdomadaires des Séances de l'Académie des Sciences*, vol. xxi., Paris, 1845), "from whom physical force can proceed is the necessary Being. Force is the expression of His Will. The various forces of equilibrium and movement are secondary causes. Universal gravitation, that is, the attraction of two bodies in inverse proportion to the square of their distance, is a law, which is the expression of the Divine Will." Newton himself had said, "I by no means affirm that gravity is essential to bodies;" and Leibnitz (*Cont. Atheist.*): "Mobility, not movement, is a property of bodies." Again: "We see that matter now follows the infallible laws which govern it, and which maintain invariable regularity; but there must have been a first impulse, which ordered all, for all time. Even those deviations from its laws which we observe in the admirable system of the heavens attest the actual and indefectible presence of their Creator. Everywhere we find the supernatural, and science must be satisfied to solve certain problems by other means than that of observation, which is impracticable. Now, the origin of all things is one of those problems which, under the cloak of a prudent reserve, men are afraid to face. But this question is imperative, and to attempt to evade it is useless" (Barthélemy de St. Hilaire, *Journal des Savants*, 1862, p. 607).

[4] P. Janet, in his work, *Le Materialisme en Allemagne*, has also made use of this proof, now discredited by certain philosophers: "We know those laws of motion to which all bodies are subject,

Our third proof confirms this statement. The movement of life which we observe throughout the universe does not proceed from a chance or random impulse, but is throughout ordered on a fixed and definite design. All that exists in the visible world, whether considered as a whole or in each several organism, shows unmistakably adaptation to an end. These ends form collectively a grand teleological system. The laws of the non-organic world subserve the existence of organic beings, each individual of which is again ordained for the preservation of the whole. But order and conformity to end reveal an ordaining and adapting Intelligence. Therefore, the visible world is the creation of an Intelligence which established all things in this order from the first; and this infinite Intelligence is God. This argument from design is more readily grasped than the direct metaphysical proofs already given, for although man's own intellectual life is nearer to him than the outer world, and, as St. Augustine says,[1] "Truth is found within," yet he turns first to the life of the senses, before he withdraws within to contemplate himself. Thus, in Greek philosophy, physics preceded ethics; for Socrates "first brought philosophy

Argument from design.

but not their cause. If we say gravitation is this cause, we only give it a name without defining its essence. Gravitation alone does not explain the courses of material bodies, since there must be some independent force which gives the first impulse" (B. Cotta, *Geologie der Gegenwart*, p. 321).

[1] "In teipsum redi, in interiori homine habitat veritas" (*De Vera Religione*, c. 39).

from heaven to earth," and epic poetry, which is the poetic representation of the outer world, came before lyric poetry, which represents the inward life.

But atheism contends that this order and conformity to design, manifested throughout nature, is but the result of chance.[1] What, then, is chance? A word, and nothing more—the *x* of our sums, a conventional sign, employed to signify an unknown quantity.

To make, then, chance a cause, to the exclusion of the true Cause, is to set up an empty negation as the cause of existence and order, and to affirm a fact without a cause.[2] "If the fortuitous concurrence of atoms," says Cicero, "could create the universe, why has it never produced a temple, a

Order of universe not fortuitous,

[1] "But from this boundless mass of matter first
How heaven, and earth and ocean, sun and moon,
Rose in nice order now the Muse shall tell;
For never, doubtless, from result of thought
Or mutual compact could primordial seeds
First harmonise, or move with powers precise,
But countless crowds, in countless manners urged
From time eternal, by intrinsic weight
And ceaseless repercussion, to combine
In all the possibilities of forms
Of actions and connections, and exert
In every change some effort to create,
Reared the rude frame at length—abruptly reared,
Which, when once gendered, must the basis prove
Of things sublime; and whence eventual rose
Heaven, earth and ocean, and the tribes of sense"
(*Lucretius*, Book V., v. 431).

[2] Hence even Democritus said, "Only the ignorant ascribe things to chance, for in reality there is no such thing" (Stobæus, *Eclog. Ethic*, p. 344). No better answer was ever made to the mechanical theory of nature.

portico, a city, or house, the construction of any of which objects would be far more simple?"[1] "The perfect harmony which we find in all parts of the universe," says Mädler, "proves the existence of a volition, intelligent, self-conscious, and free in its action; *e.g.*, the comets are irrefragable signs that an All-wise, Almighty Being governs the universe."[2] Agassiz[3] tells us that "the world is the manifestation of an Intelligence as mighty as it is productive; of a Goodness as infinite as it is wise; furnishing thereby the clear evidence of the existence of a personal God, Creator of all things, Ruler of the universe, Dispenser of all good."

The assertion of some atheists, that the forces and laws of nature are *necessarily* in action, is simply another subterfuge. Strauss[4] argues, "We have no right to conclude that because man cannot produce a work requiring the adaptation of means to an end without consciously aiming at that end, therefore such works in nature must be similarly produced; that is, by an intelligent Creator. For," he rejoins, "nature herself proves that her adapted work does not imply conscious intelligence in the worker." But, on the contrary, this necessarily fixed action of the forces of nature, and conformity to their purpose, are an additional argument for the existence of a cause which has deter-

nor necessarily produced.

Fixedness of natural law proof of lawgiver.

[1] *De Natura Rerum*, L. ii.
[2] *Die Kometen.*
[3] *Ueber die fossilen Fische*, i. p. 171.
[4] *Der alte und der neue Glaube*, p. 117.

mined this fixedness and conformity.[1] Nor can the result be ascribed, as others say, to different products, resulting from differentiated motive forces; for who, or what, differentiated these forces, so as to produce these different effects, each of which expresses a different idea? Who so ordered this marvellous variety, that the most perfect harmony arises therefrom?[2]

Animals endowed with instinct or intelligence alike prove an intelligent Creator.

Again, Strauss appeals to the instincts of animals: "Just as instinct is an action which seems directed to a known end, and yet is not so, so also it is with the works of nature."[3] Now, instinct not only *seems*, but *is* conformable to its end. Instinct works with known and determined purpose, although the animal is as unconscious of it as the plant is unconscious of the purpose of its growth. The brute's and the plant's unconsciousness of their purposes in creation simply proves that they did not appoint them.[4] Man acts with an end, and is conscious of so acting. And as, accord-

[1] *Cf.* Trendelenburg, *Logische Untersuchungen*, ii. p. 24.

[2] Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 26: "Atoms are to the different organisms what the letters of the alphabet are to Homer's *Iliad;* their proximate and material cause (*causa efficiens et materialis*), but not their adequate cause (*causa finalis et formalis*); and the adequate cause alone made the poem and the body what they are. That cause was, in one case, the idea in the poet's mind, preceding the poem; in the other, the idea in the mind of the Creator, preceding the organism, and determining that which was in itself indifferent."

[3] *Der alte und der neue Glaube*, 1873, p. 117.

[4] "These things, which are without knowledge, only tend to their end by direction of some agent, who has both knowledge and intelligence, as the arrow directed by the archer" (S. I., Qu. ii. Art. 3).

ing even to the materialists, man himself is a part of nature, his designed action is surely evidence of design in nature's works.

Plato declares that it is a prejudice of the ignorant multitude "to believe that all students of astronomy or science are prone to deny the Gods, because they ascribe everything to the action of necessary laws, without the intervention of an intelligent free Cause; but that, in fact, the exact opposite is true, namely, that the soul is the first and most ancient of all existences, the original source of movement and order. Even in primitive times, those who investigated this matter more closely surmised, what is now firmly established, that it would be impossible for soulless bodies, devoid of intelligence, to preserve such regular uniformity, and an order so accurately determined. And some found courage to express their conviction that this perfect ordering of all things under heaven must be the work of a Supreme Intelligence."[1]

Again it is argued, "that the order which reigns in the world proves at most the existence of an Architect, who fashions all with materials ready prepared to his hand, not that of a Creator, to whose idea all is subject, or who is the absolute Master of all that exists."[2] But this *intentional* form of things in nature is not accidental or external; it is their interior, essential, and substantial form; *i.e.*, their very idea, nature, and

Form of anything not accidental, but essential, shows "ordo intentionalis."

[1] *De Legg*, xii. p. 967; *Apolog. Socrat.*, p. 18.
[2] Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, p. 100.

essence; and is, consequently, absolutely inalienable from the things themselves. It does not merely belong to them; it is within them; one with them; and is inalienably identified with the idea we form of them.[1] Thus conformity to design is the essential mark of an organism, without which it cannot be conceived. And as He Who determined the form determined also the essence—for we are speaking of essential forms—this same Being must be not merely the Architect, but the Creator of the world.[2]

But is it indeed true that order and design prevail throughout the universe? Nature presents a very incongruous scene, a mixture of good and bad. When the rains and sunshine of spring have so fittingly developed the germs and blossoms, what more incongruous than a destructive frost?[3] But does our ignorance of the purpose of one particular event destroy the evidence of harmony and design offered by the

[1] "Τὸ μὲν γὰρ τι εστι κἰα τὸ οὗ ἑνεκα ἕν εστι" (Aristotle, *Physic*, ii. 7.)

[2] "The natural necessity inherent in those things which are determined to one type, is a Divine impress directing them to that end, just as the necessity by which the arrow is directed to a determined mark is impressed, not by the arrow, but by the archer. There is, however, this difference: the Divine impress gives creatures their nature; the human impress only acts violently on the nature already created" (S. I., Qu. ciii. Art 1).

"Art," says Buffon, "finds its models in the works of nature: all man's inventions are only rude imitations of what nature has created in perfection" (vol. ix. p. 12).

[3] Strauss, *Glaubenslehre*, ii. p. 384. "The untoward events or failure of purpose in the history of individuals and of nations is a subject largely made use of by Voltaire in his well-known satires against Divine Providence" (Candide, *The Earthquake of Lisbon*, &c.). *Cf.* S. I., Qu. xxii. Art. 2. ad. 2.

universe as a whole? "A chronometer," says De Maistre, "found by some savage in the forests of America, is as clear a proof to him of the skill and intelligence of its maker as it is to the greatest astronomer." What to our limited vision and individual interests appears incongruous, finds its purpose when viewed in relation to creation at large? "All is ordered," says St. Augustine,[1] "in subservience and conformity to the completeness and beauty of the universe as a whole, so that details, which, viewed individually, seem incongruous, in their relation to the whole are found therewith to be in perfect harmony." Nor do we contend that this general conformity to design is always evident; still less, that its final purpose is the immediate and suitable provision of the wants of man's daily life. We only say that the world, as a whole, affords unmistakable evidence of design and harmony; and, as Vanini remarks, "this design, seen in a blade of grass, presupposes an All-wise and Almighty Creator." The apparent imperfections in single organisms may be necessary for the preservation of the whole, which is the primary end of nature.[2] Many germs of life

Evil permitted in parts for good of whole.

[1] *De Vera Religione*, xi. 76. He compares those things in the world of whose purpose we are ignorant to the implements in a workshop whose use we do not know. Only a fool, he adds, would therefore infer that they are useless (*In. Gen.*, i. 16).

[2] "God, nature, and every agent, of whatever kind, acts for what is best for the whole, not for what is best for each part, except in order to the whole. . . . Thus many good things would cease to be if God forbade any evil to exist. Thus fire is only generated by

perish because their unlimited production would entail the destruction of all.[1] "In very few years," says Bertholt, "insects, at their rapid rate of increase, would multiply a milliardfold, and strata would be formed of the bodies of worms and grubs. Swarms of winged insects would obscure the atmosphere. The sea and rivers would overflow with shoals of fish; and on land the increase of prolific swarms of reptiles, birds, and quadrupeds would be enormous."[2] Karl E. v. Baer justly remarks[3] that the idea of a waste of vital force, such as F. A. Lange advocates,[4] is only the result of judging the working of nature by the standard of human action. The energy of nature depends upon universal forces and relations, whose result is secured by their very universality. When the plants are refreshed by rain, we must not think it wasted if it falls also on dusty roads, barren rocks, or dry watercourses. For it is thus nature produces a wealth of germs, especially among the Cryptogamia and the lower types of animal life, which are exposed to many perils, in order, by their extraordinary productivity, to preserve them from extinction; whilst, at the same time, she sets limits to their excessive increase.

The beneficent destruction of insects.

corruption of air, and the lion preserves his life only by the destruction of the ass" (S. I., Qu. xlviii. Art. 2).

[1] Heer, *Die Urwelt der Schweitz.*

[2] *Die Herrschaft der Zweckmässigkeit in der Natur*, 1877, p. 92.

[3] *Studien aus dem Gebiete der Naturwissenschaft*, Part ii.

[4] *Gesch. des Materialismus*, ii. p. 248.

Even Huxley's theory requires teleology as a complement to a purely mechanical explanation of the universe. "The whole creation, living and not living, is the result of the mutual interaction, according to definite laws, of the forces possessed by the molecules of which the primitive nebulosity of the universe was composed. If this be true, it is no less certain that the existing world lay, potentially, in the cosmic vapour; and that a sufficient intelligence could, from a knowledge of the properties of the molecules of that vapour, *e.g.*, have predicted the state of the fauna of Britain in 1869, with as much certainty as we can say what will happen to the vapour of the breath on a cold winter's day. . . . The teleological and the mechanical views of nature are not necessarily mutually exclusive. On the contrary, the more purely a mechanist the speculator is, the more firmly does he assume a primordial molecular arrangement, of which all the phenomena of the universe are the consequence."[1] Again, Lyell says: "In whatever direction we pursue our researches, we discover everywhere the clear proofs of a creative Intelligence, and of His foresight, wisdom, and power. As geologists, we learn that it is not only the present condition of the globe that is suited to the accommodation of myriads of living creatures, but that many former states also were adapted to the organisation and habits of former races of beings. The disposition of the seas, continents, and islands, and the climates,

Huxley and Lyell on design.

[1] *The Academy*, vol. i. p. 13, 1869.

have varied, the species likewise have been changed, and yet they have all been so modelled on types analogous to those of existing plants and animals as to indicate throughout a perfect harmony of design and unity of purpose."[1] This principle of design is also displayed in the science of anatomy. Recent discoveries show that the construction of the ligaments which support and keep in place the human thigh-bone exactly corresponds to the rules of modern mechanics, founded on mathematical laws of strain and resistance as now applied to railways.[2]

But a Creator implies an Almighty Being. To bridge over the yawning abyss between nothing and existence is the prerogative of God alone.[3] The finite and contingent being is dependent upon and limited by matter, which he forms, fashions, and shapes; but he does not create that which already existed in substance; his own essence being conditional, his action is also necessarily conditioned thereby.[4] How, then, are we to repre-

Creation a Divine act,

[1] *Principles of Geology*, ii. 613, 1868.

[2] *Cf. Verhandlungen 'der physikalisch medicinischen, Gesellschaft in Würzburg*, 1872, p. 142.

[3] "To have been created simply denotes the transition from nothing to being" (*Nihilum sui et subjecti*).

[4] "God," says St. Thomas, "is pure activity (*agens tantum*), and absolutely free in His action (S. I., xliv. 4). He has no end to gain or lose, and no limit as to His power. Finite causes are not simply active, but both active and passive, because dependent on the end they desire to attain, and limited by the matter on which they act. To this idea of God, as the Supreme Being, pure activity, essential mind, corresponds creation, that is, a free creation, which is solely the effect of the Divine Will and Goodness. Only because

sent to ourselves the creative power of God? We conceive, recognise, and assume it, for thus far we are necessarily led by external things: but we can never represent it, as it is in itself; for the finite mind can only represent to itself that which is within its sphere, and has entered within the range of its visible phenomena. "We shall never discover," says an able writer,[1] "how essence or existence is called into being. Had we to create a world, the solution of this problem would be important for us; but as we have only to do with what already exists, we are ready to admit that all being is a mystery, whose eternal[2] existence we have to take for granted, but whose origin we simply acknowledge as a fact without being able to fathom the manner of its production." "State umana gente al quia?" was the wise saying of the poet.

incomprehensible to the creature.

The axiom of the Epicureans, "From nothing, nothing is made," which our modern philosophers quote so triumphantly, is of no real weight. As an argument against the theory of creation, its strength rests only in the imagination, which substitutes phan-

creation was out of nothing is God the First, Absolute, and Essential Cause of all things; and since He is this, Creator is His exclusive attribute. "The most universal effects must always be referred to the most universal and primary causes. But, amongst all effects, the most universal is being itself, which can, therefore, only be the effect of the First and most universal Cause; and this Cause is God" (S. I., Qu. xlv. Art. 5). Therefore, to speak of a secondary creative power is a contradiction in terms.

[1] Lotze, *Medicinische Psychologie*, p. 152.

[2] Christian philosophy admits only one eternal Being, the Creator Himself.

tasms for intellectual ideas, and then represents creation as the act by which this imaginary nothing is changed into the universe, just as the earth itself, by the organic process of assimilation, is changed into flowers and fruits. Hence, if the phrase "out of nothing" means pre-existing matter, which is transformed into and has become the world, the axiom, "Out of nothing, nothing is made," is true, and it does not require any great acuteness to apprehend this. But the phrase, "God created the world out of nothing," was employed to exclude any idea of pre-existing matter, and it is by a direct perversion of its sense that "nothing" can be understood as the matrix, origin, and matter of being.[1]

"Out of nothing, nothing is made," merely denies existence of matter prior to creation.

Let us now consider how reason within us, as well as the external world and history, bears witness to the existence of God.

III. Proof from the *human mind.*

In the previous chapter we have shown that the first principles of our reason regulate all our intellectual acts and beget all our knowledge, whether mental or moral. The primary ideas of logic, mathematics, metaphysics, and ethics are objectively true, and are not merely the product of any individual mind. Whence, then, comes their truth? Is it the work of our

Truth objective to and independent of the reason.

[1] "When we say that anything is made out of nothing, we mean to deny the existence of any material cause" (S. I., Qu. xlv. Art. 1). "When we affirm," says St. Augustine, "that God created the world out of nothing, we do not thereby grant that nothing has any existence, but we simply mean to distinguish the Divine Essence from the essence of created things" (*Op. Imperf. Cont. Julian.*, v. 31).

reason? No! For "if I had created truth," says St. Augustine, "I might say 'my truth.'" But who has ever said this?[1] "Truth is not mine, or thine; nor does it belong to a third person, but is common to us all. Thou callest us, O God, to fellowship in the truth, and this Thou teachest us, not to regard truth as our private possession, lest we should be deprived of it.[2] For he who desires that as his property, which belongs to all, is driven from what is in common to his own, that is, from truth to a lie; for he who 'speaketh a lie speaketh of his own.'"[3]

Nor can we say that that only is true which is conformable to our reason; for truth is eternal. That the whole is greater than the part, that we must do good and avoid evil, would still be true even if our reason, or other created reason, had no existence; just as light exists whether the eye sees it or not. Truth, then, is not a product of reason, but reason was given for the understanding of truth. Once granted a created reason, the reasonableness or essence of this reason consists in its apprehending truth; just as the material eye needs but to open in order to see light, because it is organised for sight. And thus truth is a law above and prior to reason, nor can reason renounce truth without falling away from itself and becoming irrational.

[1] *Confessions*, xii. 25.

[2] "Ut nolimus eam habere privatam ne privemur ea."

[3] John viii. 44. Heraclitus had before pointed out that the isolation of thought, the result of breaking away from the objective Divine Reason, is the root of all error. *Cf.* Sextus, *Empiric.*, vii. 133.

Whence, then, is truth, and where is its abode? Does it abide in those things which we call true? Not so; for these things appear and vanish, whilst truth remains for ever unchangeable and eternal. Things are contingent; they can either be or not be; but truth must necessarily be. Had a geometrical figure never existed, the propositions of geometry would still hold; and when we call a past action good, or demonstrate a geometrical proposition by a figure, we only apply to the reality the measure of the idea which existed prior to, and external to that reality, and which, independently of it, is true.

Not co-existent in creatures, which are contingent, while truth is absolute and eternal;

Or does truth exist of and by itself? This is impossible; for what is truth apart from and external to the reason which perceives it, or what is thought without the thinking mind? Truth, then, presupposes one universal supreme reason, in and through which the fundamental truths of the intellect are clearly manifest in their unity and connection. This supreme and primal reason, the prototype and principle of human intelligence, is not merely a mental abstraction, for it would not then be independent of our minds or constitute the law of thought. Moreover, a mere abstraction has no real existence outside the mind; it is *non ens*,[1] a mere nullity; and, as such,

[1] "An abstract universal includes two ideas: the nature of the thing itself, e.g., *man*, and the universal idea abstracted therefrom, e.g., *humanity*. The nature exists only in *singulars* (*i.e.*, in living men); the universal idea abstracted from the nature is in the mind" (S. I., Qu. lxxxv. Art. 2, ad.).

could never be the source of truth and reason. But as truth exists, though it exists only in the mind, as the mind is its sole habitat, therefore eternal truth demands an Eternal Mind, a Supreme Intelligence, as its basis. And this Supreme Intelligence is God. God is Truth, and Truth is God. And the fundamental ideas of the human reason constitute the image, the reflection of the Divine Reason in the human mind.[1]

and therefore presupposes a supreme eternal existing reason;

"The necessary truths of reason," says St. Thomas,[2] "are eternal truths; not that what is eternal can exist apart from God, but because they exist from all eternity in the Divine Mind." He elsewhere[3] demonstrates most forcibly the existence of God as supreme

[1] Even Plato recognises this when he says: "On the extreme limits of the intelligent world we find the idea of Good. Though scarcely perceptible, when once distinguished we recognise it as the source of all beauty and goodness, of all truth and reason, in the world of intelligence; as it is of light, and of the luminaries which give light in the visible world" (*De Repub.*, vii. 517). And again: "In its upward flight the soul contemplates justice, wisdom, and science; not science as subject to change, and different in different beings, but science as it exists in Him Who is the one self-existent Being" (*Phædr.*, p. 27). "La vraie raison et essentielle loge dans le sein de Dieu; c'est là son gîte et sa retraite; c'est de là qu'elle part, quand il plait à Dieu nous en départir quelques rayons" (Montaigne, *Essais*, ii. 41). "All these created goods must be good by reason of some one good, and that *the* Good itself. All other goods are more or less good, in so far as they participate in that one Good, which is itself the supreme and highest Good" (St. Anselm, *Monolog.*, cap. i.). Cf. *Ibid.*, cap. xviii.; *De Verit*, cap. x. 13. We find the same proof in Aristotle, *Schol.*, p. 487, *Edit. de Berlin., De Cœlo.*, i. 9.

[2] S. I., Qu. x. Art. 3.

[3] *Quæst. Disp. Quæst. Unica de Sp. Creat.*, Art. 10.

reason. "We must necessarily admit," says he, "an Intelligence higher than the human mind, upon which its knowledge depends; for all that belongs to anything by participation must exist in another in essence and cause. Now, the human mind does not know by its essence; otherwise it would be pure intelligence; but it is intelligent only as regards one of its faculties, that of knowledge. There must then exist something which is intelligent wholly and essentially according to its nature, from which the intellectual faculty of the mind proceeds, and on which it depends. Moreover, act must always be prior to the faculty or potentiality of action; what is perfect must always precede the imperfect. But at first the mind has only the faculty of knowledge, and its knowledge is imperfect, since in this life it never knows all. Thus we must admit the existence of a reason superior to human reason, which knows all and is in full possession of all truth." [1] "We know, then, all things in God. He is the measure by which we estimate and measure all in His Truth which He has communicated to us." [2] As St. Augustine says: "Ideas are the enduring prototypes and unchanging forms of things, not created,

as is shown by St. Thomas,

and St. Augustine.

[1] So also Aristotle, *Metaphys.*, xii. 7: "The first is not the seed (the simply possible, the imperfect), but the perfect." And Plato, *De Legg.*, xiii.: "The leader precedes him who is led; the guide him who is guided." And Descartes, *Medit.*, p. 18: "It is manifest to reason that there must be, at least, in the efficient and total cause whatever is found in the effect."

[2] S. I., Qu. xii. Art. 11.

but eternal, and therefore the ever-true exemplars of the Divine Intelligence. They know neither birth nor death, but all that is born or dies is modelled on them. . . . But where thinkest thou ideas can dwell save in the Mind of the Creator?"[1]

Man, however, is not mere intelligence. He is also, and in an especial manner, as we have seen, a moral agent. As truth is the law of his understanding, so the idea of moral good is the law by which he judges every act in himself and in others, and estimates its moral merit. And this law is objective and inflexible, independent of, nay, often opposed to, self-interest, and superior to the attractions or repugnances which the senses feel to merely natural good or evil. Again, this law is manifested to us, not as a theory of morals, but as a rule of life, which enforces its precepts by the sense of obligation it imposes on the will. This law is universal, admits of no exception, is unchangeable and eternal in its sense and application; obedience to its precepts brings its own

Man also a moral agent.

His conscience witnesses to a moral law,

[1] Q.Q. Div. lxxxiii. Qu. 46. Bossuet justly remarks, *Œuvres*, Paris, 1841, Tom. i. p. 79: "Supposing we were the only intelligent beings in the world, we should still be, with our imperfect intelligence, of more value than all other things, which are wholly brutal and stupid. It would then ever remain incomprehensible how this intelligent part could have sprung from an unintelligent whole, for intelligence cannot be born of what is brutal and senseless. Hence we must admit one perfect intelligence, from which all else receives its measure and faculty of intelligence." Bossuet states St. Thomas's argument in various ways, and always with equal acuteness and power.

reward, their violation its own punishment, as our conscience constantly bears witness.[1]

> "A God doth whisper softly in our hearts,
> Softly, yet audibly, doth counsel us,
> Both what we ought to seek and what to shun."
> —Tasso, iii. 2.

Whence, then, come the laws of the moral order? Whence is conscience? It is not the work of man, for man's creations are transient, and conscience exists always and everywhere; conscience is within man, not by his own act, but in spite of him, and against his will. Or is this moral law the creation of human reason? Reason recognises but does not create truth, whether metaphysical or moral; still less can it legislate for the will. A law can only be promulgated by a superior, and man cannot be at once superior and subject. Moreover, every

which, as eternal and independent,

[1] The ancients expressed themselves admirably upon the power of conscience—*e.g.*, Tacitus, *Annal.*, vi. 6, and Suetonius, *Vita Neronis*, c. 34: "And yet he could not endure the consciousness of his crime, and often confessed that he was tormented by the *image* of his mother, by the blows of the Furies, and by burning torches." And Cicero, *Pro Roscio Amerino*, c. xxiv.: "A man's chief torturer is his own fraud and error. His own crime is that which torments him and drives him mad. His own evil thoughts and conscience are the terror of his soul." *Cf.* Æschylus, *Chœphor*, 1010–1062; Euripides, *Orestes*, 284–292; and Juvenal, *Satir.*, xiii. 190–250. The law of Manu says: "Sinners flatter themselves that none see them; but the Gods see them, and the spirit which lives in them: the greatest Deities of heaven know the acts of all creatures. If thou sayest, 'I am alone with myself,' there dwells perpetually in thy innermost soul that Supreme Being who is the attentive and silent witness of all good and evil. This judge, who dwells within thy soul, is a stern judge, an inexorable avenger."

act of legislation is an act of the will. Reason, then, cannot create the moral law; it is not self-governing, autonomous, nor its own lawgiver, but only the herald by which the supreme pre-existing law is promulgated to the mind.

If, then, right and justice are not mere empty terms, if the moral order be indeed man's most precious possession, it must emanate, not from the finite intellect, but from a Supreme Lawgiver, Who is Himself the moral Ideal and moral Good. And this is God, "Who alone is good,"[1] Whose goodness is the source of all that is good, just as His truth is the source of all that is true.

can originate only in the will of God.

We have, then, demonstrated the existence of God in three ways—from history, nature, and the human mind. Since, then, God exists, What is God? Must our knowledge of Him be only a vague, undefined, and undefinable sentiment such as the poet describes?[2]

[1] St. Matt. xix. 17: "One is good, God."

[2] "Who can name Him, and, knowing what He says,
Say, 'I believe in Him?' And who can feel,
And with self-violence to conscience,
Hardening his heart, say, 'I believe Him not?'
And does not all that is, seen and unseen,
Mysterious all, around thee, and within,
Untiring agency, press on thy heart and mind?
Fill thy whole heart with it, and when thou art
Lost in the consciousness of happiness,
Then call it what thou wilt.
Happiness! Heart! Love! God!
I have no name for it—*Feeling* is *all*,
Name, sound and smoke,
Dimming the glass of heaven."

—GOETHE, *Faust*, Pt. I. chap. iii. 3090–3115.

True, it was through our feelings that God first revealed Himself, when, in the dawning consciousness of our childhood, the secret presage of the Infinite thrilled through our souls. But man is given intelligence that he may seek out and bring to light what is at first but a vague feeling, and that he may set in definite terms his primal, mysterious notion of God. He must find that Being, who is within him; he must grasp as far as possible that truth, which is the object of his knowledge. Nor is the task above him. The Creator is, indeed, unutterable by human lips, and incomprehensible to the finite mind, but none the less He can be known, inadequately indeed, but in truth. Thus it is we have recognised God as the "I am, Who am," the one self-existent, necessary, and absolute Being. God is *Infinite*, because bound neither by condition nor limit, but not *indefinite*, in the sense of an empty abstraction, who has no personal existence, nor as the sum and aggregate of all finite existences, for then He would be not One Being, but many. Rather, He is Infinite, because He is the Absolute Being, the Source of all existence. And from this Source flows that Being, which He communicates in limited measure to creatures, from whom again, by reason of their limitation, He, the Infinite, is essentially distinct.[1]

God not unknowable.

Though infinite, not indefinite.

[1] Thus God is not the universal, indeterminate Being of Pantheism, the *esse commune* of the ancients. God is not Being, but He is "He Who is." The phrase "God is Being" expresses the pan-

But this is not all. Our knowledge of God is not merely negative, nor expressed by denying of Him the imperfections essential to a creature. We know not merely what He is not; we know, inadequately indeed, but still certainly, what He is. God, then, is not merely the unconditioned, necessary Existence. He is at the same time the Origin and Principle of all existence, of all that lives in His creation. All that is good, true, or perfect, of every kind, in creation must exist primarily in God, only in an infinitely higher, purer, and more perfect form, as the idea of the Divine Essence demands, for whatever appears in the effect must necessarily be contained in a far higher degree of perfection in the Cause. And all these perfections in Him are not, as in finite beings, distinct and separate from one another, but together form one, simple, infinite perfection of the One infinitely simple perfect Being. To the finite mind the Divine perfections appear separable, because it only views them,

One, but virtually multiple.

theistic view of the infinite as something common to all and indeterminate. The use of the Infinitive denotes the personification of the abstraction, and confuses it with the concrete; *das gehen, hören, denken,* walking, hearing, thinking, have no actual existence in themselves, but only in the walker, hearer, thinker. "By placing the Article before the Infinitive," remarks Ancillon (Perrone, *Prælect. Theolog.*, vol. iii., Part iii. sect. i. cap. 1, note), "the German metaphysicians change that which is in itself absolutely undetermined into a determined being, with fatal results to German philosophy." Groundless too, as we have seen, is the objection of Spinoza and the pantheists that we limit the Divine Essence by defining it, "Omnis determinatio est negatio," for limitation is precisely that which is denied of God when He is defined as Infinite.

reflected in the mirror of creation, as broken and scattered rays of the Divine Essence;[1] just as the eye sees divers colours in the rainbow, although there is but one sun.[2] For the Infinity of the Divine Nature demands that its one, indivisible, simple Essence should be conceived by the finite mind under the most varied aspects.[3]

[1] When Jacobi asserts that in creating man God necessarily made him in a divine likeness, and that in recognising God man necessarily imagines Him under human attributes, he is right in a certain sense; for "every creature has, by reason of its own species, that by which it participates in a certain resemblance to the Divine Essence" (S. I., Qu. xv. Art. 2). "As God is the first Exemplar of all things" (S. I., Qu. xlv. Art. 3), the knowledge of Him is possible, "but that which we obtain of Him from creatures extends only so far as they represent Him" (*Ibid.*, Qu. xiii. Art. 2). Hence such knowledge of God is inadequate and only analogous, being based upon the relations of creatures to their Maker, in so far as they are realised by a finite mind. "For no creature represents Him as being of the same genus or species with itself; but as a super-eminent principle, the idea of which is never fully represented by the effects which it produces, though they may possess some likeness of it" (*Ibid.*, *l. c.*).

[2] In like manner, St. Augustine (*Serm.*, cxli.; *De Sanat.*, n. 8) seeks to reconcile the Unity of the Divine Essence with our different conceptions of it. "Whatever things you say of God, He is not understood as being any one or all of them, nor can anything be said worthy of Him. For these are but the expressions of minds illumined by a certain ray of His light, and affected by its qualities, as bodies are by the shining of the visible light; for when the visible light disappears all bodies are of the same colour, but when it shines each receives a different tint, according to the nature of each, though the light itself is one and the same."

[3] "If His attributes," says Schleiermacher, "represent to us something of the Divine Essence, it follows that each of these must express something in God which is not expressed by the others" (*Glaubenslehre*, p. 280). His premises are right, but his conclusions utterly false; namely, that "if knowledge is proportionate to its object, it follows that, as this knowledge is composite, so also must be its object." Each attribute is only a quality of being. Now, as

These ideas present to the mind a true, objective knowledge of God, although they represent His Essence only in its analogies with Creation.[1]

God is the one and only one Divine Being; for only because He is the one God is He absolutely supreme. A subordinate Deity would cease to be the Infinite, Supreme Being, God. He alone is the Supreme Being, Who, limited by no secondary being, governs all, without limitation.[2] Reason forbids the idea of more than one absolute Being, for if several absolutes

One Supreme.

God is the one perfect Being, He possesses in Himself all those attributes by which creatures in finite and diverse degrees resemble Him; but in Him these attributes are infinite, and undistinguished from His Essence. A higher nature always includes the lower, but in greater degree; as, *e.g.*, the human soul possesses the functions of animal and vegetable life without therefore ceasing to be a simple being. A logical and a real distinction are essentially diverse; nor does the former in any way imply the latter. Catholic theology does not, then, as Strauss says, contradict itself in teaching that the attributes of God are virtually distinct, though His Essence is one. Our conception of justice (*ratio formalis*) is really distinct from our conception of mercy, and as we are forced to speak of God in a human way, we call these attributes virtually distinguished in Him, because, though in Him they are one, they are realised only under distinct conceptions by us. *Cf.* S. I., Qu. xiii. Art. 3.

[1] "If I ascribe omniscience to God," says Strauss (*ad. loc. cit.*), "I am not certain whether limitation (!) and finality (!) are not essentially bound up with that idea of omniscience, or that it is conceivable without them." As a demonstration he quotes a saying of Spinoza (*Ep.* lx.): "If a triangle could speak, it would maintain that God is in supreme degree triangular," which is true. But man alone can speak, that is, think and perceive; and thus man alone of visible creatures, as a finite intelligence, is the image of the Infinite Intelligence, and is capable of knowing God.

[2] Lactantius, *De Ira. Dei.*, c. xi.; Tertullian, *Cosit. Marc.*, i. 2.

were possible, an infinite number would be equally possible, which is a contradiction in terms. God, being supreme and simple, is therefore pure Act; that is, pure Spirit;[1] for matter has in itself no principle of activity. Thus God is Supreme Intelligence. "He that planted the ear, shall He not hear? or He that formed the eye, doth He not consider?"[2] Aristotle defines God, the Supreme Cause of all things, as Thought; the absolute, eternal, thinking Essence, distinct from matter; Thought, ever the same and unchanged, whose object is supreme perfection. God is Himself the Object of His Thought—the unity of Thought and Being, having perfect knowledge of Himself, and therefore He is the One supremely perfect and ever-blessed Being.[3] God is free, for free will is the immediate consequence of intelligence. Again, because God is infinite, He is not limited by the bounds of the finite, by space and time, but is Omnipresent, Immortal, and Eternal. The world is not God Himself, nor is it outside God,[4] but it is in God, and He in

A Spirit, and therefore Intelligent.

And, because intelligent, free.

[1] God is pure Act—*Actus purus.* All that is truly in act is only so because it exercises a certain activity. Thus the mineral, for instance, exists because of the forces of cohesion and repulsion, and without their action it would be dissolved. In God there is no faculty nor potentiality, but He is all act, all life. This can never be the case in creatures, neither in bodily things, as we have seen, nor in created intelligences, whose faculties are not always in action.

[2] Ps. cxiii. 9.

[3] *Metaphys.*, xii. 7–9.

[4] Ἐν πᾶσίν ἐστι, καὶ πάντων ἐκτός (*Cyrill. Hieros. Catech.*, iv. 5).

it, by His Essence and His power. The world proceeds from God; in Him it rests. All power, all energy, all life in the world proceed from Him alone; all finds in Him its beginning and end. As He created the world by His Power, Wisdom, and Love, so by them He preserves it and guides it to Himself, its last end; and all evil and all sin, which He permits, must finally subserve His Eternal Scheme. "For it is but a portion of that power, which still would do the evil, and yet always does the good."[1]

If the sufferings of the just in this life and the prosperity of the wicked be urged against the doctrine of Divine Providence, we deny that here the just are always miserable and the unjust happy, for the latter are as often, or more often miserable than the former. But the question would be better put, "Why is the just man not always happy, and the sinner unhappy?" To which we reply, that then virtue would have no merit, and that this life is not the end of the Divine Action, but only a means to its attainment.

Sufferings of the just for their probation.

Against the atheist, who denies the existence of God, or the Deist, who will not admit His Providence, we have shown that God is, and that our God is not a dumb idol or inaccessible phantom[2] who leaves the world

[1] "Ein Theil von jener Kraft,
Die stets das Böse will, und stets das Gute schafft."

[2] "For, O ye powers divine, whose tranquil lives
Flow free from care, with ceaseless sunshine blest,
Who the vast whole could guide, 'midst all your ranks,
Who grasp the reins that curb th' entire of things?"
—LUCRETIUS, ii. v. 1105.

to chance, but the One Omnipresent Creator and Sovereign Lord of all. And it is this, the true knowledge of God, which alone explains the reality and grandeur of this earthly life. Life is not a play of alternating forces, without starting-point or final aim, nor a progress towards an uncertain and indefinite future. *Life is a Divine Thought*, designed from all eternity to be realised by mankind, and by each individual man, only, indeed, through Divine help and guidance, but to be accomplished by man's free will. Neither aimless chance nor blind necessity governs the destinies of man. Ages ago the Eye and Hand of God determined the goal and appointed to each his path, and those only who refuse His guidance are finally abandoned to the destruction they have chosen for themselves.

Faith in God alone gives life its value.

Without God there is no future life; for immortality is only from God, of and for Him, Who is the God, not of the dead, but of the living,[1] before Whom the dead live[2] for ever. Without God this life, so full of toil, suffering, and conflict, sinks into ever-deeper gloom. Without Him, each day a portion of our life—our whole life—passes away if for us there is no other; each fleeting hour rends away a portion of our very souls, and with it our courage, energy, and joy. Let us, then, draw near to God, and He will draw near to us, and we shall know by experience

[1] St. Mark xii. 27.

[2] "Regem, cui omnia vivunt" (*Offic. Mort.*).

that with Him there is neither bitterness nor desolation of spirit, but unending peace—"Thinking these things with myself, and pondering them in my heart, that to be allied to wisdom is immortality, and that there is great delight in her friendship, and inexhaustible riches in the works of her hands, and in the exercise of conference with her, wisdom and glory in the communication of her words; I went about seeking, that I might take her to myself." [1]

[1] Wisdom viii. 17, 18.

CHAPTER IV.

MATERIALISM.

THERE is, then, a God, and before all time God was. In Him is the Fount of life, and from this infinite Source He drew forth life, and communicated it to others, which till then were not.[1] This did He from love, for God is love; and it is of the nature of love to communicate of its own. Thus God is the Creator, and the world, which he made by His power His wisdom and goodness, is an image of Himself, and an indelible reflection of His glory. Man is, then, without excuse if he, "being delighted with the beauty of created things, takes them to be Gods."[2]

In these words, Holy Scripture, many thousand years since, condemned the false doctrine which deifies the world, or confounds God with it. Yet this same error appears throughout history, repeated with varying modifications, under two chief forms, materialism and pantheism. They agree, in that they both make God and the world, or nature,[3] one and the same thing. They

Materialism and pantheism alike deny aught beyond nature.

[1] "God alone is His Being, creatures have only participated being" (S. I., Qu. xlv. Art. 1). [2] Wisdom xiii. 3.

[3] Hence the name of "naturalism," often given to materialism.

differ, in that the materialist ascribes the origin of the universe to a multitude of fundamental principles or atoms, while the pantheist regards as the first cause one supreme principle, which, however, is indistinguishable from the world, and is coincident with it. Though neither system in any way explains the origin or nature of things, they both supply a new and indirect proof of the existence of God as Creator and Sovereign Lord.

Materialism, then, starts with the theory that matter, a primordial substance, without consciousness or life, is the origin and principle of all that exists, from the inorganic stone up to man.[1] Matter alone really exists. Matter is eternal, contains all things, and beyond it there is nothing: no soul or conscience; no virtue nor intelligence; no God.

Materialism makes matter the source of everything, and eternal.

This doctrine is by no means new. It was that of the Ionian philosophers, Thales, Anaximenes, and Anaximander; for in these rude beginnings of thought men naturally turned first, like children, to what they saw and touched. "The ancient philosophers," remarks St. Thomas,[2] "only attained by degrees to the knowledge of the truth; for at first, involved in material conceptions, they knew of none other than sensible bodies." Thus Aristotle rightly says[3] that Anaxagoras, in maintaining that

The error not new.

[1] The application of modern materialism to man, his nature and end, is dealt with in Chapters VI. and VII.

[2] S. I., Qu. xlv. Art. 2.

[3] *Metaphys.*, i. 3.

reason was the principle of the world, spoke like a reasonable man; whilst those before him only talked at random. The French materialists of the last century, Diderot, D'Alembert, and especially La Mettrie and Helvetius, regarded this return to the philosophy of childhood (as Cuvier[1] calls the Ionian philosophy) as the intellectual achievement of their age. Nor have our modern materialists, Feuerbach, Vogt, Moleschott,[2] advanced any new argument. They have only refurbished the worn-out weapons with a new and pompous phraseology, and presented them to the public as the final utterance of science and the panacea for every ill.

Materialism, then, declares that "matter is everything, that there is nothing else."[3] "Matter is the primeval cause of all being."[4] "Creation is only the affinity of matter,"[5] from which "earth, air, and water are evolved into growing and intelligent being."

[1] *Système de Physiologie*, i. p. 10.

[2] And their French imitators, Littré, Taine, &c.

[3] "If any shall not blush to affirm that besides matter there is nothing, let him be anathema" (*Conc. Vatic. Consti. Dogm. de Fid. Cath.: De Deo Rerum Omnium Creatore*, Can. ii.).

[4] Büchner, *Kraft und Stoff.*, p. 31.

[5] "The carbon and nitrogen imbibed by plants from the earth and air become successively grass, clover, and wheat, man and beast, and revert at last into mould and ammonia. This is the marvel of the circle of life. For in this sublime creation which we daily witness nothing is suffered to decay or to perish; everywhere air and plants, men and beasts, unite to purify, develop, renovate, and ennoble one another; so that the individual is sacrificed to the species, and death is only the condition of immortality for the whole circle of life" (Moleschott, *Kreislauf des Lebens*, p. 84).

But what then is matter? "The materialist," says Feuchtersleben, "imagines that he has silenced his antagonist by asking, 'What is the soul?' but can he say what is the body?" The essence and nature of matter is, of all things, most obscure and most inexplicable, and whatever progress science has made, the question remains insoluble. Yet the materialists make little of this fundamental difficulty. "Materialism is a truth," says Büchner,[1] "which, notwithstanding its clearness, simplicity, and certainty, is far from being universally accepted by scientists of the present day. Matter is immortal, indestructible; not a grain of dust in the world, whether great or small, is ever added to or taken from it. By the laws of gravitation, we are bound to admit that the addition or subtraction of the least atom would throw the world into confusion, derange its laws and the necessary and fixed equilibrium of matter. During the last twenty years chemistry has done us good service by clearly demonstrating that the continuous daily changes in things around us, the appearance and disappearance of organic forms, do not, as formerly supposed, depend upon the formation and disappearance of non-preëxistent matter, but are simply due to the constant metamorphoses of original matter, which, both in quality and quantity, remains always the same. Atoms are by nature incorruptible and indestructible; they appear first in one, then in another combination, under the endless

What is matter?

Its indestructibility,

[1] *Ad loc. cit.* p. 11.

variety of forms in which matter, in ceaseless change, is presented to our senses."

It has often been said of systems of error, that what is true in them is not new, and that what is new is not true. But in materialism neither its truths nor errors are new. The fact that all the various forms of the material world are but successive modifications, by destruction and reformation of one original substance, has always been taught by Catholic science,[1] and by Plato and Aristotle[2] of old. The materialist doctrine is only the revival of

taught by Plato and Aristotle,

[1] If there did not remain a material element, that passes out of the body which perishes into the new body which is formed—as, *e.g.*, the sap into the blossom, the blossom into the fruit, and so on—we could not speak of the formation of new bodies, which would not then be formed, but be newly created. "Inferior bodies," says St. Thomas, "are subject to substantial change, because the matter of which they are composed can continue even when they have lost their substantial form" (S. I., Qu. ix. Art. 2).

[2] "Primary matter," ὕλη, as Aristotle terms it, "is the foundation of all that is created: it is absolutely undetermined, and is determined only by the addition of form (εἶδος μορψη), which makes each being into that which it is" (*Metaphys.*, xii. 5), called by Scholastics "forma substantialis." St. Augustine relates how he arrived at the idea of a common unconditional primary matter. "And I bent myself to the bodies themselves, and looked more deeply into their changeableness, by which they cease to be what they have been, and begin to be what they were not: and this same shifting from form to form I suspected to be through a certain formless state, not through a mere nothing. . . . For this changeableness of changeable things is itself capable of all those forms into which these changeable things are changed. And this changeableness, what is it? Is it soul? Is it body? Is it that which constitutes soul or body? Might we say a 'nothing something,' an 'is, is not,' I would say, this were it; and yet in some way was it even then, as being capable of receiving these visible and compound forms" (*Conf.*, xii. 6). *Loc. cit.*, c. 7, he calls matter "prope nihil," "nearly nothing"

Epicurus's fallacy that the world was created by the fortuitous encounter of atoms or molecules of matter, infinite in number, independent of one another, and existing from eternity. Lucretius thus graphically describes this system :—

Atomic theory of Epicurus.

> "Atoms innumerous, that in countless modes
> From time eternal have been so convulsed
> By repercussions, by intrinsic weight
> So urged and altered, and, in every form

(*De Genes. ad Litt.*, L. i. c. 15). He interprets the words of Genesis, "Terra erat *inanis* et vacua," "The earth was without form and void," to signify, not formless existing matter, since matter cannot exist without some form, but that the imperfect world, as it existed prior to the six days, had been created out of "materia prima," which had no form, and which came into existence by the addition of form thereto. The formless matter and the form to which it was united were simultaneously created, and the word "inanis" points to priority of origin, not of time: "for the Holy Scripture, in narrating, can distinguish times which, in the creation itself, were undistinguishable." In the same passage he compares the voice to the matter of the words, and the words to formed voice, "vox formata;" and as the speaker does not first utter formless words, and then compose them in a *certain* form, so God did not create first formless matter, which He afterward determined by form, but created at first and from the beginning matter and form. Burmeister says the same, but with an absurd conclusion:— "In every natural body, form alone is perishable. If a natural body ceases to exist, only the individual, as such, disappears. The matter of which it was formed returns to its amorphic material primordial form; . . . for matter does not die; it does not perish. Rather, it is indestructible and eternal; from the beginning it has been present, and is beyond all finite limitations." That is, because every being consists of matter and form, and because matter is receptive of different forms, matter must be eternal. By a parity of reasoning, as of the same marble the sculptor can mould a Minerva or a Faun, marble must be eternal! And this is logic! Besides, the expression "amorphic, primary form," is as absurd as "formless form" would be.

and by St. Augustine.

Combined, coining still some action new,
In every mass some effort to create ;
That nought stupendous seems it, they at length
Should gain those stations, those connections gain,
Whence sprang th' Entire of all things, and subsists,
E'en though the rise of things I ne'er could prove,
Yet dare I, from the heavens' defective frame,
And many a scene alike perverse, affirm
No power divine this mass material reared
With ills so gross, so palpable to sight." [1]

Let us now examine this theory in detail. It assumes matter to be the first cause of all being. But as matter has no unity, it cannot be this sole cause. On the contrary, since all things are said to proceed from innumerable atoms or molecules, there must be an endless number of first causes. Here are at once a whole array of contradictions. How do materialists know that there are atoms? For even admitting that they exist, since they are the minutest of bodies, indivisible and without extension, they are imperceptible to the senses. Their existence then is at least only an inference, and incapable of experimental proof. Yet materialism postulates sense perception as the one test of truth, and affirms that the "investigations of the microscope, and physical measure and weight are the only media of true knowledge and exact definition," [2] and hence the first cause of all

[1] *De Natura Rerum*, bk. v. 197, trans. Good.

[2] "The natural philosopher," says Büchner (*Kraft und Stoff*, 5th Edit., p. 247), "only recognises bodies and bodily qualities. All beyond this he calls transcendental, and transcendentalism is with him an aberration of the human intellect." "Sensible experience is the limit of human thought" (Vogt, *Köhlergl und Wissenschaft*,

creatures, according to their own showing, cannot be demonstrated. Even Virchow allows that "physical phenomena lead back to certain general principles, few of which are capable of positive demonstration; whilst the greater number are so hypothetical that it is very doubtful whether they can form a lasting basis for science. This is especially the case with the atomic theory. No one has yet ventured to assert that it offers a satisfactory solution of the world's problem."[1]

Atomic theory undemonstrable.

Again, an infinite number of elementary causes, *i.e.*, of atoms, is assumed.[2] But an infinite number is inconceivable and impossible; for we can add new units to any number or sum, but that which is capable of addition is plainly finite, otherwise the infinite would become still more infinite[3] by the increase of each unit, which is a contradiction in terms. Accordingly, atoms can at most only be regarded as a number of necessary absolute and eternal existences. But this is wholly repugnant to reason, for the conception of the universe points,

An infinite number of atoms inconceivable.

p. 108). "In my second letter I showed that, outside the relations of the corporeal world, we cannot grasp anything with our senses. All our knowledge is sensible" (Moleschott, *Kreislauf*, p. 387).

[1] *Archiv für pathologische Anatomie*, vol. ix. p. 12.

[2] "We call an infinitesimal portion of matter an atom, which we take to be no longer divisible, or, at least, not divided; and we hold that all matter is composed of atoms" (Büchner, *ad loc. cit.*, p. 2).

[3] "Materialism hazards the most senseless theories of all kinds; such as time without beginning or end, endless space, an absolutely infinite number of atoms, as if these base infinities (as Hegel says) were not self-contradictory" (F. Hoffmann, *Zur Widerlegung der absoluten und bedingten Atomistik*, p. 22).

not to a multiplicity of causes, but to one absolute Being, one First Cause.[1] And as atoms, however numerous, must always form in the total a definite number, upon what ground are we bound to accept that number of atoms, neither more nor less, instead of the one First Cause? Does not their very multiplicity show that they were created.[2]

Their multiplicity a proof of their creation.

Thirdly, if these atoms are absolute and eternal, they must also be immutable, for as time is the measure of change, so eternity is the measure of immutability. But atoms are not immutable, since mutability is the essential property of all bodies, which are supposed to be formed from them. If they exist absolutely and solely of themselves, whence come their mutual limitation and dependence, and whence the "affinity of matter" and its "creative force?" Again, these atoms are simple and indivisible, and yet by their aggregation they form bodies, which are divisible. Again, they are unconscious, and yet consciousness is evolved from them; they are not free, and yet produce freedom: thus movement, life, and soul proceed from that which is blind, inert, and unintelligent.[3] They

Other contradictions.

[1] "A half-conscious awe of the unity of the forces of nature, and of the mysterious links between the sensible and the supersensible, is common, even among savage races" (Humboldt's *Cosmos*, i. p. 16).

[2] "As creation is the result of design, all created things," says St. Thomas, "are contained under (or correspond to) a fixed number, and an infinite multitude of creatures in act, even *per accidens* is an impossibility" (S. I., Qu. vii. Art. 4).

[3] "It would be hard to find in any theory of creation such a mass

have no determinate properties,[1] yet are differentiated, and produce the world, with its manifold variety of life! If materialists allege, in reply, that these different qualities and beings proceed from the various configurations, grouping, and combinations of matter, which is itself without properties, still more do we insist: Whence come these differences of forms, grouping, and combinations? Whence have these atoms this order and form, and an order and form which endures as a permanent rule and law? If from themselves, they must be intelligent beings; they must be mind and not matter. If they proceed from another who determined their being, their different combinations, and their conformity to law, then that other must be He Who the Scripture says, ordered all things in number, weight, and measure.[2]

The law and order of their combinations proves an intelligent cause.

But, according to the materialist, "affinity of matter is the creative power of the universe."[3] "The

of contradictions as in that of materialism. We are told that the mutable proceeds from the immutable, the finite from the infinite, movement from inaction, life from what is dead, sense from the senseless, spirit from that which is unspiritual" (F. Hoffmann, *Ibid.*).

[1] "In our judgment, all matter is compounded of these atoms, and both exists and retains its properties by their reciprocal impulse and repulsion" (Büchner, *Ibid.*, p. 21).

[2] Wisdom, xi. 21. Richter, the author of *Stœchiometry*, took this text for his motto.

[3] "How puerile," says Cuvier, "are those philosophers who speak of nature as if it had a personal existence, apart from the Creator, apart from the laws which He made, and which are impressed on all His creatures; apart from the characteristics and forms with which He endowed them, and which determine their action!" (cf. *Journal des Savants*, 1863, p. 623).

affinity of atoms to one another is that which controls and disposes of the units; and without affinity nothing would have existed; so that atoms are not the sole, efficient, active cause of all things, but the primary Cause is rather to be found in the principle which produced the "affinity of atoms," and the diversity and multiplicity of bodies thence derived. To sum up the foregoing argument in the words of a modern writer, "Everything which is conditional presupposes a condition, which, as such, is necessarily unconditioned and absolute. Atoms are reciprocally conditioned by one another. But this reciprocal conditionality cannot exist in the atoms themselves, otherwise they would be at once conditioned and unconditioned. Consequently the existence of atoms presupposes something absolute and unconditional, which, as it is the cause of their conditionality, must necessarily be also the cause of their existence." [1]

Not the affinity of atoms, but the principle which produced that affinity, the primary Cause of all things.

Nor can materialism fall back on incomprehensibilities,[2] for what is self-contradictory is not only incomprehensible, but inconceivable and impossible; and a system claiming the exclusive monopoly of "clearness, simplicity, and scientific precision" has no right to take refuge in mystery.

[1] Ulrici, *Gott und die Natur*, Leipzig, 1862, p. 314. "Every composite has its cause; for things diverse in themselves could not come together in the same subject save by means of some cause uniting them" (S. I., Qu. iii. Art. 7).

[2] Büchner, *loc. cit.*, pp. 132, 191. Strauss, *Glaubenslehre*, i. p. 685: "Let us here again own how inadequate is our conception."

But there are other errors. By the hypothesis, everything has been spontaneously developed from matter; but development necessarily implies motion. Now, matter in itself is inert; that is to say, indifferent to rest or motion: it remains quiescent until set in motion by some external impetus. Once set in motion, it moves onward until some opposing force arrests its course. For instance, a round ball placed upon a level surface remains stationary until struck, and when struck it commences to roll, and continues rolling until arrested by the friction on its surface. Whence then comes movement? Whence all development and life? Virchow says that, "as the motion of a projectile is not from its own inherent power, nor the force of its impact from its own material properties, nor the course of celestial bodies from their form and organisation, neither can the phenomena of life be fully explained by the properties of their component matter."[1] "The first Being," says St. Thomas, "must be in act, and in no kind of potentiality. As regards time, potentiality is doubtless prior to act, in a being which passes from one to the other of these states. But as regards the thing in itself absolutely, act is prior to potentiality, for

Matter cannot produce movement,

[1] *Gesammelte Abhandlungen.* Bayle (*Diction. Criti.*, art. *Leucippe*) himself says: "According to our ideas, the nature of an atom consists of extension and hardness, which does not include the power of movement: this is foreign to and beyond our notions of the body, and of extension." On the indifference of matter *cf.* Euler (*Briefe an eine Deutsche Fürstin*, t. ii. Brief 5) and Laplace (*Système du Monde*).

what is in potentiality cannot be actuated, save by what is already in act. Now, every body as such is in potentiality to (or receptive of) movement." [1] Hence De Maistre argues that, as "matter cannot act except by motion, and all motion is an effect, it follows that a *physical material cause is, strictly speaking, an absurdity*, a contradiction in terms. The mover must always precede that which is moved, the leader that which is led. Matter can of itself do nothing, and is only the evidence of mind." [2] Thus motion presupposes a mover, this again a First Mover, Who acts of Himself, Who does not derive motion from an external impetus, Who is of, and by Himself, movement and energy and pure intelligence.[3]

and supposes a First Mover Who must be immaterial.

The assumption, then, that matter was necessarily in movement from all eternity [4] is purely gratuitous, and the idea is absurd, for eternal movement implies eternal time and a temporal eternity, *i.e.*, an eternity which day by day becomes more eternal, and a time

[1] S. I., Qu. iii. Art. 1.

[2] *Soirées*, p. 294.

[3] According to Plato (*De Legg.*, x. 892 *seq.*, xii. 967), the first, adequate cause does not reside in anything corporeal, because no body has the power of self-movement. The first cause of movement must, therefore, be in a spiritual principle. He points out the fallacy of the assumption that matter existed before mind, since mind is the origin of the existence and movement of all things, the original motive force, the primal cause of all being.

[4] "Eternal matter is necessarily endowed with perpetual motion. Therefore the movement of matter is eternal as itself. Why matter was first set in a certain motion at a given time we have no possible means of knowing" (Büchner, *ad loc. cit.*, p. 55).

which has no beginning, *i.e.*, which is no time. Moreover, attraction can only occur between two or more molecules or bodies, since no body contains within itself the principle of its attraction and movement; therefore no body is self-sufficing or possesses an unconditioned, absolute existence. If this is true of one, it is also true of the whole, for a sum total of conditioned beings does not constitute one unconditioned being. "We attribute," says Virchow, "the universal attraction of matter, which we cannot explain, to the force of attraction or gravitation, although we are unable to say how this is effected."[1] And Newton expressly declares "that the laws of gravitation by no means explain the origin of movement."[2] "It is inconceivable," he says,[3] "that inanimate brute matter should, without the mediation of something else which is not material, operate upon and affect other matter without mutual contact, as it must do if gravitation be essential to, and inherent in it. That gravity should be innate, inherent, and essential to matter, so that one body may act upon another at a distance, through a vacuum, without the mediation of anything else by and through which this action and force may be conveyed from one to another, is to me so great an

Materialism contradicts itself.

Gravity not the origin of movement.

[1] *Ad loc. cit.*, p. 13.

[2] "They continue, indeed, in their orbits by the laws of gravitation, but they could never have first acquired the undeviating position of their orbits through these laws" (*Philos. Natur. Princip.*, I. iii., *Schol. Gen.*).

[3] *Letter to D. Bentley*, iii. p. 438, Edit. Horsley, 1783.

absurdity that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking can fall into it. Gravity must be caused by an agent acting constantly, according to fixed laws." [1]

But there is not only movement in the world; everywhere movement has the character of design: all that moves is ordained to a definite end. This adaptation to end [2] is especially apparent in organised bodies, from the smallest blade of grass to the framework of the human body. The structure of each organic body, with the laws and forces proper to its nature, is such as it would have been if it were undoubtedly designed by an All-

Design in organised bodies.

[1] "Gravitation," says Kästner (*Höhere Mechanik*, iii. s. 130), "is the effect of a simultaneous fixed action in two bodies which are reciprocally attracted. In its essence it is not twofold, not dualism, but both are propelled by a higher Unity." Euler (*Briefe an eine Deutsche Fürstin*, 68 *Brief*) urges the use of the expression "impulse" (*impulsio*) in preference to "attraction" (*attractio*), because "we cannot see how two distant bodies could act upon one another." Arago (*Remarques Scientifiques*, vol. iii. p. 500) and Biot (Janet, *ad loc. cit.*, p. 70) also consider that attraction, in itself, is not an adequate explanation of the movement of heavenly bodies.

[2] Büchner points to monstrosities, or abnormal beings, as evidence against "conformity to design" in nature, as if exceptions, referable to certain external influences, did not serve to confirm the rule. The very word "deformity" points to conformity to design as the law. As St. Thomas remarks, "The very fact that casualties are found in things of this kind proves that they are subject to some one Being who governs them. For unless these corruptible creatures were governed by some Superior they would have no purpose, especially those which are irrational; in which case nothing unpurposed (*præter intentionem*) would be found in them to suggest the idea of chance" (S. I., Qu. ciii. Art. 5). "Every deformity is a failure in nature, which is often to be accounted for by some hindrance to her free action" (Schaaffauser, *Archiv für Anthropologie*, v. iii. p. 99).

controlling Intelligence for a preconceived end. And every such combination of forces and material, called an organism, bearing in its effects the stamp of design, is a special selection among innumerable possible combinations which would not have fulfilled this end. This internal evidence of design, undeniably manifest in all living beings, testifies to a power which both provides for and absolutely governs the natural forces of motion. "In the microscopic drop of the yet inert fluid of every germ, a spiritual type or prototype is at work. Whenever anything is to be produced, whether it be a work of nature or of true art, the primary requisite for its production, and one which must have existed from eternity, is the conception, the law, which must precede the realisation of the created organism; just as the plan of a projected building must exist in the architect's mind before the stones can be raised. In every germ the form is still inert, and, as seen through the microscope, it appears a simple cell, filled with colourless fluid. This is the beginning of all known organisms; nor can the subtlest anatomy distinguish between the primary germ of bird, fish, or even man." [1] "So carefully," says Trendelenberg,[2] "does nature conceal her laboratories, that she appears designedly to preclude any possible clue to the causes of her mysteries. For instance, if the eye, during its formation, were exposed to the light, we should naturally conclude

[1] Carus, *Organon der Erkenntniss der Natur und des Geistes*, Leipzig, 1856, p. 82.

[2] *Logische Untersuchungen*, ii. p. 26.

that this marvellous organ was fashioned by exposure to luminous rays. But the eye is formed in the obscurity of the womb, to respond to the light only after birth. So also is it with the other senses. Between the light and the eye, between sound and the ear, between the ground on which we tread and the mechanism of the feet and limbs, there is a preconcerted harmony. For, without any prior connection, they enter at once, not during but after their formation, into the closest relations. Light did not awaken the sight, nor sound the hearing; nor did the earth, on which the creature is to tread, form its limbs and feet; but these members were already designed for their several functions. This, then, is the magic circle, but it contains no fallacy. The organism, with its energies, but with its designed structure, is subjected to the action of the external cause, and to the law of its own operation. The eye sees, but the laws of sight (*das Sehen*) had already formed the eye. The feet walk, but the laws of locomotion adjusted their articulations. The organs of the mouth speak, but speech itself, the necessity of expressing thought, had made these organs movable. Such is the magic circle; but, again, it is the circle of simple fact, and this predetermined harmony thus proved reveals a central Power, dominating and uniting all its members, in whom thought is the alpha and omega. . . . Wherever design is found realised in the world, it was preceded by thought as its first cause." Burmeister owns that "the organs of speech

Senses predisposed for their special objects.

point to the communication of thought as the cause of their existence; for in nature definite, fixed purposes are always effected by definite means."[1]

Nor is design only manifest in isolated cases. It constitutes an uniform law, according to which all species and genera of living beings are ever developed. The animal and vegetable kingdoms are the same to-day as when described by classic writers. There is an invariable type, a primordial form, prior to the creation of living beings, a type stamped upon all plants and animals of the same genus, a predetermining conception, antecedent to all organic forms, and after which all organic things are severally moulded. The recognition of this theory of origin has proved of much service to natural science. Harvey is said to have discovered the circulation of the blood whilst reflecting upon the object of the valvular system in the veins. Cuvier, as Whewell points out, was able to demonstrate from a single bone the whole structure of an extinct antediluvian animal, in its essential parts, with absolute certainty. "Zoology," he says, "has a principle peculiar to itself, and of invariable application, *i.e.*, the principle of the conditions of existence, commonly called the law of final causes." For since nothing can exist which does not possess in itself all conditions necessary to its existence, the constituent parts of every being must be so formed and co-ordinated as to make the whole possible, not only in itself, but also in relation to the beings which surround it.

Design and natural science.

[1] *Geologische Bilder*, i. pp. 207, 214, 276.

And, he adds, this principle is "the basis of general laws, which are as clearly demonstrable as those which are the result of calculation or experience."

But not only in the formation of simple organisms is thought manifest. Throughout all creation, both organic and inorganic, we trace one progressive system of development [1] which points to a definite end, *i.e.*, to the intellectual, self-conscious life of man,[2] a fact long before recognised by St. Thomas, who says: "Every bodily creature tends, as far as possible, to assimilation to the intellectual creature, and thus the 'forma humana,' namely, the rational soul, is said to be the ultimate end for which the lower nature was designed."[3] And this unity of purpose manifested throughout the universe demonstrates clearly the pre-existence of an absolute Intelligence, of a living, personal God, Who fulfilled in time the plan of creation, which He had designed in eternity,[4] and Who

All creation culminates in man.

[1] "We cannot but own that a unique plan, a determined and immutable law, regulates the evolutions of the whole animal kingdom. We constantly recognise in the older forms of animal life the prototypes of their numerous descendants, whilst the conformity of fixed types to external conditions proves that the organisation of animals depends upon the times and circumstances in which they are placed" (Burmeister, *ad loc. cit.*, p. 242).

[2] Ulrici, *ad loc. cit.*, p. 315.

[3] II. *Dist.* i., Qu. ii. Art. 3.

[4] In his *Principles of Comparative Osteology*, the eminent anatomist, Owen, ably remarks: "If the world was created by a Spirit or pre-existing Intelligence, that is, by a God, there must have been a conception or model of the universe before its creation, and a knowledge of created things before they existed. Now, the recognition of an ideal type as the basis of the organisation of vertebrate animals proves that, before man appeared upon the earth, a being

had ordained all the forces of nature to co-operate in its realisation. "The whole," says Aristotle, "is before its parts." Materialism is unable to explain the inner conformity to design of even one organic body, still less this constant uniformity of species and genera throughout all ages. "The bee," says Cardinal Wiseman,[1] "has been striving without intermission in the art of making its sweet confection since the days of Aristotle; the ant has been constructing its labyrinths since Solomon recommended its example: but from the time they were described by the philosopher and the sage, we are certain that they have not acquired a new perception or a new organ for their purposes. Egypt, which, as the learned commission of French naturalists well observed,

The uniformity of species another proof of design.

like him was already known. In the formation of the prototype the Divine Mind foresaw all its future modifications. The conception of the prototype was realised in our planet long before the existence of those species (of animals) in which it is now developed." Elie de Beaumont says in the same sense: "The history of animal organisation in our planet presents the same aspect as the historic development of zoological formation of creatures in our day. Therefore, the same plan of organisation for each animal kingdom, which is the basis of all development, whether general or particular, existed from the very beginning." *Cf.* Burmeister, *ad loc. cit.*, vol. ii. p. 232. "All differences in antediluvian animals exhibit a definite relation to the period of their existence, and especially to the grade of their organism. We shall best indicate this relation if we consider the animal world of the successive periods of creation as showing the successive stages of development in the animal kingdom. In fact, the different species of primeval animals correspond to distinct stages of development in the animals now existing" (Giebel, *Tagesfragen*, p. 145).

[1] *Lectures on Science and Revealed Religion*, Dublin, 1866, p. 127. *Cf.* Quatrefages, *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1861, p. 192.

has preserved for us a museum of natural history, not only in its paintings, but in the mummies of its animals, presents us every species, perfectly unchanged, after three thousand years." [1]

How accounted for.

"Whence, then, comes it," asked Lactantius,[1] "that these atoms, thus fortuitously thrown together, have preserved their present order until now without attempting any new combinations? What hand has compelled them to observe that order which they themselves formed by accident? Why do they not continually produce new beings, new species and genera?" Every species, every genus of organic beings, constitutes an independent exclusive realm, ever the same, ever reproducing itself only. Whence, then, spring these millions of different and independent organisms? Were they produced fortuitously from simple atoms by combination and separation? But each organism produces always, and only, its like, never what is dissimilar. The theory of a so-called *generatio æquivoca*,

Theory of spontaneous generation abandoned.

that is, the spontaneous generation of new and foreign organisms from, and in others wholly dissimilar, without any corresponding seed or germ, is now rejected on more accurate investigations.[2] On the contrary, Harvey's old theory,

[1] *Div. Instit.*, Lib. ii. 11.

[2] Burmeister himself is reluctantly compelled to abandon the idea of a *generatio æquivoca*, and Virchow pronounces it to be "jugglery and diabolical trickery." "The doctrine," he says, "of spontaneous generation, according to which living beings are said to proceed from dead matter, without father or mother, is well nigh

"Omne vivum ex ovo," has been fully confirmed, and has found more accurate expression in the formula "that all life, both vegetable and animal, originates from a cell."[1] Liebig says:[2] "The notion that the creative force of nature, the *horror vacui*, the *spiritus rector*, is capable of producing a variety of plants, or some animals, from disintegrated

"Omne vivum ex ovo."

abandoned, and in our day can only be revived in regard to the lowest animal and vegetable organisms. For all higher types, this theory of 'spontaneous generation' is set aside: every plant has its seed, every animal its egg or germ. All living beings form one long, unbroken series of generations, in which the child knows the mother: the effect becomes the cause, a connected chain of living links, in which there is combined movement and perpetual renewal of the forces of life. Plants produce plants, and animals animal life; but each several species of plant produces plants of its own kind and none other, and the animal only propagates itself within its own species. For the plan of organisation within each species is unchangeable; one kind does not change with another kind" (quoted by K. Schmidt, *Anthropologie*, 1865, p. 174). Again (in his Wiesbaden Address, 1887): "Never has a living being, or even a living element, let us say a living cell, been found of which it could be predicated that it was the first of its species. Nor has any fossil remains ever been found of which it could ever be likely that it belonged to a being the first of its kind, or produced by spontaneous generation" (*Tablet* trans., October 15, 1887).

[1] *Cf.* Quenstedt, *ad loc. cit.*; Schleiden, *Das Alter des Menschen-Geschlechtes*, 1863, p. 28; Ulrici, *Gott und die Natur*, p. 280 *ff.*; Huxley on *Our Knowledge of the Phenomena of Organic Nature*. Pasteur's experiments prove that the air is full of floating organic germs. Unger found that, on admitting common atmospheric air into the purest distilled water, *Protococcus minor*, one of the lowest algæ, and the simplest of vegetable organisms appeared; but if the air had been previously purified, there was no trace of any organic substance to be found, even after the lapse of many years; yet, on removing the cork for a few seconds and again closing the bowl, the little germ plant presently appeared in the water.

[2] *Chemische Briefe*, p. 20.

stones and decaying vegetable substances, and the assumption that iron and phosphorus can produce living animal organisms, are the result of insufficient investigation. Our imagination has no warrant for creating new causes merely because our efforts to discover the true causes by investigation have failed. When we see that infusoria are produced from eggs, it only remains for us to find out how these eggs are propagated."

Materialism, however, still seeks a way of escape. "In the primeval age of organisation,"[1] it is said, "the process of formation, like everything else, was different. Unless we are disposed to take refuge in miracles or mysteries, we must admit that the first living beings were formed out of the earth by the free generative power of matter itself, and we can infer why this generative power has ceased from the general laws of nature, according to which only that which is necessary survives, not that which is superfluous." Thus, in order to get rid of mysteries and miracles, a purely arbitrary hypothesis, condemned alike by science and experience, is set up. "How this development of organic being took place," Büchner says, "cannot be as yet explained with scientific precision,

Biogenesis unfounded and impossible.

[1] Burmeister, *Geschichte der Schöffung*, 5th Edit. According to him, we are forced to accept this hypothesis, "since without it the appearance of organic life upon the earth could only be explained by the immediate operation of a higher Power" (p. 304). We are reminded of Goethe's saying, "Theories are lullabies, with which the professor lulls his scholars to sleep" (*Sprüche in Prosa*, iii. p. 285).

but it is hoped that future investigations may throw more light upon this subject."[1] In other words, materialism is now as impotent to assign a scientific basis for its assertion as it was in the days of Lucretius.[2]

But it is argued, further, that what cannot now occur under the actual conditions of nature may have been possible in earlier periods, when the chemical forces were more intense. To which R. Wagner justly replies, that "any greater degree of intensity of the physico-chemical processes, any increase of light, heat, electricity, and the like, above their normal degree of energy weakens instead of strengthening vital power, and, after a certain point of intensity, utterly destroys all organic life. Consequently, to assume *that* to be the cause of production of organic life, which is pernicious to and destructive of its existence, is a self-evident contradiction."[3] As Bischof well says,[4] "Geology has no lawful concern with the primal

Violent chemical changes destructive of life.

[1] Büchner, *ad loc. cit.*, p. 72; in his *Seven Lectures on the Darwinian Theory*, Leipzig, 1868, p. 100.

[2] *De Natura Rerum*, ii. 824. His materialism was thus met by Lactantius: "Why is it that creatures are no longer produced out of the earth? This, they say, was necessary in the beginning, so that creatures might be everywhere produced. But now that they exist, and are able to reproduce themselves, the earth has ceased to bring them forth, and other conditions have appeared" (*Div. Instit.*, ii. 11).

[3] This remark disposes of all absurd hypotheses, such as that of Oken (*Enstellung des ersten Menschen*, Isis, 1819), who ascribes the origin of man to a mollusc of primeval mud, in the form of a two-years-old child; Reichenbach, Büchner, and Vogt to an ape, or "any other animal you like" (*Büchner, ad loc. cit.*, p. 82).

[4] *Lehrbuch der chem. und physich. Geologie*, i. p. 3; ii. p. 101.

condition of the world at the period of creation: the object of this science is solely the world as it exists, without inquiring how it became what it is. Why, then, should we embark upon a period where fact ceases, since even within our assigned limits our deductions are so often hypothetical? . . . How the first plant came upon earth is as mysterious to us naturalists as the first beginning of all things." Again, Virchow[1] admits that "there must have been a beginning of life, since geology points to epochs in the formation of the earth when life was impossible, and when no vestige of it is to be found;" and he adds that the conditions of this beginning are an unsolved problem of science.

The beginning of life a mystery.

The tendency to materialism has, however, received a new impulse from Darwin's[2] theory of transmutation or descent. According to this theory, every form of organic life, from the lowest plant up to man, originated at most from eight or ten ancestors, or may have all descended from one primitive type, into which "life was breathed."[3] Other scientists, as Lotze,[4] Snell, Rothe, Pfeiderer, Herme,

Darwinism.

[1] *Vier Reden über Leben und Krankheit*, p. 31. Also Ose. Schmidt *Descendenz-Lehre und Darwinismus*, 1873, p. 10.

[2] Lord Monboddo, 1714–1799, Lamarck, 1744–1829, had also taught evolution, derived from a self-elevation, by appetency, or use and effort.

[3] When criticised in the *Athenæum* for the use of this and other Pentateuchal terms in a purely scientific work, Darwin replied, "I ought not, perhaps, to have used such terms, but they will serve to confess that our ignorance is as profound on the origin of life as on the origin of force or matter" (*Athenæum*, 25th April 1863).

[4] *Ueberweg*, ii. p. 313.

while admitting the principle of evolution, attribute the formation of the primary organs to a Creative Will, and their subsequent transmutation to the spontaneous action of the same Creative Power. Others again, as Kolliker[1] and Nageli[2] find in the evolutionary development, as they accept it, the operation of a predetermined law, and thus reject the doctrine of chance, to which Darwin's theory practically amounts. Darwin's teaching has one merit, though of a negative kind. He furnishes solid arguments against the unwarrantable multiplication of species, so strongly advocated by some earlier naturalists,[3] as also against the latest theory advanced by the

Its negative merit against the multiplication and eternity of species.

[1] *Ueber die Darwin'sche Schöpfungs-Theorie*, 1864.

[2] *Entstehung und Begriff der naturhistorischen Art.*, 1865.

[3] The evolutionist theory thus supports the unity of the human race, which was so strongly denied by sceptical naturalists of the last century in France. Desmoulins puts the number of independent human families at eleven, Boisy de St. Vincent at fifteen. "None but a blind man can doubt," says Voltaire, "that the whites, negroes, albinos, Hottentots, Laplanders, Chinese, and Americans are entirely distinct races" (*Histoire de Russie sous Pierre le Grand*). *Cf.* Wiseman, *Science and Religion*, vol. i. p. 171. Even Burmeister (*Geolog. Bilder*, Pt. i.) says: "If the colour of the negro was a matter of such importance as to constitute the negro and the European two different species of the human race, in the view of natural science, it is obvious that these two species ought to differ as radically from one another in bodily structure as in the colour of their skin, which is not the case. There are, indeed, certain shades of difference, more or less marked, between them, but they are not organically different, as they would certainly be if the two species were absolutely distinct. The differences between the horse and the ass, the ox and the buffalo, are far greater. Each bone and muscle of these animals are so different, that a practised eye can at once distinguish to which of these species they severally belong." So, also, A. von Humboldt, *Cosmos*, ii. p. 379. "As long as attention was

materialists, that of the eternity of species, formulated by Czolbe.[1]

It is, however, with Darwin's constructive theory that we are here concerned, and against the theory of evolution, simply by natural selection (otherwise called the struggle for existence, or survival of the fittest) and heredity or descent, the following objections are raised:—

Cuvier's[2] question to Lamarck, Darwin's predecessor, has never been satisfactorily answered: "If all species are transmitted by almost imperceptible gradations from other anterior species, how is it that

directed only to the extremes in varieties of colour and of form, and to the vividness of the first impressions of the senses, the observer was naturally disposed to regard races rather as originally different species than as mere varieties. The permanence of certain types in the midst of the most hostile influences, especially of climate, appeared to favour such a view, notwithstanding the shortness of the interval of time from which the historical evidence was derived. In my opinion, however, more powerful reasons can be advanced in support of the unity of the human race; as, for instance, in the many intermediate gradations in the colour of the skin, and in the form of the skull, which have been made known to us in recent times by the rapid progress of geographical knowledge. . . . The greatest number of the contrasts which were formerly supposed to exist have disappeared before the laborious researches of Tiedemann on the brain of negroes and of Europeans, and the anatomical investigations of Vrolik and Weber. On comparing the dark-coloured African nations, on whose physical history the admirable work of Prichard has thrown so much light, with the races inhabiting the islands of the South Indian and West Australian Archipelago, and with the Papuas and Alfourons (Harofores, Endamenes), we see that a black skin, woolly hair, and a negro-like cast of countenance are not necessarily connected together" (*Cosmos*, vol. i. p. 361).

[1] *Neue Darstellung des Sensualismus*, p. 170.

[2] *Journal des Savants*, 1863, p. 700.

innumerable transitional forms do not everywhere abound?" Agassiz and Owen prove that, not only when compared with the fossil genera and species, but also among living families, genera, and species, there is a manifest systematic progress from lower to higher forms, which attains its climax in man. Elie de Beaumont shows that the appearance of single organic types in the several geological formations exhibits a progressive advance from lower to higher forms, analogous to that now seen in creation, so that one and the same plan of structure must have existed from the beginning.[1] Had the different species only arisen by "natural selection," then a "confusion of form" would necessarily have appeared in both organic kingdoms, and precluded all possibility of systematic separation and grouping. But in nature the existence of species is an undoubted fact, absolutely incompatible with the theory of selection. "If there exists," says R. Wagner, "a group of individuals, historically united by the process of generation, which, notwithstanding changes in their outer form or inner structure, never pass into forms of another circle, but constantly tend to revert to their original type; then the species is clearly not merely a number of units, bound together by external characteristics, nor

Objection:— 1. The absence of transitional forms.

2. Fixity of species proved by their continuous historic descent.

[1] *Cf.* K. Schmidt, *Anthropologie*, 1865, p. 177. Agassiz says of the Darwinian theory: "I consider the transmutation theory as a scientific mistake, untrue in its facts, unscientific in its method, and mischievous in its tendency" (*Essay on Classification*, p. 108).

the abstract conception of some zoological classifier, but a real historic species, separated and limited within its own race." Among the thousand clearly defined "good" species usually very rich in individuals, none are anywhere found in the earlier stages of a really new development. Lyall puts the various species of shellfish in the Miocene period, which are identical with those now existing, at from 17 to 35 per cent. of the whole molluscæ of that period. In the later Pliocene beds, the number of species identical with the present marine fauna is increased from 60 to 80 per cent. But there are species still extant which can be traced back to the Eocene period, that is, to the lowest strata of the Tertiary formation, and which, according to the Darwinian theory, as proved by the superincumbent strata of more than 750 metres in depth, must have existed two or three millions of years ago. Darwin's principle, "infinitesimal steps in gigantic periods of time," is therefore without meaning. Besides, since the Tertiary period, most of these primitive species must have passed through extraordinary changes in all the conditions of existence, yet without producing the slightest "transmutation" from the primitive types.

3. Identity of primitive and existing types.

Again, in the great majority of cases, the varying forms, that is, those species which are morphologically most closely allied, are either locally separated or only touch on the extreme borders of their respective "habitats." Yet, according to Darwin's hypothesis, they should be most numerous at the centre of the area

of diffusion, because there the "struggle for existence" would be most severe. Barrande,[1] in his work on trilobites, asserts as a fact what Darwin admits would be ruinous to his theory of descent, viz., the sudden appearance of groups of species allied to one another. Whilst in the Cambrian strata not a single trilobite is found, among the primeval Silurian fauna of Bohemia seven different species unexpectedly appear together, a phenomenon which recurs equally unexpectedly in all known Silurian deposits. Again, in the lowest zone of the second Silurian fauna, no fewer than twenty-one new species as suddenly appear unheralded by any transitional forms. Still more damaging to the theory of "descent" is the fact that the number of trilobites, in respect of families, species, and individuals, far exceeds all other creatures of the primordial Silurian fauna. The absence of any progressive development from the species of the primitive Silurian fauna towards those of the Carboniferous strata, as also the formation of new family types under conditions precluding any possibility of variability in the species, alike tell against Darwin.[2] In England, out of eleven extinct

4. Sudden appearance of new groups of species.

[1] *Trilobitis, Extrait du Supplément au Vol. I. du Système Silurien du Centre de la Bohème*, 1871.

[2] *Cf.* Leonhard und Geinitz, *Neues Lehrbuch für Mineralogie*, 1871, p. 963. "Barrandes' exhaustive researches have proved how completely palæontological experience contradicts Darwin's theory" (Quinstedt, *Klar und Wahr*, 1872, p. 64). "I have always contended for a progressive development, from the less to the more perfect; but the question is whether this will explain everything. In their several localities creatures appear as perfect as if, Minerva-like, they

mammals found in the deposits of the glacial period, no less than ten are identical with species now existing, as, *e.g.*, the roe, the reindeer, the wolf, &c. This fact proves the immutability of certain species, especially under altered external influences.

5. Variations of type limited and determined.

Variations of type within the same species are limited and determined. Hybrids of species absolutely diverse do not multiply. They either revert to one of the two original species or become sterile.[1] To meet this objection, Wagner propounded his theory of migrations, that is, the formation of new species by the separation and migration of some individuals, and the free crossing of these with others of the same species under altered circumstances. But the whole hypothesis is unsupported by proof, and, if true, would imply design in the migration.

had sprung, fully developed, from Jupiter's head. Geology has taught us nothing more in this respect than Zoology; on the contrary, it has rather increased than diminished our difficulties in apprehending the act of creation. According to our judgment, it would seem, *à priori*, more fitting that creation should have evolved man from the higher animal organisms, *e.g.*, an ape, rather than have formed Adam out of clay. But this supposition is not proof. And whatever likeness to man, even extending to the convolutions of the brain, we may find in the tailless orang-outang, pongo, or gorilla, however shrewd and intelligent they may be, however able to understand one another, yet they are without the faculty of speech. When, on the physical side, we admit a kinship with the lower animal world, we are not surrendering any of our prerogatives—indeed, they are justly objects of our compassion. . . . But all the more thankfully let us uphold the nobility of our soul."

[1] In consequence of this difficulty, Huxley gives to Darwin's theory only a provisional acceptance (*Man's Place in Nature*, 1863, p. 107).

Doubtless every species varies more or less, but only within certain limits. We find in nature inherited and acquired variations. Inherited variations, being absolutely independent of external conditions, prove nothing as regards the theory of transmutation. Acquired or cultured variations, suddenly produced and sharply accentuated, can only be preserved by assiduous care, and disappear under great external changes; *e.g.*, the flora of Greece in the time of Homer. For heredity tends to obliterate the variations, but to preserve the specific characteristics, of the breed. Darwin himself admits it to be most improbable that variations restricted to a few individuals would ever be permanent, and allows that when crossed with the primitive forms they inevitably disappear.

But, granting the possibility of fortuitous variations, how, without a predetermined plan of development, would an endless series of such variations, in each stage of development, follow the direction required for the formation of a new species? The lengthened neck (seven feet) of the giraffe presupposes a prolonged period of scarcity, during which the longer-necked offspring were better able than the rest to reach the upper branches of the trees, after the lower ones had been stripped bare. And the scarcity must have been conterminous with the lengthening necks of the young giraffes. Here the hypothesis of "sexual selection" comes in aid; that is, the preference of the female for a male,[1] with some pecu-

Giraffe.

[1] *The Descent of Man*, vol. i. p. 231.

liarity unlike the common herd, being supposed to explain its reproduction. But this reasoning is inapplicable to plants, and to the androgynous lower animals, as these are partly hermaphrodites, partly propagated by germination.[1]

6. Survival of the lowest organisms.

If every creature be constantly striving after a higher adaptation to its conditions of existence, how is this persistence of the lower forms to be explained? Yet, as a matter of fact, organisms of every grade alike possess the capacity of life, and each of these grades is everywhere represented, whilst, according to Darwin, only one—namely, the highest—ought to survive. Nay, more: the lowest forms are precisely those which are most enduring and unchangeable. Under the law of the "struggle for existence," would not evolution rather tend downward than upward, since the simpler organisms are better fitted for the struggle than the more complex, being less dependent upon external influences? Accordingly, we find the lower forms of plants and animals spread over vast areas, compared with the very limited regions peopled by the higher forms. The logical inference from Darwin's principle is, then, the exact opposite of that which he deduces from it. Instead of a progressive multiplication of the forms of life, it points to their increasing unification—a result which

[1] *Cf.* A. Wigand, *Der Darwinismus und die Naturforschung*, Newton's und Cuvier's, 1874. Dr. Mivart asks, "If natural selection be so potent, why has not any other hoofed quadruped acquired a long neck and lofty stature besides the giraffe, and, in a lesser degree, the camel, guanaco, &c.?"

can only be explained by reversing his teaching and accepting a principle of development which "determines the direction and limits the amount of variability."[1] Von Baer, R. Wagner,[2] Agassiz, and even Linnæus do not deny the evolution of new species, but under limited conditions. "How came the 'struggle for existence,'" says Fechner,[3] "to be the governing principle in the actual relations between the animal and vegetable kingdoms? For is not the animal kingdom dependent for its very existence upon the vegetable kingdom? Doubtless there is, in a certain sense, a 'struggle' between them, since animals feed upon plants; but instead of animals, as higher organisms, exterminating plants in order to take their place, the increase of each is so limited as to secure the preservation of both. Within the animal kingdom the carnivorous do not supplant the vegetarians, but only prevent their excessive increase, so that neither shall be in want of sustenance, whilst the surplus serves the carnivorous for food." Again, he remarks: "Of course, in the struggle for existence, the most perfect exemplars of each species, or those

Extermination and excessive increase alike prevented.

[1] Cf. *Archiv für Anthropologie*, vi. p. 134.

[2] R. Wagner (*On the Creation of Man*, 1854) seeks to demonstrate that the question whether all men have descended from an original man can be answered neither affirmatively nor negatively; that the possibility of such descent is physiologically indisputable, since we see physiognomic peculiarities originating in men or animals and becoming permanent, which phenomena resemble, though it may be only remotely, the probable phenomena accompanying the formation of races; and that, therefore, the latest results of natural science leave the belief in the Bible unmolested.

[3] *Ad loc. cit.*, p. 225.

best adapted to their surroundings, supplant the weaker. But the dominant principle in nature is that of completion; that is, the exemplars and the species are mutually dependent. This is especially true in regard to the sexual relations. That sexless individuals should be changed into those sexually differentiated is most improbable, since no such changes could ever occur in the innumerable sexless species now existing." "Besides, from the well-known principles of production, the phenomenon of two individuals becoming sexually differentiated at the same time and in the same locality is most improbable, even in a single species, and far more so in the whole animal kingdom."

Again the same difficulty arises, in another form, in the case of those numerous plants whose fertilisation depends on the insects which feed upon them. These "enormous" difficulties can only be overcome by substituting for Darwin's theory of chance "the conception of a co-relation of place, time, and causation in the conditions under which organisms originate and exist; that is, the principle of their mutual dependence and completion. But this higher principle presupposes a conscious creative Cause, governing the world according to a definite plan.

Again, the greatest variety of species are found in the same localities, and identical species in very different localities. "It points to a fixed plan in the structure of typical forms, when we find frogs, tortoises, &c., in all five quarters of the globe entirely independent of one another, and frequently so similar in form that

they cannot be distinguished without close examination. Now, let us place another picture before us, from which we will draw a contrast. In a small lake we find infusoria, fishes, frogs, crocodiles, water-mice, algæ, grasses, pupæ, &c., in close proximity, all sharing the same climate and country. Do all these plants and creatures spring from the same primal germs and prototypes? Again, in countries far distant from one another, with nothing in common but a hot climate, nature planted three primal germs—one in the Nile, another in the Ganges, a third in the Amazon—and these produced a crocodile, a gavial, and an alligator. Again, she placed three primal germs, with the same capacity for evolution, in the same lake, and they produced (severally) an infusorium, a rodent, and a pupa! Is not this pure sorcery? Thus, different conditions produce the same organisms, and similar conditions beget differences the most striking in nature. Now, since these differences cannot be derived from their surroundings, they must be ascribed to the First Cause." [1]

7. Various species found in same locality, and the same species in diverse localities.

Again, it follows from Darwin's hypothesis that morphological properties, being indifferent, should be readily susceptible of change, whilst physiological qualities would be difficult to alter. Yet facts prove the reverse. Nägeli remarks:[2] "I have never observed

[1] Aug. Müller, *Ueber die Entstehung organischer Wesen*, Berlin, 1866, p. 29.

[2] *Entstehung und Begriff der naturhistorischen Art*, 1865, p. 26.

a single morphological modification in plants, nor do I see how one is possible, because the ordinary processes of morphological formation are totally independent of physiological conditions. According to the Darwinian theory, which requires indifferent characteristics to be variable, and those which serve a purpose immutable, the purely morphological properties of plants should be the most susceptible, and those determined by a designed fulfilment of the organic conditions of the structure most unsusceptible of change. But experience proves the contrary. Whether in a cultured or uncultured state, the arrangement and relations of the cells and organs are their most permanent and tenacious characteristics. Take the instance of a plant with leaves in pairs opposite one another, and with blossoms in multiples of three. Now, all possible functional changes will be more easily produced in these leaves than their rearrangement into a special form, although, as being quite indifferent to the 'struggle for existence,' they could not attain to this 'constancy to type' by 'natural selection.'" Darwin[1] owns the force of this argu-

8. Morphological properties unsusceptible of change; functional the reverse.

[1] *Descent of Man and Sexual Selection*, 2nd Edition, p. 132. "I must admit, after reading the essay of Nägeli on plants, and the remarks by various authors with respect to animals, more especially those recently made by Professor Broca, that in the earlier editions of my *Origin of Species* I probably attributed too much to the action of natural selection or the survival of the fittest. I have altered the 5th Edition of *The Origin* so as to confine my remarks to adaptive changes of structure. I had not formerly sufficiently considered the existence of many structures which appear to be, as far as we can judge, neither beneficial nor injurious; and this I believe to be one of the greatest oversights as yet detected in my work. . . . If

ment. With Nägeli concur A. Braun, Askenasy, and many modern naturalists. They deny that "natural selection" is the original cause of mutation, nor do they admit "unlimited variability," but only recognise a "definite and designed variation, according to the nature of each species, which resists change in one direction while yielding to it in another."[1] But this is to abandon the Darwinian theory of descent, and to assert an "inner law" instead of a purely external adaptation, a principle which tends to the simplification of species, but does not derive all species from a single type.

Hence it is now generally admitted that the origin of a new organ cannot be explained by "natural selection," because this presupposes, in order to be efficient, an organ already partially differentiated. Häckel,[2] indeed, instances the heredity of diseases, but a diseased or stunted organ is not a new one. How can Darwin explain the existence of neuter ants, since this peculiarity is not heritable? How did eyes originate in creatures destitute of them? Whence the origin of the nervous system, or the difference of gender in creatures originally without this distinction? Whence came the bee's sting, which, when used, does not preserve the bee's life, but destroys

9. Uninherited peculiarities. Neuter ants.

I have erred in giving to natural selection great power, which I am far from admitting, or in having exaggerated its power, which is in itself probable, I have at least, as I hope, done good service in aiding to overthrow the dogma of separate creations."

[1] Askenasy.

[2] *Ad loc. cit.*, p. 159.

it? How shall we account for the different mental characteristics and various instincts of animals? Are not their organs instruments made use of by the instinct, rather than causes of a gradually developed and inherited instinct?[1] As human experience and science are not transmitted from any bodily organisation of the parent, neither is instinct among animals merely due to the inheritance of a higher organisation which has developed by use. Do we not find proofs of a higher intelligence among certain lower creatures (for example, ants and bees) than among many higher forms? Against Darwin's assumption that instinct is a product of bodily organisation, we maintain:

10. Higher instinct in lower organised animals.

First, That in similar bodily organisms very dissimilar instincts are found. All spiders are furnished with the same spinning apparatus, yet their webs are quite different. Nearly all birds have the same structure for building their nests, yet what endless variety we see in the nests they construct! The same is true of their songs, of their care of their young, &c. The limbs of the hare and rabbit have the same structure, yet one burrows and the other does not.

11. Different instincts in similar organisms, and *vice versâ*.

Secondly, That the same instincts are found with different organisations. Birds, either with or without claws apt for climbing, and apes, with or without prehensile tails, alike dwell in trees. The wild dog digs

[1] *Cf.* S. I., Qu. lxxviii. Art. 3. "For the faculties are not for the organs, but the organs for the faculties."

holes, and the hyæna unearths the dead, yet both are without feet specially adapted for these purposes. The German mole secretes food in his cheek-pouches; the large bat has not these appendages, and yet does the same. Moreover, instinct is shown in attempts to use an organ not yet fully developed.[1]

Though the three great kingdoms of nature, the mineral, the vegetable, and the animal, are doubtless built on an ascending scale, there is no proof that the one proceeded from the other. If they did, the same mode of genesis would apply in the formation of the internal organs. But, as a matter of fact, each organ is differentiated from the common protoplasm of the organism; and just as the brain is not evolved from the heart, so neither is the bird from the fish, nor the fish from the mollusc; nor, in metals and metalloids, is gold evolved from silver, or silver from mica; nor, again, are the different kinds of animals evolved from one another, but in one kingdom, as in the other, there are fundamental generic differences.[2] Häckel[3] contends that rudimentary forms furnish incontestable proofs of the truth of Darwin's theory. Agassiz,[4] however, finds evidence to the contrary in the fact that "organs often appear in animals for which there is no corresponding function; that is,

11. Independent formation of species and of organs.

[1] Burdach, *Blicke ins Leben*, p. 210; E. v. Hartmann, *Philosophie des Unbewussten*, 1869, p. 54 *ff.*

[2] Carus, in Fichte, *Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, 1865, p. 250.

[3] *Verhandlungen der deutschen Naturforscher im. J.* 1863; *Generalie, Morphologie, natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte*, 1868.

[4] *Essay on Classification*, i. sect. 1.

organs without function, as, for instance, the uncut teeth of whales, the nipples in male mammalia; organs apparently formed and retained only for the sake of symmetry, as structural adjuncts, conformably to the general type, although practically superfluous." That function and organ are identical is plainly an error, in the sense of the continued function, producing or transforming the organ; as shown, *e.g.*, in the gills of fish and the lungs of higher animals, which fulfil, indeed, the same function, but morphologically occupy very different positions. It is also evident that totally distinct types of animals and plants are found under the same outward circumstances and conditions, and that, on the contrary, the same species retains its type unchanged under utterly different climatic and physical conditions; that when modifications occur they are always superficial, and do not affect the fundamental plan of organisation. Diversity of structure pervades the whole internal arrangement and grouping of the organs; and this diversity has been continuous. The same organic forms which we see in the animal world around us prevailed in the primitive fauna of the globe. The principal typical classes of animals, radiates, molluscs, articulates, and vertebrates, are found in all geological strata, from the earliest to the latest; no lapse of time, no alterations, however violent, in the conditions of life have ever essentially changed their structure. The so-called "retrogressions," that is, an appearance of lower

Rudimentary organs.

Four typical classes of animals unchanged.

organisms ("microcephales"), have only a pathological significance, as the products of a sickly degeneration.[1] Hence, emboldened by the result of his paleontological researches, Oswald Heer[2] declares that "the origin of species is a secret, a mystery, which we try indeed to fathom, but whose adequate solution cannot be found in the natural phenomena with which we are acquainted, nor in the application of existing laws."

Modern materialism is not, then, as it pretends, the inevitable result of the scientific study of nature.[3] Rather is it the effect of nature studied as a system of *necessary* laws, without regard to the first or final cause.[4] Hence many eminent naturalists, knowing the injurious effects of the exclusive study of the experimental sciences, have exercised their minds in other subjects. Cuvier studied the classics; Werner, the geologist, comparative philology; Ampère, the electrician, knew the "Imitation of Christ" by heart.[5] To a well-balanced mind,

Injurious effect of exclusive study of natural science.

[1] Virchow, *Leipzig-Rede*, 1878. Again, in his Wiesbaden Address, 1887: "The final decision regarding evolution in man has not been advanced by one hair's-breadth" (*Tablet*, October 15, 1887). Aetz, *Naturforscher-Versammlungen zu Cassel*, 1870.

[2] *Ad loc. cit.*, p. 603.

[3] Büchner, *Kraft und Stoff. Vorwort.*

[4] Passavant, *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1861, p. 179.

[5] Darwin deplored most bitterly the atrophy of the higher powers of his brain, and the gradual loss of æsthetic tastes. "My mind seems to have become a kind of machine for general laws out of large collections of facts; but why this should have caused the atrophy of that part of the brain alone on which the higher tastes depend I cannot conceive. . . . If I had had to live my life again,

nature, Herschel tells us, reveals a Divine Intelligence everywhere. The origin of life, and of the visible order, is to be found then, not in "*generatio æquivoca*," nor evolution, nor abiogenesis, nor eternity of species, but in the Almighty "fiat" which first made things to be. "And God said, Let the earth bring forth the green herb, and such as may seed, and the fruit tree yielding fruit after its kind. . . . And God made the beasts of the earth after their kind, and cattle, and everything that creepeth on the earth after its kind. And God created man to His own image, male and female, He created them" (Gen. i. 27).

Creation acknowledged by the most eminent naturalists.

A sufficient number of leading naturalists are found in every age to show that this primal truth of revelation agrees with the most exact demands of science. Thus, Linnæus prefaced his system of nature with the words, "I awoke, and saw trace of God, the Eternal, the Immense, the Omniscient, the Omnipotent passing by, and was astounded." The faith of Copernicus is seen in the humble prayer which he had placed on his tomb:—

I would have made a rule to read some poetry and listen to some music at least every week, for perhaps the part of my brain now atrophied would have been kept alive through use. The loss of these tastes is a loss of happiness, and may possibly be injurious to the intellect, and more probably to the moral character, by enfeebling the emotional part of our nature" (*Life*, 4th Edition). Tyndall also speaks of the logical feebleness of science. *Cf.* Mivart, *Genesis of Species*, p. 309.

"Not grace, like Paul, I ask,
Nor shrift, like Peter, crave,
But what my Lord, when crucified,
The thief repentant gave."[1]

Keppler, Newton, Humphry Davy, Œrstedt, Ampère —all of them eminent in science—have opposed themselves to the materialism of their day; and among modern scientists who have resisted the tendency to materialism are A. and R. von Wagner, J. Mädler,[2] J. Hyrte, J. R. Mayer, Gauss, C. von Leonhard, Fr. A. Quenstedt, K. E. von Baer, Oscar Traas, and Oswald Heer. In France, among more recent naturalists since the time of Cuvier, A. Cauchy, Biôt, Quatrefages, and C. Bernard may be noticed; and in England, Chalmers, who declared that "Christianity had everything to hope and nothing to fear from science;" also Murchison, Faraday, Prichard, Brewster, Mivart, A. Meadows, and J. Baile.[3]

[1] "Non parem Pauli gratiam requiro,
Veniam Petri neque posco; sed quam
In crucis ligno dederas latroni
Sedulus oro."

[2] "If astronomy comes from heaven, let it show itself worthy of this origin. It demands the knowledge of God, since it searches into truths which reveal to us His great works, and develops laws, rightly called 'natural laws,' not because nature dictated them, but because God appointed them to nature" (*Gesamm. Naturwissenschaft*, iii. p. 551).

[3] To which may be added Carpenter, the Duke of Argyle, Sir W. Thompson.

CHAPTER V.

PANTHEISM.

We have already seen that pantheism, as opposed to materialism, assumes the unity of one supreme principle as the only explanation of all that exists both in nature and thought. So far then, but no farther, pantheism and Christianity agree. For the infinite Being Who, according to Christianity, is not only the principle of all things, but also their creative cause, is, with the pantheist, identical with the things themselves. They are but the phenomena, and realisation of this one, universal, absolute Being, and His relation to them is *not* that of cause to effect, but of substance to accident.[1]

According to pantheism, one First Principle is the *substance* of all that exists.

[1] Spinoza says (*Ethic*, i. p. 18), "God is the immanent, not the transient cause of things." He distinguishes the organ of the manifestations, "creative nature" (*natura naturans*), from the manifestations themselves, "created nature" (*natura naturata*). Goethe makes the Deity of pantheism speak thus:—

"Amid life's billows,
In the tumult of action,
I am borne hither and thither,
Floating upward and downward,
Life and death
An eternal Ocean,
An ever-changing motion,
A glowing life.
Thus I work at the busy loom of life,
And weave the living Robe of the Godhead."

Hence pantheism has been also termed "monism," since it teaches that all things which exist are one and the same in their nature, substance, and proper essence;[1] that all differences are merely apparent, not real. And as there are no finite, conditional substances, there never was a creature, for all things which are apparently finite are but the forms, attributes, and manifestations of the one ever-infinite Being.[2]

Such is the theory. On what does it rest?

1. If the world were not essentially different, but only modally distinguished, from the Divine Substance, as my thought is distinguished from my mind, then, as the mode manifested follows necessarily the nature of the substance modified, all things visible being, by this hypothesis, but the manifestations of an eternal, necessary, and infinite substance, must themselves be eternal, necessary, and infinite.[3] But the things of this world are exactly the reverse. They appear and disappear; they are temporal, contingent, and finite; they differ

The things identical with the Divine Substance would be themselves eternal.

[1] "To imagine the being of the world, is to strip it of all individual and contingent forms, and to conceive it as an universal, necessary Being, distinct from every other; that is, as God" (Hegel, *Encyclopædia*, s. 50).

[2] "Absolute necessity being assumed as alone true and real, in what relation do outward things stand to their principle? . . . They differ from absolute necessity, but without it they have no independent existence. There is only one Being, and this belongs to necessity. Things are only accidents; that which we call absolute necessity is to be hypothesised as the Universal Being" (*Hegel's Werke*, vol. xii. p. 437).

[3] Mode is an entity which cannot possibly exist apart from its subject. A thought cannot exist apart from the thinking mind.

from one another, and have separate existences, and thus cannot be phenomena of this one and the same substance.

2. If finite beings could, by composition, become one universal substance,[1] then the infinite would be obtained by the addition of things finite, and the absolute by the union of things contingent, which is as inconceivable as that a unit could be the product of a sum of zeros.

Things finite cannot by addition become infinite.

3. If all phenomena in the world were mere modifications and appearances of one substance, then the same substance would be at once free and necessary, conscious and unconscious, intellectual and unintellectual. There must then exist at least two essentially distinct substances, which, being different by nature, must proceed from the First Cause of all things, not by necessary emanation from its essence, but by determination; that is, by creation.

Nor the same substance at once conscious and unconscious.

[1] "Since finite things produce themselves severally in the endless vicissitudes of birth and decay, they constitute an universality which is not their cause, but their substance" (Strauss, *Glaubenslehre* i. p. 382). Lange well remarks (*Dogmatik*, i. p. 213): "Philosophers such as Strauss reckon up things conditioned, like the tradesman who sold every article below cost price, and when told that this proceeding would make him bankrupt, replied that he should get his profit by the number of goods sold. Thus, these speculative calculators derive the independent condition of the world from its millions of conditioned existences. The pantheistic view of the world is nothing but a pantheistic comedy, which began in Germany with the revival of the romantic element: it fills the imagination, but will not bear reflection. With Schelling, especially, it is poetry rather than philosophy."

4. According to the pantheistic theory, that which is free and conscious must have emanated from what is necessary and unconscious. Thus, what is essentially of a lower order would produce what is essentially of a higher order.[1] This, however, is equally impossible, because every force must contain potentially its operation, and, in like manner, every efficient cause its exterior manifestation or effect. Therefore, the perfect can produce the imperfect, but the imperfect can never produce the perfect.[2]

Nor can the less produce the greater.

5. If all things and all phenomena had necessarily proceeded from one cause, then nature would be nothing more than a table of logarithms, a materialised logic. True, mathematical laws, as well as logical principles, appear everywhere in nature; but with them we see also a prodigality of individual life, colour, and form. And thus Stahl[3] justly calls indi-

[1] "It must be said of the Absolute," observes Hegel (*Werke*, vol. ii. p. 16), "that it is only in the end, that which it is in truth." Aristotle had already refuted this error (*Metaphys.*, xii. 7).

[2] The derivation of the perfect from the imperfect contravenes the supreme law of thought, that of the sufficient cause, and assumes effects for which no adequate cause exists. "Whatever perfection exists in an effect must be found in the efficient cause (*causa effectiva*). For it is evident that the effect pre-exists virtually in the cause which produced it. But that virtual pre-existence in the efficient cause is not a less perfect, but a more perfect, mode of pre-existence" (S. I., Qu. iv. Art. 2). "Although the seed is the principle of the living thing generated therefrom, it has, anterior to itself, the animal or plant whence it has fallen. For whatever is in potentiâ must be preceded by what is in act, since potentiality cannot be reduced to act save by what is already in act" (*Ibid.*). *Cf.* Aristotle, *Metaphys.*, xii. 5.

[3] The ancients used to say, "Socrates non est humanitas;" for the idea of humanity does not fully express the nature of the indi-

vidualism the refutation of pantheism; for whatever *is necessarily* developed from one type has no more individuality than casts repeated from the same mould; nor, on the other hand, can that which possesses individuality be the product of any blind necessity, but of a free will.

Individuality refutes pantheism.

But individuality appears everywhere in nature, and most evidently in the individual character of man and man, with their variety of powers, talents, and gifts. Spinoza evades this question, and simply describes individuals as "modes" of the one Substance. He fails, however, to prove why each "modus" differs from all others. Subjective idealists, like Kant, Fichte, and Schopenhauer, explain the multiplicity of objects as a subjective phenomenon, arising out of the conditions of space and time. But this only transfers the difficulty from the object to the mind; nor do they explain why each individual thinks independently for himself, and distinguishes himself from all others of his kind. According to Hegel, the idea is the only universal Substance; besides it there is nothing, and the processes of nature are merely the laws of thought applied to external objects. But even Hegel allows that neither idea nor word can grasp the individual "this" (the *hœcceitas* of Scotus), the personality which yet can only be thus defined. Individual personality is beyond the scope

vidual man. "That which constitutes a man contains," says St. Thomas, "a something which humanity has not" (S. I., Qu. iii. Art. 6).

of Hegel's absolute idea, and therefore has no place in his philosophy. Nor can Hegel explain multiplicity as a real phenomenon. Actual multiplicity is not a mere conception, but an aggregate of individuals, each distinct from the other, and which, being apprehended, not by the intellect, but only by the senses, cannot be the self-developed product of one original idea.

6. Finally, if the world is not the work of God, but self-created, then, as the less cannot produce the greater, it must have been the work of man.[1] But man is inconceivable apart from nature. He is nature's child, born of its soil and sustained by its produce; indeed, of all organic beings he is the last produced. Therefore, the world was not created by man, who is conditioned and finite, but by a First Cause, Who is superior alike to man and the world.

If God did not create the world, man must have done so.

Sensible of this difficulty, pantheist writers have affirmed the eternity of the human race. "It is difficult," says Michelet, "to derive the perfect from the imperfect; still less are we disposed to concede that mind was evolved from matter. This difficulty, however, is easily solved if we admit the eternity of the human race." And he allows that without this assumption his whole system would be a mere chimera.[2]

Hence pantheism affirms eternity of mankind,

[1] According to Hegel (*Werke*, xi. 11), God is the result of universal progress. But since, in his system, the world had no temporal beginning, and cannot have an end, this result will never be attained: God will never become a reality.

[2] *Ueber die Persönlichkeit der Absoluten*, p. 120.

But an endless duration of the human race is a contradiction in terms, and disproved alike by science and history, as we have seen. Moreover, if man existed from all eternity, and will eternally exist, and if, according to Hegel's theory, man's intellectual development is already complete, what remains for future ages to discover or learn? Nothing but the unendurable monotony of the one absolute idea!

which is impossible.

But how does pantheism stand the test of experience? If it be true, then all divergence and all opposition between things are merely apparent, and all things are one and the same; then all action in the world is the immediate action of God, the life of the world is the life of God, and God alone is all. Or, in the words of Schelling, "the 'I think, therefore I am' (*cogito, ergo sum*), has been, ever since Descartes, the fundamental error of all philosophy, for thought is not my thought, nor being my individual being, but all is of God alone, or rather all is of All."[1]

Is this really so? We recognise in ourselves a series of numberless phantasms, operations, opinions, conclusions, affections, resolves, and of all these experiences, though they be distinct from, and even opposed to, each other, our "ego" is, we know, the sole subject. Nay, further, all these interior experiences are but our individual selves, or "ego," modified in these various ways On the other hand, we receive impressions which arise, not from our self-consciousness, but which are involuntary, and often

Our consciousness tells us of *self* and *non-self*,

[1] *Aphorismen zur Einleitung in die Naturphilosophie*, p. 144.

make themselves felt even against our will. There are, then, other substances outside ourselves which act upon us; that is, there exist two essences, two substances, myself within, and what is not myself, the world without; consequently, pantheism is refuted by the immediate, simple, and incontestable fact of experience.

and of our freedom of action.

But we are conscious not only of the power of acting for ourselves, but of acting with freedom. I know myself to be one who freely determines to do good or evil; therefore I am responsible for my actions. The choice of merit and demerit, reward and punishment, is mine. I am master of my lot. I feel then in my innermost being that I am not a wave, tossed to and fro, nor a sand-heap, whirled together by blind necessity, to be again dispersed into the one hopeless "absolute Whole;" but I have a proper personal existence of my own, and that existence has a purpose. I am not a leaf of autumn, blown down to make room for another, nor merely a means to an end; but I have an end, which is mine own by right, and belongs individually to myself.[1] And if men were not thus free there would be no history, for history is the common product of two factors, necessity and liberty; nor would there be any true development, nor any progress toward a higher state, for all human life

[1] As a political theory pantheism necessarily leads to Absolutism. The independence of the individual and the family is regarded as "egotistic exaltation of the personal, and far inferior to the disinterested patriotism of classical times. Despicable indeed is this vain self-idolatry, which refuses to be absorbed in the absolute substance of the State" (Chalybæus, *Ethics*, vol. i. p. 370).

would revolve in one and the same eternal circle of blind necessity.

But let us consider pantheism in its assumptions and proofs. Pantheism, notably in its latest phase,[1] starts with the arbitrary assumption that all genuine science has one supreme principle, which is the only source of truth. But the intellect possesses no one all-embracing truth. For an universal idea only represents what is common to many diverse beings, apart from their differentiated properties, of which it can, therefore, give no idea. Again, an universal idea, being obtained by abstracting from what is concrete, singular, and existing, has of itself no existence, and is only a mental concept. "When we speak of an universal abstract idea," says St. Thomas, "we understand thereby two things, namely, the nature of the thing itself, and the abstraction, or universal conception thereof. The nature itself, which is grasped by the mind, or of which an abstraction is made, or which is considered under an universal idea, exists only in singular, undivided things (*singularibus*). But the conception, or abstraction, or the universal idea, resides in the intellect. We can make this evident by an example from the material world. The sight sees the colour of the fruit, independently of the odour. If we ask where the colour is, which is seen without the odour, it is evidently only in the fruit. That the colour, however, can be perceived without

Assumption of pantheism.

Only one principle of knowledge.

No universal, all-embracing truth.

The abstract is drawn from particulars.

[1] Schelling and Hegel.

the smell depends upon the sight, which recognises the colour, but does not detect at the same time the odour. Similarly, the idea of mankind exists only in this or that man. But that mankind may be conceived without the individual conditions, that is, that an abstraction may be formed of humanity, in order to form a general conception of man, this apprehension of humanity is the act of the intellect, which considers in this case merely the nature of the species, and not the individualising principles." [1]

This knowledge of all truths by means of one single idea is an ideal unattainable by the created intellect, but possible to God alone.[2] Only when He is seen face to face will all be seen in Him, Who contains all truth in Himself.

One universal truth possible to God alone.

Equally false is the second assumption of pantheism, the necessary sequence of the first, which asserts the identity of the ideal and real, of thought and being.[3] For the opposition between our thought and external things is told us in our self-knowledge. We cannot evolve our sense experiences from unaided thought, nor the laws of thought

Thought and being not identical.

[1] S. I., Qu. lxxxv. Art. 2. "Universal ideas," says Aristotle, "are not separate from singular" (*Metaphys.*, xiv. 4, xiii. 9; *De Anima*, iii. 8). "No ball exists which our senses cannot perceive" (*Metaphys.*, vii. 8). On the same principle, all science has the singular for its direct object, and from it the universal is obtained by means of abstraction.

[2] "God," says St. Thomas, "knows all by His Essence" (S. I., Qu. lxxxix. Art. 1).

[3] According to Hegel, the distinction between thought and being, between subject and object, must be rejected, as "barring the entrance to philosophy."

merely from what our senses tell us. Sensible experience is only the matter on which our thought works. The thought is potentially in the mind, as the plant is potentially in the seed. But as the seed requires heat and moisture to be developed into the plant, so the mind requires sensible impressions, external and internal, to develop its thoughts.[1] In this sense, all our knowledge is founded upon sense experience, for sense experience and the intellect together form its adequate cause.[2] True, the mind finds in the external world the laws which direct its own thought; for the laws of reason are also the laws and first principles of all things.[3] But the mind does not create these external objects, for it is only by degrees, in part, and with much toil that the thinking reason learns to know the objective reason incorporated in nature. Neither thought nor nature,

The laws of nature and thought have a common First Cause.

[1] *Cf.* Aristotle, *De Anima*, 6 c., and St. Augustine, *Ep. ad. Hebrid.* 13, At. 218: "In saying that 'we understand,' we mean a mental act, which can be effected in two ways—by the mind itself, reflecting on itself, by reason within, as when we understand that the thing is understood, or by the admonition of the senses, as when we understand that the object perceived is a body." "Sensible experience," says St. Thomas (S. I., Qu. lxxxiv. Art. 6), "is not the whole cause of intellectual knowledge; rather it is only its material cause (*materia causa*)." Hence he understands the well-known saying, with Aristotle (*De Anima*, iii. 4), "The intellect is an unwritten tablet, on which nothing is inscribed" ("Intellectus tabula rasa in qua nihil est scriptum.").

[2] The intellect, as a passive faculty, receives the sense impression, and, as an active faculty, renders that impression intelligible by abstracting the universal idea of species from its material condition.

[3] "The laws of thought," says Suarez (*Metaph.*, ii. Disp. 39), "are, at the same time, the determining principles of the essence and nature of things." "Objectivity can only be known by being recognised

therefore, can be God, but both must alike proceed from one common Supreme Cause, from one Primal Reason, which is also Primal Force and Creative Power; that is, God.[1]

What has been said proves the falsity of the third assumption of pantheism, that of the existence of pure thought, of a reason absolute yet impersonal, the "absolute reason" of Hegel. Now, there is no such thing as indeterminate, universal thought, any more than there is undetermined act. All thought is that of a definite, individual, and determinate being, with a definite object, and is therefore definite thought. There is no middle

The absolute impersonal reason. But abstract thought does not exist.

as originally rational, since the laws of reason which govern our mind show themselves to be exactly the same as the objective reason existing in it; *i.e.*, external objects" (J. H. Fichte, *Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, vol. xxiii. p. 160).

[1] Our reason recognises the eternal laws, which are embodied in things, because it is a participation and reflection of the Divine Reason which formed the world, according to Its eternal thought. Hence the world reveals the Being of God.

"Unless the eye had felt the light,
The sun it ne'er could see:
If in my soul dwelt not God's might,
He ne'er could quicken me."

—GŒTHE, *Xen.*, iii.

"The human understanding," says Passavant, "which has the mathematical law in itself, recognises the same law in nature. Thus 'like agrees with like,' the subjective with the objective; and this is true not only of the mathematical law, but also of that of logic. Those primary ideas, without which we could not think, are also the primary forms of all being. . . . The law of development, which is the fundamental law of all living beings, presupposes design. Thus, between the laws of reason and nature there is perfect harmony. . . . Both alike spring from one Supreme Common Cause, from a Primordial Reason, which is also a Primordial Force; in one word, from God" (*Miscell. Essays*, p. 90 *ff.*).

term between mind and nature.[1] But in every thinking mind we distinguish the thinking substance, the faculty of thinking, its act, and the object of thought. This universal, absolute reason, from which, according to the pantheistic theory, everything is blindly and necessarily evolved, is a purely intellectual abstraction, and cannot exist. For what is unconscious thought but a thought which does not think?[2]

The assumption of an absolute science is, then, wholly unjustifiable, yet by it pantheism stands or falls. Were our knowledge absolute, unlimited, and therefore immediate, we could, in one act and one idea, comprehend all things at once, without the aid of the objects themselves; and our classification of the different sciences would be meaningless, since this classification is determined solely by the mode in which the object of each science contributes to our knowledge. But as the sciences are many and diverse, and each science is specified and limited by its formal object, it follows that the objects themselves are many, diverse, and limited, and that no one created object contains all truth.[3]

[1] Absolute reason, as the foundation and measure of all truth, exists; but it is self-conscious, it is indeed God Himself. "Things true and necessary," says St. Thomas, "are eternal, because they are in the Eternal Mind, which is the Mind of God alone" (S. I., Qu. x. Art. 3). God is Truth, and essential Truth.

[2] Hegel (*Logik, Vorrede*, i.) himself calls his system "a realm of shadows." "The fundamental fallacy of Hegel's philosophy," says J. H. Fichte, "consists in his identifying abstract human thought with absolute thought, a purely arbitrary and groundless hypothesis" (*Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, vol. xvii. p. 292).

[3] "Such an attempt to comprehend the plan of the universe—the

The mode by which science is attained, step by step, from particular facts to universal laws or principles, and the slowness of its advance, both in individuals and in mankind, further show that we are not possessed of all truth, and that *absolute science is not ours.*

Absolute science incompatible with the diversity and progress of sciences.

Finally, every substance [1] is not, as Spinoza defined it, the one Substance, God. Every substance is, as the term implies, self-subsistent, and not a mere manifestation of a subject in which it inheres; but it is not self-subsistent in the sense of being self-created or self-existent. Nor, again, is God, because absolute and infinite, merely Being in the abstract, universal, and undetermined, and as such non-existent, and only existent when determined by finite existences. On the contrary, because He is infinite and absolute Being, God is the First Cause

One Substance alone exists, viz., God.

But God, though infinite, is not undetermined.

order of nature—must begin with a generalisation of particular facts, and a knowledge of the conditions under which physical changes regularly and periodically manifest themselves, and must conduct to the thoughtful consideration of the results yielded by empirical observation; but not to a contemplation of the universe based on speculative deductions and development of thought alone, or to a theory of absolute unity, independent of experience" (Humboldt, *Cosmos*, vol. iii. p. 7 of Introduction, Otte's trans., 1871).

[1] "Substance is that to which it belongs, not to be in a subject" (St. Thomas, *Contr. Gent.*, i. 25). Or again, "Substance is a thing to which it belongs to be in itself, and not in another as in a subject." "To which it belongs," and not "is" simply to distinguish the thing itself from its modes of being, or its essence from accidents. "Not in another" excludes inherence in a subject, but not derivate existence. See Suarez, p. 15.

and plenitude of all Being.[1] As First Cause He can give to all things else a derived and secondary

[1] St. Thomas thus proposes and answers the pantheist contention, that God, because the infinite, primal Being, must be indefinite. St. Thomas. "Being," he puts as his objection, "which is irreceptive of addition (determined by no specific difference) is Being in common, and as such is predicated of all things: therefore, God must be Being in common and predicable of all things." He replies: "A thing may be understood in two ways as irreceptive of increase. First, when it is irreceptive of this addition by its nature; as, for instance, it is of the nature of an irrational animal to be without reason. Secondly, when, though it is not irreceptive of addition by its nature, the addition has not been made; as animal generically (*in communi*), *e.g.*, is without reason, because reason does not belong to the idea of animal generically, but it may be added thereto, as in the case of the rational animal, man. The Being of God (*Esse Divinum*) is incapable of increase (coinfinite) in the first of these ways; *Esse commune*, Being in common, only in the second." The mathematical infinite in space is imperfect, for it is indeterminate and potential. "Matter is perfected by its defining form (*formam per quam finitur*); and therefore 'infinite,' as predicated of matter, signifies something imperfect or undefined" (S. I., Qu. iii. Art. 4). St. Thomas, again, thus anticipates and answers Spinoza's objection, that God is necessarily limited by being defined. He puts the objection, "What is *here and not there*, is finite as to place; therefore, what is *this and not that*, is finite as to substance. But God is *this and not that*, for He is neither wood nor stone; and therefore He is not infinite as to substance." He replies: "The fact that the Being of God subsists in itself, and not in any subject, shows that His infinity is different from all other infinities. If whiteness subsisted by itself, it would by that fact alone be distinct from all whiteness existing in subjects" (S. I., Qu. vii. Art. 1). Cf. *De Ente et Essentia*, c. vii.: "By His purity the Being of God is distinct from all other being. . . . The individualisation of the First Cause, which is absolute Being, is by the purity of His goodness." Nor can we say that the world is outside and by the side of God, since these expressions refer only to conditions of space, not to dynamic relations; for the world is in God, and is upheld by Him and filled with His Presence.

God not limited by being defined.

existence. He can call into being that which was not; in other words, He can create. But because of His infinitude, again, because He is all act, all spirit, He is essentially distinct from the world, and from all that is finite. Infinite and all-perfect in Himself, the Creator gains no increase from creatures, nor by their annihilation would He suffer loss. Before the world, and independently of the world, God then "knows Himself by Himself."[1] He is not the blind, undetermined

God can create.

God exists personally apart from the world.

[1] S. I., Qu. xvi. Art. 2. "Personality," argues Lotze, in answer to Strauss, *Glaubenslehre*, i. 505, "is not founded on the distinction of self from a not-self, but on self-subsistence, which self-consciousness affirms, without reference to that which is not self. The Personality of God, therefore, does not necessarily involve the distinction by God of Himself from what is not Himself, and so does not imply His limitation or finiteness; on the contrary, perfect personality is to be found only in God, while in all finite spirits there exists only a weak imitation of personality. The finiteness of the finite is not a productive condition of personality, but rather a hindering barrier to its perfect development" (*Mikrocosmos*, vol. iii. p. 576). St. Thomas (S. I., Qu. xxix. Art. 3), with his accustomed exactness, says: "'Person' expresses that which is most perfect in nature, subsistence in a rational nature. As, then, we should predicate of God all that is most perfect, since His Essence contains every perfection of creatures, we must predicate personality of Him, not as of creatures, but in the higher sense in which attributes of creatures are applied to God." "That is called subsistent," says Suarez, "which has its being in itself, and not in another, as in a subject; but since it is by itself, and self sustaining, it is, as it were, the primal subject and quasi-foundation of its own being" (*Disputat. Metaphys.* Disp. xxxiv. sect. i.). The idea, therefore, of human personality can only be relative, and by analogy applied to God; for the simple reason that humanity is not identical with any individual man, but is manifested in a multitude of different human personalities, with one common nature; whilst in God idea and reality, the Divine Nature and each Divine Person, are one and the same God. *Cf.*

Lotze, St. Thomas, on Personality.

"All" of the pantheist; but the one, only, self-conscious Personal, though infinite, God. Being God, He is not in the world as a Spirit confined by matter, which He cannot break through. On the contrary, the world is the work of His Hands, penetrated by His Spirit, upheld by His Power, and governed by His Will.

Pantheism, then, destroys the idea of God and of the world, and explains nothing. The very lowest external phenomena, the nature of the human mind, of human knowledge, the direct facts of self-consciousness, free will, conscience, the existence of evil, the meaning of history, progress, whether in individuals or in the nation —all these are left unsolved. Despite its boasted liberty and independence, pantheism is only the fatalism of old, "Everything is so, because it is so; and because it is so, therefore it is true and good." But without freedom there is no responsibility, and, consequently, neither virtue nor vice; for everything is but the manifestation of a force which operates blindly and of necessity; that is, of the *anima mundi*, the universal soul of the world. Evil, then, is only an inevitable transition, a foil for good, and the divinely appointed condition of its development.[1] Only by conflict and

Pantheism destroys the idea of God and the world, and explains nothing.

S. I., Qu. xi. Art. 3. St. Augustine (*De Trinit.*, v. 9) says: "Yet when the question is asked, What three? human language labours altogether under great poverty of speech. The answer, however, is given: Three Persons. Not that it might be spoken, but that it might not be left unspoken; 'Non ut illud dicitur sed ne taceretur'" (Dods's translation).

[1] According to Catholic theology, man was created for a supernatural end, and through the gift of original justice was made

struggle, only by the realisation of all possibilities, can the soul of the universe attain to the full development of its infinite capacities. Evil is the dark but indispensable background upon which the yet incomplete image of the Divine makes itself seen; and all that from a lower point of view seems discordant, contributes by aid of this philosophy to the harmony of the whole. Thus, by its law of absolute necessity pantheism destroys all distinctions between good and evil, between truth and error, and paves the way for intellectual and moral nihilism.

No distinction between good and evil.

Hence it is that pantheism is self-destructive. Some of its later leaders have, indeed, screened under a poetic veil its skeleton of fatalism.[1] True that some noble spirits have been rescued from the results of their own theories; yet pantheism, *pur et simple*, as understood by the masses, among whom it rapidly spread, produced its inevitable effect in Communism and Socialism. When once man has denied the living God, he places himself on the

Pantheism self destructive, ends in Socialism.

impassible and immortal. Suffering and death, therefore, are not, as the pantheist teaches, the divinely appointed conditions for the evolution of human life, but the purely penal consequences of man's wilful transgression both of the divine and natural order. "By one man sin entered into the world, and *by sin, death*, and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned" (Rom. v. 12). But through the grace of redemption, human sufferings, which were in themselves penal, become remedial and meritorious, "For all things work together for good to those who love God" (Rom. viii. 28).

[1] Goethe, in *Werther* (*Sorrows of Werther*, trans. by Pratt., Letter 33), calls the God of pantheism "an insatiable monster, continually employed in devouring and regorging its aliment."

throne of the Deity, and all individuality is bound to do homage to the people, otherwise called the State. In the political movements of the last twenty years we have seen the first attempts to popularise the doctrines of pantheism, and cannot doubt their practical effect. Goethe says, with truth, "He who only tastes an error holds it long; but he who drains its cup, if he is not an idiot, knows it through and through."

The sway of pantheism, then, over the minds of men could not be lasting. After its first introduction into the philosophy of the seventeenth century by Spinoza,[1] it was revived by Fichte and systematised by Schelling and Hegel, and for a while attracted within its magic circle many of their contemporaries, only, like some brilliant but shadowy meteor, to set and pass away.

A transitional system, leading to materialism or to Christianity.

Against the deists and rationalists, who admit Creation but banish God from His own world, and dictate to Him the limits of His power, pantheism has a relative value, as admitting His active and constant Presence throughout the universe. But it has never been more than a transitional phase of thought. Minds pass through it, but never rest therein. Hegel's followers broke into two factions, of which one returned to theism and Christianity, the other degenerated to

[1] Spinoza's contemporaries boldly and rightly called his system, and those allied with it, *atheism;* for where all things are God, nothing is God. The name "pantheism" was never used until the last century.

materialism, which they now defend more or less frankly, as the ultimate result of science. In the history of human thought, the brief reign of pantheism shows clearly that, after traversing the whole circle of error, man has no alternative but to sink into the slough of materialism or to return to the living God.

Pius IX. on pantheism.

In his Allocution of June 9, 1862, Pius IX. thus condemned pantheism: "With a perversity only equalled by their folly, they venture to assert that the Supreme, All-wise, All-provident Deity has no existence apart from the visible universe (*hac rerum universitate*); that God and nature are the same, and similarly subject to change; that God is modified (*reapse fieri*) in man and the world; and that everything is God, and possesses the very substance of the Divinity. But God and the world then being one and the same thing, there is no difference between spirit and matter, necessity and liberty, truth and falsehood, good and evil, right and wrong. In truth, nothing can be imagined more insane, impious, and irrational than this teaching." Further, the Pope shows how absolutism in the State follows logically from pantheism. "They attack and endeavour to destroy the rights of all lawful property, and imagine and coin for themselves, with perverse mind and purpose, an unlimited, uncircumscribed right, which the State is to enjoy, the State being, in their rash judgment, the organ and source of all right." [1]

[1] Pantheism was condemned in terms by the Syllabus (Prop. i.

In contrast with the atheism, veiled or declared, of so-called "modern thought," we subjoin the testimony of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, the three great men in whom Greek genius and ancient philosophy reached their highest development. The extracts given show how human reason, aided only by the study of the world without and the operations of the soul within, arrived at the knowledge, imperfect indeed, but certain, of the existence of a personal God.

Socrates.

According to Socrates, God is the Supreme Good and Supreme Wisdom, Who, though hidden from our sensible vision, reveals Himself through the wonderful order of nature. By His providence He watches over all, and specially over man, and in the worship due to Him, demands, above all, purity of heart and justice.[1] There can be but one Supreme Being, Who has ordered the world as one great whole; Who is at once the First Cause and First Mover of the human soul, which participates in the Divine Nature. When Socrates, with his monotheism, speaks of Gods, he means beings subordinated to the Supreme Creator, Who is All-wise as well as All-mighty, Who both rewards virtue and punishes vice.

Plato.

According to Plato, God is the Supreme Good and the Supreme Spirit, for the Absolute can only be conceived as possessing soul and intelligence;[2] Who created the sun in the visible world to

Prop. xxxix.). Cf. *Constitut. Dogmat. de Fide Cath. de Deo Rerum Omnium Creatore*, Can. iii.

[1] Xenophon, *Memorab.*, i. 3, 14; i. 4; i. 5, 10; i. 1, 19.

[2] Soph., p. 248.

be an image of His action in the intellectual world, wherein He dispenses light and heat and life.[1] He is the source of all good and of all perfection. He is the absolute, perfect, living, and spiritual Being, in Whom is neither past nor future, but simply the present.[2] By Him the world was made; for the soul existed before the body.[3] The world is not the effect of a blind, necessary cause, but the work of God's wisdom and knowledge: things were not, and through Him they were.[4] The world was made in the likeness of His own spiritual, living, and perfect Essence.[5] It is the realisation of His eternal idea; the work not of necessity, but of love, which is the daughter of superabundance and mercy.[6] God guides and rules the world, and cares for all.[7] Even evil itself must serve the great whole; and none can escape the punishment he has deserved. "However insignificant thou mayest be, thou canst not escape from His eye, even if thou shouldest hide thyself in the depths of the earth: nor canst thou escape, if thou art so great that thou couldest attain to Heaven; thou must bear the punishment due to thy evil doings either in this life, or when thou hast descended to Hades, or hast been placed in another and still more terrible place.

[1] *De Rep.*, p. 508. [2] *Tim.*, p. 30. [3] *De Legg.*, v. p. 892.

[4] Soph., p. 265. Yet this passage does not clearly express the Christian conception of creation (ἄλλου τινὸς ἢ θεοῦ δημιουργοῦντος, φήσομεν ὕστερον γίγνεσθαι πρότερον οὐκ ὄντα), although Clement of Alexandria thus understands the Platonic teaching. Cf. *Cohort. ad Gent.*, c. 6.

[5] *Tim.*, p. 39. [6] *Sympos* p. 202. [7] *De Legg.*, x. p. 898.

And this thou must say to thyself concerning those, whom thou seest raised to honour by evil deeds and all kinds of injustice, as if the gods did not regard the affairs of men. Thou knowest not their final destiny, nor how they may contribute to the perfection of the whole."[1]

Aristotle on pantheism.

According to Aristotle, God is the cause of all movement, for nothing is set in motion except by a Being Who is Himself already in motion; therefore God is immutable, immaterial, pure energy, pure spirit, the Source and End of all things[2] and fulness of life.[3] From Him proceeds the Spirit, which animates the human body.[4] The Divine Spirit must have an object of thought worthy of Him: which is Himself. God contemplates Himself,[5] and in this knowledge, which He has of Himself, consists His beatitude.[6] By the perfect mode of this perception, which is a pure intuition, He comprehends Himself, the Principle of all Being, so perfectly, that He sees all being, all energy in Himself as the cause.[7] As the object of all love, God sets the universe in motion;[8] He is the Supreme God, the Principle of all life, both in kind and quantity.[9] "The world is like an army, whose order demands a Supreme Head. The order does not create the Supreme Head, but the Supreme Head creates the order: those who refuse to admit a Supreme Head, self-subsistent and separate from the

[1] *De Legg.*, 904.
[2] *Metaph.*, xii. 8.
[3] *Ibid.*, xii. 7.
[4] *De Generat. Anim.*, ii. 3.
[5] *Metaph.*, xii. 9.
[6] *Ibid.*, xii. 7.
[7] *Ibid* xii. 9.
[8] *Ibid.*, xii. 7.
[9] *Ibid.*, xii. 8

world, are forced to admit one of two illogical and absurd theories: either that being has proceeded from nothing, or else that all things which exist are one (atheism, pantheism). There is only one Supreme Cause: those who admit an endless succession of beings, each of which is its own cause (materialism), destroy the unity of the world, and substitute for it a number of independent individualities. But things will not be thus misruled. Long ago Homer well said, 'It is not good for us to be under the dominion of the many. One alone must be our Ruler.'"[1]

[1] *Metaph.*, xii. 10. *Cf.* Kym., *Die Gotteslehre des Aristotles und das Christenthum*, Zürich, 1862; Zell, *Verhältniss der Aristot.-Philosophie zur Religion*, Mainz, 1863.

CHAPTER VI.

SOULLESS MAN.

"LORD, teach me to know myself; teach me to know Thee," was the prayer of St. Augustine many centuries ago; and, in still earlier times, to "know thyself" was declared by the oracle as the beginning of wisdom. The knowledge of God and the knowledge of self are, then, the two poles of man's intellect, the twofold object of its researches, of which the end is one and the same. The light flashes from one to the other, and if either truth be obscured, the other is also overshadowed. All error concerning God leads to erroneous notions of man's nature; and these, in return, to false conceptions of the nature of God.

What is man?

We have seen what God is; what, then, is man? "Who art thou?" is the first inquiry of awakening self-consciousness, both in the individual man and in mankind at large. "Am I nothing but dust, or does this earthly form but veil a nobler being? If so, what and whence is it; whither does it tend?" The pantheist replies, as we have seen, that man "is the most perfect manifestation of the Divine Essence;[1] his spirit

[1] Strauss, *Glaubenslehre*, i. p. 399.

is the spirit, his intellect the intellect, of God." But such teaching, however flattering, can but momentarily deceive. Man knows he is human, not divine; and when he awakens from his delusion he casts himself from the pinnacle to which he had mounted in his dream, and in proportion to his pride is his fall. Again he asks, "Who am I?" and the answer comes, "Thou art not man, but a brute, with the same beginning, and therefore with the same end, as all that lives around him."[1]

If pantheism, then, deifies human nature, materialism degrades it; and its doctrines are now taught with such pretentious dogmatism, and are so widely spread by the dissemination of cheap literature,[2] that they deserve careful examination. Its teaching is summed up in the old formula of Feuerbach, the founder of the school: "There is nothing real but what the senses apprehend; therefore, the true, the real, and the sensible are one."[3] "In theology," says

[1] Büchner, *Kraft und Stoff*, p. 234; Vogt, *Bilder aus dem Thierleben*, p. 419.

[2] This is true also, unhappily, now in England. *The Childhood of the World*, by Edward Clodd, is written in the spirit of the crudest materialism, and has reached its twenty-second thousand. It is to be had in Dutch, Flemish, French, Italian, Slavonic, Swedish, and in embossed type for the blind. Also by the same author, *The Story of Creation* has reached its fifth and sixth thousand.

[3] Virchow says the same (*Gesamm. Abhandl. zur wissenschaftl Medicin*, Frankfort, 1856): "Until a soul-substance has been discovered, the working of which can be physically tested, the animists have no scientific standpoint;" *i.e.*, the existence of an immaterial soul can only be admitted when it has proved itself material. The very point to be proved, namely, that nothing but matter exists, is the one always assumed.

Vogt,[1] "the soul is an indivisible, immaterial principle informing a particular body. . . . In natural science, on the contrary, is recognised no immaterial principle apart from the body, and the soul is but the collective name for a variety of functions, which are entirely dependent on the nervous system, and, in the higher animals, on its centre, the brain; and, like all other functions, are modified by any disturbance of their organ. With the destruction of the organ, or of the body to which the organ belongs, the function ceases; soul and body together die. Science knows nothing of the continued life of the soul after death." "Is man, then, like the brute, a mere machine, and his intellect only the product of a certain organisation? Has he no free will? Is it with the brain as with the muscles, and must thought follow the external stimulus by the same necessity which forces the muscle to twitch when the motor nerve is irritated? I can only answer, Yes, the fact is so. Free will has no existence, and, in truth, we are neither responsible nor accountable for our actions. . . . The organism cannot govern itself, but is governed by the laws of its material structure." "Each individual man," says Büchner, "represents the sum-total of his parents and ancestry, of conditions of place and time, air and climate, food and clothing. His will is the necessary consequence of all these causes, which bind him by a natural law, manifest in the character of the individual; just as the planet is bound

According to materialism, man a nexus of matter and nerves.

[1] *Bilder aus dem Thierleben*, pp. 419 *sqq.*

to its own orbit, or the plant to the soil in which it takes root. . . . Thus, thought is a vibration of the cerebral substance. . . . No phosphorus, no thought, and consciousness is a property of matter. . . . The same force which digests in the stomach thinks in the brain. All the talk about the independence of the human mind is mere nonsense."[1] "The brain is modified in the course of time, and, with the brain, habits, which are the measure of morals, also change."[2] "It is difficult for most men to realise the necessity which governs their existence and actions. They do not consider that every impression on ear and eye is a material effect, carrying with it material changes that whatever they eat or drink modifies the blood, and, consequently, the nerves; that each change of temperature or climate acts on the principal nerves, and, through them, on the brain."[3]

Thought product of the brain.

But materialism claims also to represent the highest ideal of human existence. The "cycle of life," according to this teaching, offers a far nobler and grander conception of the order of the universe than the narrow and egotistical morality of Christianity, "Is that view prosaic," says Moleschott, "which ennobles the most apparently insignificant material tendencies, inasmuch as we see in them the source of mental emotions and actions? Is there no poetry[4] in the doctrine of the convertibility of

The poetry of materialism.

[1] *Kraft und Stoff*, p. 122. [2] *Moleschott, passim.* [3] *Ibid.*

[4] Materialists resent far more being called prosaic than irreligious. Even this poetical aspect of materialism is only the "spiritualistic" idea repeated, and is irreconcilable with its own first principles.

matter; is it not a perennial spring of young and vigorous life? We see matter in perpetual motion, producing flowers and fruit, the teeming life of our pastures and plains, from carbon and hydrogen, from the ammonia and salts of the grave, as well as new powers of thought in the human brain. Death is in life, and life in death; but in this death there is nothing dark or fearful, for floating in the air or reposing in the soil are the germs of the new efflorescence. He who sees death under this aspect comprehends the ever-active force of life and the perfection of poetry, immutably based upon the granite pillars of truth." [1]

Its real meaning.

Such is the so-called modern doctrine of the nature and end of man. It is put less poetically, but more accurately, by Schiller; [2] "Man is made of filth, and for a time wades in filth, till at last he fouls the boots of his own posterity. That is the burden of the song, the filthy cycle of human fate." . . . It is summed up in the words quoted by the Apostle, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." [3] And

[1] Büchner begins his chapter on the immortality of matter with the lines from Hamlet:—

> "Imperious Cæsar, dead and turned to clay,
> Might stop a hole to keep the wind away.
> Oh that the earth, which kept the world in awe,
> Should patch a wall to expel the winter's flaw!"

Thus, according to Büchner, the genius of the great Englishman discovered the doctrine of materialism. But he might go back even farther than this, to the old Book, wherein man is told, "Dust thou art, and to dust shalt thou return."

[2] Franz Moor, in Schiller's *Raüber*, Act iv. sc. 2.

[3] *Wisdom*, ii. 6 *ss.* Büchner inveighs against all self-denial, and

the theory and its teachers were thus condemned by Pius. IX: "They recognise none but material forces. Their whole system of morals and their aim in life consist in the acquisition of riches, and all that subserves their sensual passions. And by these evil and abominable principles they flatter, defend, and justify all fleshly lusts, which war against the Spirit, ascribing to them so-called natural rights and prerogatives, which, as they assert, are infringed by the laws of the Church. For they heed not the words of the Apostle: 'If you live according to the flesh, you shall die; but if by the Spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live.'"[1]

Condemned by Pius IX.

asserts, with enthusiasm, "the dignity of matter" (*loc. cit.*, p. 28). "In our eating and drinking," says Moleschott (*loc. cit.*, p. 436), "we are working in the interest of mind and propagating it throughout the world and the ages." Heine gives the frankest expression to this point of view. "Not renunciation! It is pleasure, the dances of the nymphs, nectar and ambrosia, that we demand. Would that the world had never believed in a God! Then we should have been happier." Later, from his sick-bed, his "mattress-tomb," as he calls it, he confesses, "As long as it was confined to good society, this doctrine pleased me; but when it was thrust down my throat by the rude fists of Weitling's workmen, I found it odious." Numberless epitaphs show how literally in heathen times this theory was practised. We find: "What I have eaten and drunk remains with me." "Thou, who readest this, enjoy thy life; for after death there is neither laughter, nor dalliance, nor any delight." "Friend, fill thy goblet with wine, and drink it, and crown thy head with flowers; after death, earth and fire consume all the rest." "I have lived, and had faith in life only: you, who read, trust in nothing. Nothing belongs to us." *Cf.* Döllinger, *Heidenthum und Judenthum*, p. 596.

[1] Allocutio, 9th June 1865. *Cf.* Prop. lviii. and Prop. lix.: "Right consists in the material fact, and the so-called duty of man (*omnia hominum officia*) is but an empty name."

The arguments against the existence of the soul may be briefly stated. The brain is the seat and organ of thought; by its size, form, and structure the mental activities are strictly determined. In childhood, as the brain develops the intellectual powers increase, and with its diminution in old age they too decrease. As in women the brain is relatively smaller than in men, the intellect is less powerful, for a man of genius has a larger brain than a ploughboy.[1] Abnormal smallness of brain is invariably accompanied by defective intellect. The cerebral development of the negro is inferior to that of the white man, and consequently his intellect is of a lower order. Any serious malady affecting the brain disturbs the mental faculties, and produces idiocy or mania. When portions of the brain of animals are removed in successive slices their intelligence is correspondingly diminished, so that the anatomist may be truly said to cut away the intellect piecemeal.[2]

Proofs of materialism.

Power of thought depends on size of brain.

[1] Büchner quaintly appeals to the hatter as an authority. "It is well known to hatters," he says, "that the cultured classes require larger hats than the uneducated."

[2] Büchner, *loc. cit.* p. 125. Even the alleged facts are false. It has been proved that in persons who were found after death to have existed with only one half of the brain the mental powers were unimpaired. This shows (1) that the individuality of the soul was independent of the destroyed moiety of the brain; (2) that it would have been independent of the sound half, supposing that to have been destroyed and the other half preserved; (3) that as half a brain was sufficient for the existence of the individual soul, the brain was only connected with it as a subordinate organ. The soul, therefore, exists independently of the brain, and controls its functions. *Cf.*

Relying on these facts of experience, the materialist arrives at the conclusion that the intellect is only a special manifestation of the vital force, determined by the peculiar structure of the brain-substance, and that all that psychologists affirm

The soul a function of the brain.

Westhoff, *Stoff, Kraft, Gedanken*, 1865, p. 81. And it has yet to be proved that the size and shape of the cranium is the measure of intellectual capacity either in individuals or in races. *Cf.* Engel, *Untersuchung über die Schädelform*, 1851, p. 122; Prichard, *Nat. Hist. of the Human Race*, vol. i.; Waitz, *Anthropol. der Naturvölker*, Leipzig, 1859, vol. i. p. 300. The American school (Nott and Gliddon, *Types of Mankind*, 1854) maintained this doctrine in the interests of slavery, to support which the book was written. "In the course of history," says Waitz, "we behold one and the same nation rise out of barbarism into civilisation, and descend again to its former level, the shape of the cranium remaining all the while unchanged." "We doubt whether a single individual exists, possessing any knowledge of physiology, who believes that the mind can be gauged by the brain, or measured by the size of the head and the comparative development of the various parts of the cranium, or that our innumerable intellectual, moral, and emotional aptitudes and dispositions are to be traced in protuberances on the surface of the skull" (J. Moreau, *Journ. des Savants*, 1860, p. 395). R. Wagner's investigations (*Ibid.*, 1862, p. 233), verified by Flourens, place Gaus, 125; Depuytren, 179; Hermann, 326; Hausmann, 641, in a comparison of brain-weight with 960 ordinary men! S. B. Davis's recent work (*Philosoph. Trans. of the Royal Society*, London, 1868) proves from a comparison of 1139 skulls, belonging to 133 different races from all parts of the world, the fallacy of all theories which connect low intellectual capacity with small brain dimensions. The French are surpassed in size of brain by the Esquimaux, the majority of the Hindoos, the Siamese and Chinese, and even by inferior races, such as the Kaffirs, Papuans, and Alfurias. The mean brain-weight of seven Australian women was 1123, answering to a volume of 1080, and that of four Tasmanian women was 1100, corresponding to 1060 ccm. According to Vogt, "the apostle of science" with us, these women must "necessarily" have been idiots; yet amongst the women of the most intelligent nations we find the same, and even smaller, brain-weights than those of these savages. The lightest brain-weights among Englishwomen are 1055; Irishwomen,

of the spontaneity of the mind and its independence of the body is scientifically worthless.[1]

We reply that the statement of materialism, that "the same force which digests in the stomach thinks in the brain," is only an old truth, partially understood and wholly misapplied. St. Thomas asks whether there are one or several principles of life in man.[2] Next, whether, if there be one single principle of life—the vital force—it possesses one or many faculties and powers.[3] Guided by experience, he arrives at the conclusion that in man there is one and the same principle—the soul—from which proceed the vegetative faculties, nutrition and growth; the sensitive faculties, sensation and desire; and the intellectual faculties, thought and free will. We must not, however, infer that bodily growth, sensitive perception, and conscious thought are acts of one and the same faculty. Though all proceed from, and reside in one common principle of life—the

St. Thomas. Faculties many; soul one.

1090; Frenchwomen, 1090. The heaviest brains among the Australian women exceed in ten cases the sections from twelve European races that Davis was able to examine. Sixty-six ancient British skulls (fifty-six male, ten female) yielded in section a capacity for 1489 grms. brain-weight in the males and 1262 in the females, whilst the present inhabitants of England yield only 1425 and 1222. Thus, Vogt's assertion that increased weight of brain goes with greater culture is wholly arbitrary and groundless. Furthermore, this hypothesis is proved to be false by the animal world. The bee, the emmet, or the spider are not below the ox, the goose, the duck, the frog, or the goldfish in sagacity, and yet the nervous system in the former is far less highly developed than in the latter.

[1] Büchner, *loc cit.*, p. 137.

[2] S. I., Qu. lxxvi. Art. 3.

[3] *Ibid.*, Qu. lxxvii. Art. 3.

soul—still, they are distinct faculties, each of which has its special function. Thus, sight is an immediate act of a bodily organ; yet, mediately, it proceeds from the soul, which animates and limits the action of all organs of the body. This is seen by the fact that disturbances in the inferior life of the soul impede the exercise of its higher faculties, such as its powers of thought, which could not occur if man, as a vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual being, was not, while performing these different operations, one and the same being.[1] Hence it is strictly accurate and experimentally true to say that the powers of thought and of digestion proceed from the same being, because of this substantial unity of the spiritual principle. Only because of this unity can we say of any man that *he* sleeps, hears, grows, sees, thinks, &c.; otherwise the individual thinking would be distinct from the same individual sleeping, and so of the rest.[2] Those different vital actions, then, which in lower natures exist separately are united in the human soul. As the life of the plant is reproduced in the animal, not independently, but inseparably with the sensitive life, so in man the lower forms of the plant and the animal, the vegetative and sensitive life, are united with a higher faculty, the free, conscious spirit, the intellectual life.[3] But the

[1] "One operation of the soul, if intense, impedes another, which could never happen were not the principle of its action essentially one" (S. I., Qu. lxxvi. Art. 3).

[2] "That which is one has but one substantial being, but it may have many operations. Thus the essence of the soul is one, but its faculties many" (S. I., Qu. lxxvi. Art. 3).

[3] It seems to be a universal law that the higher forms always

assertion of the materialist, that the same force which digests in the stomach thinks in the brain, is false; for the same force cannot be both conscious and unconscious, both free and determined—conscious and free in the intellect, unconscious and determined in the digestion. Were this so, the vegetative and the sensitive life would be the same; there would be no difference between the plant and the animal. The intellectual soul, then, is in itself one and indivisible, although endowed with a variety of powers and operations.

Further, the materialist doctrine that thought is a product of the brain is directly opposed to experience.

The brain, condition, not cause of thought.

According to Catholic philosophy, the soul does indeed require the bodily organ for the exercise of its functions, but not as a condition of its existence. St. Thomas[1] puts the question, "How can the soul be independent and self-subsistent, since it is dependent upon bodily organs?" And answers, "It is so because the intellectual faculty is not the product of the bodily organ—that is, of the nervous system centering in the brain—but depends upon that organ only so far as it supplies the material on which the soul works; for without this organ the mind could neither receive impressions from the external world nor react upon them.[2] But it by no means

include the lower. *Cf.* S. I.. Qu. lxxvi. Art. 3; Aristotle, *De Anima*, iii. Qu. 3.

[1] S. I., Qu. lxxv. Art. 2 ad. 3.

[2] *Ibid.*, Qu. lxxv. Art. 3: "The body is requisite to the action of the intellect, not as the organ that exercises the act, but as supplying its object (*ratione objecti*). For the phantasms are to the intellect what

follows from this that thought is nothing but an act of a bodily organ. We might as well say that it is the piano which plays the tune, since the musician is so obviously dependent upon his instrument, that if the strings are broken or out of tune he can produce nothing but discord. The faculty of thought in the soul is as distinct from the organism (the body in general and the brain in particular) as the musician is from the instrument.[1]

The soul is distinct from its instrument.

The materialist objection that the powers of the mind increase with the growth of the body, and suffer with its decay, only confirms what has been said. The intellectual faculties slumber alike in infancy and in old age, because at the beginning of life the organs which supply the matter of thought, the impression from the outer world, have not developed, while at life's close they have de-

Its independence even in illness and death.

colour is to the sight." Consequently disturbances of the nervous system produce hallucinations and madness, because the soul receives only false and distorted impressions from the defect in the bodily organ, and reasons on erroneous premisses. Hence, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as mental derangement, the condition thus described really proceeding from some latent infirmity in the bodily organ, however difficult it may be to detect it.

[1] S. I., Qu. lxxxiv. Art. 7. "For a physiologist who has a correct notion of the characteristics of vital phenomena there is nothing abnormal or surprising in the restoration of life and intelligence to the brain by the influence of oxygenated blood. It is the contrary that would be surprising. In truth, the brain is a mechanism so contrived and organised as to manifest intellectual phenomena under a certain combination of conditions. If, then, one of these conditions—for instance, the blood—is removed, we certainly should not expect the mechanism to continue its functions as before" (Bernard, *Introduction à l'Étude de la Médecine Experimentale*).

cayed. At the same time, there are striking instances of intellectual power remaining unimpaired, or even intensified, in extreme age and after prolonged illness.[1] This calm and clear perception, noticeable in many dying persons when sensation is almost extinct, proves the independence of the soul in man.[2] What we see in old age is the very same process which we may daily observe in ourselves in the act of falling asleep; namely, the gradual enervation of all our mental and bodily activities, which, nevertheless, revive again, as, morning by morning, we awake refreshed and invigorated.

This is also true of all pathological phenomena, such as fainting, imbecility, and the so-called mental disease. Strictly speaking, there is no such thing

[1] For instance, Isocrates, Sophocles, Plato, A. v. Humboldt, Goethe.

[2] "One most important gain in this increased calmness (in old age), this tranquil, cloudless sky of the years when desire and passion are past, is that the reflective powers are clearer, stronger, more sustained, and more entirely dominate the soul. The intellectual horizon is enlarged, and the mind more exclusively occupied by an absorbing interest in every sphere of knowledge, which quenches all other desires and needs" (W. v. Humboldt, *Briefe an eine Freundin*, i. Let. 34). "How frequently," says the physician Lauvergne (*De l'Agonie et de la Mort*), "does the precision, calmness, and clearness with which the dying express their last wishes fill the bystanders with admiration! How is it that on the very edge of the grave a man is morally so strong that he appears to rise above his former self; that, in his extreme distress, he seems suddenly endowed with such a sense of prudence, foresight of localities, relations, space; that he has such a clear recollection of words and persons long forgotten or absent; the gift of music, numbers, architecture; the sense of comparison, of metaphysics, of religion, of God; such energy of character? Why is this? We have already answered; the soul, freed from the bonds of matter, then appears as it really is, in all its beauty or deformity."

as a mental disease; this name properly belongs only to error or sin. What passes as such consists in a pathological alteration of its organ, notably of the nervous system, which, as in the delirium of fever, presents not real but illusory images to the patient. Yet, notwithstanding this derangement of its organs, the laws of thought, which belong to the essence of the intellect, remain unchanged. "The ravings of delirium," says Herder, "so often cited as a proof that the soul is material, are in reality evidences of the contrary. The lunatic reasons from an idea which has affected him too violently, and has therefore deranged and shattered the instrument, and its connection with other organisms. He refers everything to this one conception, which possesses him, and from which he cannot escape. Around it he creates for himself a world and a chain of thought of his own. His delusions are pre-eminently personal and ideal. His combinations are governed, not by the nerves of the brain, or even by his sensations, but by the connection of other ideas with his dominant delusion.[1] Fainting, again, is nothing but a temporary

Insanity an affection of the brain, not of the mind.

[1] Consequently, circumspection, cunning, and foresight in the commission of a crime do not invalidate the plea of insanity on behalf of the criminal. As Burdach observes (*Anthropologie*, 1837, p. 613), "Those who have been suffering from mental derangement usually regain the full possession of their faculties at the close of life, even when the derangement has been caused by organic mischief in the brain." The very fact that, according to Parchappe, Pinel, and others, more than fifty per cent. of cases of mental disease are caused by violent emotions, is a proof of the influence of the soul upon the body, the moral upon the physical being. *Cf.* Letourneau, *Philosophie des Passions*, 1868, p. 357.

withdrawal of the mental and sensitive faculties of the soul, which remain unaltered and resume their function the moment the hindrance in the organism is removed.

From all these facts, however, it is evident that man is not wholly spiritual, nor wholly corporeal, but composed of body and spirit, and that all his acts must bear this dual character.[1] Any derangement in one of these components must proportionately mar what is essential to the human composite as a whole.[2] The intellect, with its act of thought, is not the essence of the soul, but only one of its faculties, although doubtless its noblest. But the sensitive faculties, with the assimilative power manifested in the nutrition and growth of the body, are as truly faculties of the soul. Thus, in sleep or in coma its assimilative and formative faculties continue to act, while those of sense and intelligence are dormant. The inactivity of a faculty under certain conditions does not then prove its non-existence. Materialists, by regarding consciousness as the soul itself, confound the soul with one of its

Man composed of body and soul.

The soul confounded with its faculties.

[1] Hence, even our most abstract and most spiritual ideas are always accompanied by sensible images, because all our acts are human, *i.e.*, corporeal and spiritual (*cf.* Aristotle, *De Memor. Reminisc.*, i. 449; *De Anima*, iii. 1. 2, 7. 3, 8. 3). The relation of the understanding to the mental image corresponds with that of the senses to their objects (*cf.* Aristotle, *De Anima*, iii. 7, 3; Thom., *De Ver.*, i. 11). "Sensible images," says St. Augustine (*De Vera Relig.*, xxxix. 52), "are so many steps by which we rise to higher things, from the temporal to the eternal, from the visible to the invisible."

[2] "Man is not soul alone, but something composed of soul and body" (S. I., Qu. lxxv. Art. 4).

faculties, and an act of a faculty with the faculty itself, and herein lies their fundamental error. From what has been said of the interdependence of body and soul, it follows that, just as mental impotency results from the degeneration of the bodily organ, so in savage races the prolonged want of all higher intellectual life has produced a deficient physical development, more especially in the brain, which is unmistakable in the form of the cranium and the facial features.[1]

We have now examined the materialist's proofs for the non-existence of the soul, and of his system, with its distorted truth and many fallacies, we may say with the poet[2]—

> "Gaudy colours, outlines blurred,
> A spark of truth, the rest absurd ;
> Such the brew that takes the masses,
> All the world holds out their glasses."

In conclusion, let us recall some of the difficulties, already alluded to, which necessarily confront the materialist. If thought were merely the material product of the brain, whence comes the purely immaterial idea of the soul and that

Objections to materialism.

[1] "Those nations which have only the dark skin, and not the facial characteristics of the negro, such as the Abyssinians, the natives of the Congo, and others, are superior to their neighbours in civilisation and religion. Those, on the other hand (as, for instance, the Hottentots), in whom the negro features are most marked are, morally and physically, in the lowest stage of degradation, and fetish-worshippers in religion. The low forehead, the heavy brow, which in Blumenthal's system constitutes the negro type, denotes a degraded state" (Wiseman, *Science and Religion*, p. 175).

[2] Goethe, *Faust*.

of God?[1] How is it that, notwithstanding marked differences in the conformation of the brain, and the whole organism of man in childhood and old age, yet the primary truths and first principles of knowledge are recognised by all men alike?[2] Again, if thought and will are only a result of a commingling of fluids,[3] then our opinions and thoughts would be as necessary and unalterable as our figure and height; and the materialists contradict themselves in attempting any kind of discussion or argument. Again, if self-consciousness and personality were merely the result of the disposition of the molecules, how could the sense of personal identity be preserved through a whole lifetime, when every particle of the original molecules disappears, as some say, every three years? This fact alone, in itself, is enough to overthrow the whole system.

Immaterial ideas.

Personal identity.

Again, if thought is only a product of the brain, how does the brain produce this function? Could we watch with the microscope the whole process, say, of thinking of a triangle, and see the cerebral atoms

[1] "Of all the aberrations of the human mind, to me the strangest is that a man can bring himself to doubt his own being; that being of which he himself alone has experience; or that he can accept it as a product of that external nature which in truth he only knows at second hand by means of the very mind which he denies" (Lotze, *Microcosmus*, c. i. p. 288).

[2] *Cf.* Plato, *Phædrus*, p. 39.

[3] St. Thomas proposes the question, whether the soul may not be regarded as the result of a mixture of elements (according to Gallenus's *Complexio*). He denies this (*C. Gentes*, ii. 62), because this theory would not account for vegetative life, and far less for sensitive and intellectual life.

immediately range themselves in triangular form; still, *whence* the thought comes to us that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles would remain unexplained. Here we see that thought is obviously something quite different from any material disposition or arrangement of atoms, for it is at this very point that thought, properly speaking, begins. We may combine the cerebral atoms or molecules as we please; we may introduce into the brain any amount of different substances, with their various forces and properties, yet in the whole compound there will be no more consciousness or thought than in the simplest mineral. To say, therefore, that thought is a product of the brain—that is, of matter—is to assert that the unconscious is conscious.[1] Thought presupposes a single,

Process of thought imperceptible to sense.

[1] *Cf.* C. G. Ruete, *Ueber die Existenz der Seele von dem Naturwissenschaftlichen Standpunkte*, Leipzig, 1864. Even Ludwig, a physiologist of the materialistic school, remarks (*Allgem. Pathologie*, i. 440) that the irritation of the nerves does not explain sensation, far less thought and consciousness. "The combination of conditions which produces sensation is still practically unknown; . . . to cause it, something must be introduced beyond the irritation of the nerves." "The more carefully I examine," says Helmholtz (*Physiologischen Optik*), "the physiological explanations of the phenomena of visual perception, the more persistently and uniformly do I trace the influence of the psychic potency, and the more logical and consistent do all the phenomena of that region appear to me." "All bodily natures are evidently within the range of the human intellect. But the intellect can only know what is *not* in its own nature, for what is naturally present impedes the knowledge of all else of the same kind. Thus, a sick man, whose tongue is infected with bile or acidity, has no taste of sweetness, but everything seems to him bitter. If, then, the intellectual principle had aught corporeal in its own nature, it would never know all

indivisible principle, essentially different from matter; that is, a spiritual principle.[1] Who could seriously speak of a corporeal thought; that is to say, a thought that could be determined, divided, weighed, and measured? "From this perception of the generic dissimilarity between all physical processes and those of consciousness," remarks Lotze, "the necessity has always been recognised of deriving the life of the soul from a principle peculiar to itself." "When once we have come to apprehend," says the gifted discoverer of the laws of the "Conservation of Force," J. R. Von Mayer, "that not only do material objects exist, but also forces as indestructible as the matter of chemistry, we are logically removed only by a single step from

bodies. The intellectual principle can, therefore, neither be corporeal nor understand by a bodily organ, since the nature of such a bodily organ, being determined, could not know other bodies; just as any determined colour, not only in the eye, but in a vase, seems to colour similarly whatever is poured therein" (S. I., Qu. lxxv. Art. 2).

[1] "If I argue thus: A is equal to B, C is equal to B, therefore A is equal to C; it is evident that this chain of reasoning is impossible, unless the same being which perceives A also possesses the perception of B and C. But this is not enough, for the same being which possesses these three perceptions must also affirm equality between A and B, between C and B, and between A and C; and all these links of the chain must necessarily be united in one single, simple, and indivisible being. Moreover, there could be no consciousness of the intellectual act of deduction unless all these elements were united within the simple substance of the soul. But not only is it necessary that all the elements of a chain of reasoning should be united within one identical, simple substance, but the same is necessary in regard to those of every science whatever. The 'ego' of the great Newton which discovered the differential calculus is the same 'ego' which had learnt the numerals and the letters of the alphabet" (Galluppi, *Lezioni di Logic*, ii. p. 19, Florentine Edit., 1841).

the recognition of spiritual beings. We speak of atoms in the inanimate world; we find individuals in the living world; for we know now that the living body consists not merely of material particles, but also of forces. But neither matter nor force are capable of thought, feeling, and volition. Man thinks. For a long time it was universally believed that the nerve membrane, and especially in the brain, contained free phosphorus, and that this free phosphorus played a prominent part in all operations of the intellect. More accurate and recent investigations have now established the fact that 'free phosphorus' is never contained in any living organism, and is, therefore, never to be found in the brain. Doubtless a material change, known as 'molecular motion,' is perpetually going on in the living brain, and the mental operations of the individual are intimately connected with this material 'cerebral action.' But it is a grave error to identify these two factors as coefficient causes of thought. Take a similar example. A telegraphic message cannot be transmitted without a certain simultaneous chemical process; but no chemical action could of itself produce the message or contents of the despatch. Still truer is this of the action of the brain. The brain is only the instrument (or rather the determining condition) of intellectual activity, but is not the intellect itself. Since the mind is not an object of the senses, it is not an object of physical and anatomical investigations."[1]

Mayer on the brain and thought.

[1] *Tagblatt der* 43. *Versammlung Deutscher Naturforscher und Aerzte*, 1869, p. 48.

Finally, on the materialistic hypothesis, how is self-consciousness possible? Sense-impressions form matter of thought, but by its power of reflection the mind distinguishes, first, the impressions of sense-objects; secondly, the operation of the faculties by which the sense-impressions are rendered intelligible; and, thirdly, it knows its own thought as distinct from both. Again, the mind not only knows that it thinks, but recognises its own intellectual personality as the "ego" that thinks and thus beholds itself, and herein consists the essence of the intellect, and the proof of its immateriality. The senses feel, indeed, but they do not feel that they feel; the eye does not see that it sees, nor does the ear hear that it hears. How, indeed, could a mirror reflect itself? Yet the mind is conscious of its own thought.[1] If the brain were the principle of thought, and could produce self-consciousness, it would necessarily be conscious of being itself the brain and the source of thought.

Consciousness. Reflection.

To all these facts the materialist has no reply, but takes refuge in *mystery;* but the mystery which he proposes is not above but contrary to reason. He affirms the identity of what is at once free and necessary, simple and composite, mind and matter; and such an affirmation is not merely a mystery, but a contradiction and an impossibility.

[1] "No bodily action is reflected in the agent, . . . but the intellect reflects on itself in acting; for it understands itself, not only as to any one part, but as a whole" (St. Thom., *C. Gent.* ii. 49).

The moral defects which prepared the way for materialism have already been pointed out. Intellectually it owes its birth in great measure to the reaction against the false idealism and spiritualism which, first taught by Plato,[1] was revived by Descartes,[2] and carried on by his anti-scholastic followers, down to Leibnitz and Wolf. According to their theory, man is a spirit with a body attached. Body and soul are two separate substances, and only related as the ship to the pilot, or the horse to his rider. This dualism in psychology was the logical outcome of Plato's doctrine of the immediate opposition between the idea and the reality, against which Aristotle wrote his metaphysics.[3] Plato's dualism and his theory of innate ideas flowed necessarily from his teaching of the pre-existence of the soul.[4] This dualism once admitted, the question arises: How can these two essentially opposed substances, body and soul, act upon one another? Three systems undertook to solve the problem—*The occasionalism of Geulincx; Leibnitz's predesigned harmonies;* and *the physical influx of Le Clerc.*

According to Geulincx, Descartes' disciple (1625–1669), the action of the soul has no effect on the body, nor that of the body on the soul; but on the *occasion*

[1] He calls the body the tomb and prison of the soul, the chain which binds it to matter (*Phædr.*, p. 82). Cf. *Alcibiad in Sin.*

[2] *Principes de la Philosophie*, i. 8, 9: "I think, and therefore I am."

[3] *Metaphys.*, i., Qu. vii. 8, xii. 6. "It is the office of philosophy," he says, "to penetrate into the causes of the world of phenomena for which Plato has no explanation" (i., Qu. 36).

[4] As was pointed out by St. Thomas, S. I., Qu. lxxxi. Art. 1.

of each psychical process, or modification of the soul, God Himself produces a corresponding modification in the body, and *vice versâ*.[1] Hence the essential unity and interaction of body and soul are completely denied, and the way is prepared for pantheism. According to Leibnitz, body and soul have each their own separate action and laws, and their mutual agreement is due only to the predetermined harmonies which God has established between all simple substances. For each substance is a mirror of the universe, as containing relations which express all created things. Thus, body and soul are as independent as two watches which, being accurately synchronised, act apparently always in concert, yet without really exercising any influence on each other. According to Le Clerc, the soul and the body act upon one another, either directly or indirectly, by means of a mixed agency, partly psychical, partly material; that is, the nerve-spirit, nerve-ether, and the ethereal body. The soul is localised in some part of the body, and its action limited thereto. The actual habitat of the soul, the nature of its action, and of that of the body are alike left unexplained; and, in fact, the whole system explains nothing.

Such, then, were the attempts of the new philosophy to explain the dualism, as they conceived it, of body and soul. But as each individual's experience tells

[1] Malebranche (1638–1715) taught in his system of occasionalism, that, since our soul has no knowledge of itself, or of external things, they only become intelligible by being perceived in God, Who alone contains the ideas of all things. Hence his doctrine that we see all things in God.

him that he is not two persons but one, fresh endeavours were made to establish on scientific grounds this essential unity of man. On the one hand, the idealists formulated the theory of the "ego" as the sole constituent of the human compositum; on the other, the materialists rejected the existence of the soul, and sought in matter, as we have seen, the essential principle of individual life. How matter and spirit, or body and soul, really combine to form the individual man we have next to consider.

CHAPTER VII.

MAN BODY AND SOUL.

THE Church tells us in her Creed that "Man is of a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting;"[1] and this definition is founded on the words of the Preacher, "And the dust returns into its earth, and the spirit returns to God, Who gave it."[2]

From the teaching of the Church and Holy Scripture we deduce these three propositions:—

Man has a soul; he is therefore more than matter.

He has a free and rational soul; and is therefore more than an animal.

He has an immortal soul; and is therefore above the perishable world.

Man has a soul. By "soul" we mean the principle of life. A living being is that which moves itself; whatsoever can no longer move itself is dead. Thus life is commonly understood, and thus even a child distinguishes between an animal as living or dead. Self-movement, then, is the test of life,[3] in

The meaning of "soul."

[1] Athanasian Creed.

[2] Eccles. xii. 7. Catholic philosophers have always defended the definition of the Council of Florence, 1311, that the soul is the substantial form of the body.

[3] "The word 'life' designates those substances which naturally

the sense that the mover and the moved are one and the same being, as opposite to inert matter, which is moved by an external force. The living body possesses within itself the principle and the force from which all its operations and movements proceed. An animal, for instance, pursues its prey and flies from its enemies by means of an inherent power; whereas the motion of a stone through the air is caused by the arm that flings it. Hence we speak of the animal as living, and the stone as dead.

Organism and mechanism.

Again, we call the body, which moves itself from within, an *organism*, and that which is only moved from without, a *mechanism*. The most perfectly constructed chronometer, then, is merely a mechanism, whilst the simplest plant, which puts forth its blossoms and fruits from its innate forces, is an organism. Thus, in science, all bodies are divided into two classes—*organic*, those which have the vital principle, the immanent power of self-movement; and *inorganic*, those which have it not, such as minerals. Consequently a soul implies an

move themselves" (S. I., Qu. xviii. Art. 1), and no later definition approaches St. Thomas's in clearness, precision, and depth. According to Hafeland, "Life is the activity of the organic forces;" according to Bichat (*Recherches Physiologiques sur la Vie et la Mort*, i. c. 1), "A battle with death;" Cuvier (*Le Regne Animal*, Introduct., p. 13), "The capacity in the organism for assimilating external elements, and preserving its own identity;" Fichte (*Anthropol.*, p. 163), "The self-sustentation of the organism;" Schopenhauer, "That condition of a body in which it preserves its essential form, whilst the matter of which it is composed is constantly changing." St. Thomas, in his classification, follows Aristotle (*Physic*, viii. 4; *De Anim.*, i. 2) and Plato (*Phædr.*, p. 245).

immanent principle of activity; but the converse is not true that immanent activity necessarily implies a soul. God is life. He has life in Himself, but no one could ever call God a soul. Nor could we apply the term to an angel or a pure spirit. On the other hand, we speak of the souls of the departed. The soul, therefore, is the principle of life in a corporeal being.

The soul, therefore, is adequately defined as the indwelling principle of life in an organic body, the indispensable and inseparable cause of all its movements and manifestations.[1]

[1] "The first act of the body, physically organised, having life in potentiality," is the standard definition of the soul since the time of Aristotle (*De Anim.*, ii. 1). The soul is that first act by virtue of which the body comes into being; whereas all other operations presuppose the body as actualised. (Act signifies the reduction of potentiality to existence or reality.) "Aristotle," observes St. Thomas (S. I., Qu. lxxvi. Art. 4), "does not say that the soul is merely the act of the body (as if the body, as such, existed before the soul entered it), but the act of the body, physically organised, and which has life in potentiality, a potentiality which does not exclude (the existence of) the soul. Hence, evidently, that of which the soul is called the act, includes also the soul itself, just as we call light the act of what is luminous; not that it is luminous apart from the light, but that it is luminous because of the light. Similarly, the soul is called the act of the body, because by it the body is organised and has life in potentiality. First act is so called with respect to the second act, which is its operation; and therefore, again, the potentiality, of which the soul is the act, does not exclude the soul." He thus distinguishes it from a pure spirit: "Anima dicitur primum principium vitæ in his, qui apud nos vivunt. Manifestum est id, quo corpus vivit, animam esse. Vivere autem est esse viventium. Vivere igitur est, quo corpus humanum habet esse actu. Hujus modi autem forma est. Est igitur anima humana corporis forma" (St. Thom., *loc. cit.*). *Cf.* 22 *Disp.*, *Qu. De Anim.*, A. 1. The ancients,

Soul act of body.

A glance at the universe shows us three great orders of organic beings, in each of which the informing and sustaining principle of the organism is an indwelling soul. First, beginning with the lowest, are the organisms of the vegetable kingdom. In this class the soul is indissolubly bound up with and limited to the organs themselves, and by means of their chemical constituents it nourishes and propagates the plant. Nevertheless, this principle transcends the properties of simple matter, since it acts from an interior principle on exterior objects, as we see in its using and adapting matter to its innate laws and purposes. This principle is called the vegetative soul,[1]

Vegetable soul.

therefore, rightly spoke of the soul of plants in the sense of an organic, plastic, non-sensitive force, informing and sustaining the body of the plant. Jules Schaller says (*Leib und Seele*, p. 176): "Ordinarily, indeed, soul and sensation are considered identical, so that the merely plastic, formative soul is not regarded as properly a soul. Yet the plant has a soul, because it forms itself, organically, from within, outwards, but it has no sensation." Holy Writ also ascribes life to plants (1 Cor. xv. 36): "That which thou sowest is not quickened, except it die first." The movements of the mimosa, the sunflower, and the various insectivorous plants do not betoken any individual sensation, but are only the reaction of the plastic impulse in response to an external stimulus, although without any psychical connection between the irritation and the motion" (*Wundt. Handbuch der Physiologischen Psychologie*, i. p. 22).

[1] "The lowest operation of the soul is that which is effected by a bodily organ, and in virtue of a bodily quality. Nevertheless, such an operation, being from an intrinsic principle, exceeds any operation of a bodily nature, since bodily movements are from an extrinsic principle" (S. I., Qu. lxxviii. Art. 1). *Cf.* Aristotle, *De Anim.*, ii. 2, 3. "The reign of the ideal is the characteristic of organic life. In it we find universal natural forces, combined in special ways in order to realise a thought, . . . which uses them for its own purpose, and brings dissimilar forms out of similar elements" (Burdach, *Anthropol.*, 1854, p. 605).

because it is the source of vegetative life. In animals the vital principle is also strictly dependent on the bodily organism, but its action is not confined, as in the plant, to its own organism, but extends to external objects, perceptible to the senses. This second principle is called the sensitive or animal soul,[1] because it is the source of sensation and of internal movements. Finally, we come to the highest form of life, in which the vital principle, being no longer restricted to bodily organs and sense-perceptions, acts immediately and by itself, and embraces in its sphere the whole realm of truth. This is the rational soul,[2] which in man is essentially united to the body, and exercises, over and above the vegetative and sensitive powers, the functions of thought and free will. As the sensitive or animal soul includes the vegetative principle of the plant, so the rational soul unites in

Animal soul.

[1] "The operation of the soul is of another kind, which, though it acts through the corporeal organ, nevertheless does not act through corporeal qualities (because sensation is by no means the act of purely material energies). And such is the operation of the sensitive soul" (St. Thom., 22 *Disp.*, *Qu. De Anim.* A. 1). "The difference between the plant and the animal is, that the vital principle in the former is purely external, while in the latter it attains to an inward existence. In the plant it is wholly absorbed in matter, and the determination of matter; whereas in the animal its plastic functions are subordinate, and do not exhaust its energies, which aim at self-domination. . . . As the plant does not possess the inward, individual life of the animal, it is incapable of self-conscious movement, and all its changes depend on local conditions and alteration in the forces of attraction and cohesion" (Burdach, *loc. cit.*, p. 608).

[2] "There is an operation of the soul which rises so much above corporeal nature, that the bodily organs are not even necessary for its action" (St. Thom. *loc. cit.*).

itself the lower forms of both animal and plant. Like the plant, man assimilates nourishment, and grows; like the animal, he has sensation and movement. But what distinguishes him from both, and constitutes his humanity, is intelligence and free will, the functions of a self-conscious spirit, which belong to the third and highest order.[1] The rational faculty of man, however, belongs to our second proposition. What we have ascribed to him now is a principle of activity, transcending the potencies of

Rational soul.

[1] "We possess," says St. Augustine, "vitality (growth) in common with plants, and sensation with animals" (Cf. *In Joan. Tract.*, xxvii. 6). "Nor doth the Spirit make to be living members any save those which the Spirit itself doth find in the body which it quickeneth" (Oxford trans.). The spirituality of the soul does not prevent its being the principle of sensitive and vegetative functions. For the immediate subject of the sensitive and vegetative life is not the soul alone, but the organs of sensation, which it animates and sustains. The soul, therefore, is not both in space and out of space at once, as Fichte conceives it, but, "being simple in its essence, is manifold in its powers and operations" (St. Thom., *De Anim.*, Art. x. Ad. 14). Hence certain of its operations (nutrition and the like) take place independently, and even in opposition to its rational faculties; for consciousness is not the essence, but only a function of the soul; the soul thinks immediately by its own act, although it assimilates and feels through the bodily organs. "Certain operations of the soul are exercised without any bodily organ, as those of understanding and willing; and the faculties of these operations are in the soul as in their subject. But there are other operations of the soul which are exercised by bodily organs, as seeing by the eye, hearing by the ear, and all those which belong to the nutritive and sensitive part of the soul. And, therefore, the faculties, which are the principles of these operations, are in 'conjuncto' (the whole man, body and soul) as their subject, and not in the soul alone. But all the faculties, whether their subject be the soul or the *compositum*, the whole man, flow from the essence of the soul as from their principle" (S. I., Qu. lxxvii. Art. 5).

mere matter, and producing phenomena which cannot be accounted for by the physical and chemical properties of his body. In other words, all organic life, whether human, animal, or vegetable, demands a vital principle, a soul, which belongs to a higher sphere in creation than dead matter and its inherent potencies. But this strikes at the heart of materialism, whose first principle is that life and all its processes are only the result of mechanical and chemical conditions. "The soul," says Burmeister,[1] "is nothing but a complexus of potencies and forces energised by some human or animal organism."[2] "If science found itself obliged," says Büchner,[3] "to admit a vital force, our principle of the universality of the laws of nature and the unchangeableness of the mechanical order of the world would fall to the ground. We should have to admit the intervention of a higher Hand, changing the course of nature, and producing effects outside our calculations; there would be a rent in the edifice of the natural world, science would have to despair of herself, and all research in natural history and psychology would close." In other words, materialism would be impossible.

No organ without life.

But if combinations of matter are unable to account

[1] *Geologische Bilder*, i. p. 251.

[2] The materialists of antiquity said word for word the same thing, namely, that the soul is a product of combinations of matter; and St. Thomas refutes this doctrine (*Sum. Cont. Gent.*, ii. 62): "The vegetative soul cannot be produced by commixture of elements; far less, therefore, can the senses and the intellect."

[3] *Loc. cit.*, p. 245.

for the organic unity of even the lowest plant, still less can these explain the sensitive life of animals, or the human intellect. For what is an organism? As an eminent modern naturalist, J. Müller, says: "In the systematic co-ordination of its parts to effect certain results, the organism resembles a machine, but in the germ which it produces it repeats and propagates its own mechanism Not only does the energy of the organism depend upon the harmonious co-operation of its parts, but it is itself the primary cause of this harmony. Nor is each part self-subsistent, but each exists only in virtue of the existence of the whole. A machine is constructed by its inventor to do certain work, according to his preconceived idea, for a designed end. Thus each organism corresponds to an idea, and all its parts are arranged in accord with this end. But the idea is not outside, as in the machine, but within the organism, which necessarily acts in conformity with its own law. Hence the unity and harmony of the organism depend, not on matter taken from without, but on the inward primary principle already present in the germ before the ultimate differentiation of the parts which it produces, as they are required for the realisation of the idea."[1] "The germ," Müller continues, "which is only a simple cell, is the whole potentially." This process is essentially the same in plants and animals, and no parallel to germinal development is found in the inorganic world.

Nature of an organism.

The germ potentially the plant.

[1] *Physiologie des Menschen*, p. 23.

The essential differences between minerals and organisms are thus clearly defined. Minerals have geometrical angles and straight lines; organisms have curves and ellipses and spiral vessels. Minerals are produced by dissolution and combination, organisms by generation. Minerals grow by external accretions, organisms by assimilation. The duration and dimensions of the mineral are indefinite; the organism has its specific limitations of form, size, and longevity. In the plant a deoxygenating process is constantly going on, and in the animal a process of oxygenation. "There is no limit to the growth of a crystal as long as the requisite matter and conditions are to be had; but for the organism the immanent specific form is the limit of its external development, which it cannot exceed. It is only for the living organism that space and time have any value and meaning, because it alone has within it the principle of self-preservation and self-development, so that its being is frustrated if it fails within a certain time to attain its due proportions. Thus the figure and measure of the individual organism are inherent in it, and the unity which it displays is real, in contradistinction to the merely conceptual unity of the atom." [1]

Organisms and minerals.

Instead, then, of matter producing life, it is this vital principle which, by its use of material forces, alone builds up and fashions each individual body as

[1] Virchow, *Reden über Leben und Kranksein*, p. 49. This demolishes Häckel's system, whose monads and crystals are formed on parallel principles (*Anthropogenie*, p. 377).

a real existing whole. This is seen by the fact that as soon as this vital principle is withdrawn, dissolution succeeds to life. Its chemical elements, being thus emancipated from the control of the soul, obey their own laws, and corruption ensues. In other words, the natural forces of matter supersede those of the organic form. This is more especially manifest in the law of capillary action, in endosmose and exosmose, the passage or repulsion of liquids and gases through membranes and porous media. The non-coagulation of the blood in the living blood-vessel can only be explained as the effect of life in the wall of the vessel.[1] Life, again, alone accounts for the reflex action, without contact, of the sensitive and motor nerves, as it is only through the grey matter in the centre of the spinal cord that the irritation of the sensitive nerve is conveyed to the motor. The reproduction in some lower organisms of an amputated member (the head or the tail), and the process of healing in all higher organisms; the adaptation, again, of means to end shown in animal instinct, all these find their only solution in the vital principle.[2]

[1] Wündt, *Physiologie*, 110. "Why does not the stomach digest itself, if none but physical and chemical forces are there?" (Claude Bernard, ed. Janet, *Causes Finales*, *Journ. des Savants*, 1877).

[2] Hence materialists are unwilling to admit instinct, and attribute all qualities to inheritance. Darwin (*Descent of Man*, p. 28) says: "In regard to mental qualities, this transmission is manifest in our dogs, horses, and other domestic animals. Besides special tastes and habits, general intelligence, courage, bad and good temper, are certainly inherited."

Doubtless in every organism physical and chemical forces are at work, but they do not act independently of the organism, nor is the organism the result of these forces. St. Thomas remarks that the vegetative processes of nutrition and growth, and even those of sensation and motion, are wrought by the soul through the instrumentality of physical and chemical forces.[1] Only thus, by the vital principle, can we explain why matter, which is indifferent to all forms, should assume that of this particular organism, germ, or species, and none other.

The soul-determining principle of matter.

"The germ-cells of the Vorticellæ," says Giebel,[2] "are, as far as we know at present, chemically, materially, and morphologically, exactly identical. The most searching and accurate chemical analysis can discover no difference; therefore it does not exist. And yet, under identical external conditions, these identical cells, not accidentally, but following fixed and invariable laws, develop into all sorts of different species of evidently various types. There are families of snakes and insects whose species can be counted by hundreds, and yet, in the material analysis of their germ-cells and

[1] S. I., Qu. lxxviii. Art. 1. "Although heat and cold, wet and dry, and other similar bodily qualities are necessary for the operation of a sense-faculty, that operation is not therefore produced by means of those qualities which are merely required for the disposition of the organ. The lowest operations of the soul are effected by a bodily organ, aided by a bodily quality. Nevertheless, such operations are from an intrinsic principle, and of this kind are the operations of the sensitive soul. Digestion, and what follows thereto, are effected instrumentally by the operation of heat."

[2] *Tagesfragen. Aus der Naturgeschichte*, 2nd Edition, p. 309.

processes of reproduction and development, we are unable to detect any variation whatever, and apparently never shall be able to do so. Let the ova of *Lacerta agilis* and *Lacerta viridis*, of *Sorex fodiens* and *Sorex vulgaris*, of the lion and tiger, be examined chemically and physically, and should any material or evolutionary difference be discovered, it will still be impossible to establish any necessary relation between such differences and the specific characteristics of the mature forms."

Even Burmeister[1] owns that "in organic bodies matter is not the determining factor, but that the form constitutes the essence of the organism, and that to it the material elements are subordinated." "Necessity," says Mayer, "governs the inanimate world, but when we pass into the organic world we enter a region of adaptability, design, and beauty, of progress and freedom. The applicability of numbers marks the limits. In physics they are everything, in physiology of little account, in metaphysics nothing. In these higher regions the knowledge of physics, though of use, must not be too strictly applied, for here we have to do with principles rather than laws. The law of the conservation of matter and energy doubtless holds good in biology. The living organism cannot create nor annihilate either, nor can it transform one elementary substance into another. Nevertheless, in the vegetable world, very remarkable ternary and quaternary combinations are

No argument from lower to higher sciences.

[1] *Geschichte der Schöpfung*, 3rd Edition, p. 304.

produced, which cannot be artificially imitated. Again, in living nature there is procreation and generation, processes to which there is nothing analogous in physics, so that the axiom, '*Ex nihilo nihil fit*,' which is absolutely true in regard to physics, is less strictly applicable to physiology, and still less so to the spiritual domain."[1]

Life unproducable.

The truth of these remarks is proved by experience. If the organism were only the product of natural forces, then, by a suitable combination of these, it must be possible to form a living body. But, with all our progress in natural science, no one has ever seriously thought that a living body could be produced from the crucible, nor a plant, nor even the lowest moss.[2] The chemical constituents of the animal body are well known, and their proportions and affinities can be expressed in arithmetical formulas, but no scientist has ever yet succeeded in producing an organism.

Regarding the importance of the vital principle and

[1] J. R. v. Mayer, *Address to the German Naturalists*, 1869.

[2] No doubt science has been successful in artificially producing substances which are identical with organic secretions, as, for instance, ammonia. Büchner makes a great deal of this. "We are doubtless able," says Liebig, "to adapt, alter, intensify, and neutralise the cohesive forces in the atoms of organic combinations. We can, by the combination of two, three, or four organic atoms, create molecules of a higher order, or we can resolve such combinations back into their constituent atoms. But we cannot, from its constituent elements, produce even one of these organic combinations. No laboratory will ever create a cell, a muscle, a nerve; in a word, any truly living particle of an organism" (*Chemische Briefe*, i. 252.)

its specific element Liebig says: "The life of plants is dependent on the aliments which they obtain from air, from water, and from the soil. These substances are inorganic. The elements of the living form consist of carbonic acid, ammonia, and water, sulphuric, phosphoric, and silicic acid, alkalis, alkaline earths, and iron. But the process which goes on in the plant is the exact reverse of that which takes place in inorganic nature; in the inorganic substance in which mechanical and chemical laws are paramount. Weathering and detrition in stones and mountains are the effects of changes of temperature and of the action of air and water; and in organic bodies also, as soon as life is extinct, oxygenation begins, and resolves the elements, from which the body was formed, back into their original combinations. But in the living plant air, water, oxygen, and carbonic acid lose their chemical characteristics, and cease to act in their former proportions, or according to their former affinities. Outside the sphere of the vital forces residing within the plant the tendency of oxygen to combine with combustible substances—carbon, hydrogen—is irresistible. When these combinations are absorbed by the plant the oxygen is disengaged, and exhaled pure from the leaves into the air. Thus the process within the plant is the exact reverse of the oxidation which is always going on in inorganic nature. It is a process of reduction. Cotton-wool, sugar of milk, and the acid in sour-kraut, although so different, consist chemically of carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen in equal proportions. So, also

Chemical elements in organic and inorganic bodies.

cane-sugar and gum are composed of exactly the same chemical constituents. Strychnine contains carbon, nitrogen, and the elements of water; its action upon living bodies is that of a deadly poison. Quinine contains the same elements, yet acts as a valuable remedy. Caffeine is composed of the same constituents; we drink it in tea and coffee without either poisonous or medicinal effect. It is impossible to attribute the poisonous, healing, or nutritive properties of these substances to the carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, and hydrogen of which they consist. Chemical analysis of the elements, therefore, supplies no data enabling us to judge of or explain the properties of organic combinations."[1]

The same constituents in different organisms produce different effects.

Facts and arguments alike, then, demonstrate irresistibly the existence of the immaterial vital principle or soul. Yet Strauss thinks[2] that he has solved the problem in a contrary sense. Vital sensation, thought itself, are all to be explained by the unity of the forces of nature. "If," he suggests, "under certain conditions we find motion transformed into heat, why should not other conditions exist under which it is transformed into sensation? On the one hand, a nerve is touched and an internal agitation set

Sensation transformed motion.

[1] *Chemische Briefe*, i. p. 356 *ff.*, 367 *ff.* St. Thomas says: "Either the body lives because it is a body, that is, consists of material substances, but in that case all bodies must have life, or else it lives because it is this particular body, and the matter of which it consists is organised in this particular way; but this is the effect of its proper form, the vital principle" (S. I., Qu. lxxxv. Art. 1). "Convenit alicui corpori quod sit vivens per hoc quod sit tale corpus."

[2] *Die alte und neue Glaube.*

up; on the other, a sensation, a perception called forth, and a thought responds. Then the order is reversed, and sensation and thought are changed into external movements of the limbs." Donders replies:[1] "The essence of every kind of action, or capacity for action which can be known or measured is motion, and the conditions of motion; but there is no imaginable combination of movement from which consciousness or any psychical function could spring. Psychical energy, as we first perceive it in ourselves, is really individual in form and essence. We find no link connecting it with other natural phenomena, and the law of the 'conservation of energy,' which governs all known natural forces, is powerless to bring psychical phenomena under its sway; for, setting aside their specific nature, which makes their genesis from chemical elasticity as inconceivable as their transformation into heat or electric motion, they can neither be measured nor weighed, and we know of no unit which will enable us to express in numbers feeling, understanding, and will." "A sensation," Strauss says, "reports itself." But to whom? unless it be to the subject, who already exists. And if thought is transformed into motion, then, surely, the thought must perish in the act of realisation. In this case the quality of the intellectual life would be deduced from the quantity, rapidity, and strength of physical energy, and the truth of a thought, the moral power of the will, might be gauged by feet and pounds; that is, by

Thought not transformed into action,

[1] *Abhandl. in der Niederländ. Archive für Arzneckunde,* 1869, p. 18.

the amount of mechanical work expended in their production. "If we knew," says Griesinger, "all that goes on in the brain when it is at work, if we could see every detail of its chemical and electrical processes, how would it help us? Oscillations and vibrations, chemical and electrical processes, are not mental images. I should like to direct the attention of these fanatics of materialism to one point which, in all these discussions, seems to me to have never yet been adequately treated. The elementary changes that take place in the nerve substance (especially if, according to the now prevailing view, these are held to be electric) must necessarily be absolutely simple, merely quantitative, and identical in all men. If so, how can they have produced that infinite multiplicity of different points of view, feelings, and tendencies which exist, not only in different individuals, but also in different epochs?"[1]

Nor produced by the brain.

Motion can only generate motion, or else resolve itself back into potential energy. Potential energy can only produce motion, maintain statical equilibrium, exert pressure or strain. The amount of energy remains always the same. This law is absolute in the material world. What is mechanical exhausts itself in the production of the mechanical effect. There are, therefore, no adequate data by which we can comprehend the mental transactions which accompany these material changes in the brain. They are outside the law of causation, and therefore are to

Motion only generates motion.

[1] *Pathologie und Therapie der Psychischen Krankheiten*, 1861, pp. 6, 7.

us incomprehensible.[1] Virchow says:[2] "We have as yet no scientific means of observing the act of consciousness, or determining its locality, or analysing its process of action, or stating what it is." "Hence," he continues, "I have always maintained that it is a mistake to refuse to acknowledge the unique character of the fact of consciousness, which dominates all our higher life." Schopenhauer, a witness above suspicion of partiality on the point, says: "The polemics now in vogue against the vital principle deserve, in spite of their imposing array, to be stigmatised as not only false, but inane."[3] That we cannot see this vital principle is no argument against its existence; for every substantial form (or formal principle) is, *per se*, imperceptible to the senses, and is only intelligible to the mind. What is seen is the material substance or organism, acted upon by the form or soul; and we recognise the existence of the

Life invisible *in se* visible in its effects.

[1] "What conceivable connection," says Du Bois Raymond, "exists, on the one hand, between certain movements of certain atoms in my brain, and, on the other, this primary, personal, undeniable fact, that I feel pain or pleasure, taste what is sweet, smell the perfume of the rose, hear the sound of the organ, perceive colours, red or blue, with the certainty, hence derived, that I exist? . . . It is utterly inconceivable that it can be other than indifferent to any aggregation of atoms of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, and oxygen whatever may be their position or movements, past, present, or future." It is impossible to imagine how consciousness can ever proceed from their mutual interaction. And if their relative position and movements are not matter of indifference to them, we must necessarily suppose that each atom is a sort of monad, endowed with consciousness. But this would not explain either consciousness in general, or individual consciousness.

[2] *Bericht der Stettiner Versammlung*, p. 41.

[3] *Parerga und Paralipom.*, ii. p. 127.

soul from its effect on the organism, just as we perceive from the attraction of the needle the presence of the magnetic force.

Unity of feeling, though nerves multiple.

Again, if there be no soul, why is all sensation individual and personal? The nerves are, indeed, the organs of feeling; yet the nervous system, with its centre, the brain, marvellous as it is in its formation, is still matter, and, as such, composed of parts, has extension, is multiple, not single; whereas the being, who hears, sees, tastes, smells, and compares these sensations, is one and the same. Were matter the subject of sensation, we should bear within us innumerable sensitive entities instead of that unity in our sensitive nature, of which every man is conscious, and which tells him that the subject of his sensations is his one indivisible soul. Aristotle's argument that the soul is divisible, because the amputated members of plants, or of many of the lower forms of animal organisms, can be propagated simply, only shows that in such organisms the vital principle is but slightly differentiated, and that the same organs, with the same functions, are repeated in all parts of the body. The higher the soul, the more complete its individuality.

Further, as has been already observed, the material constituents of our bodies are in a perpetual flux. Not one atom of the body of the infant remains in the body of the old man. If sensation dwelt in the organs, then the sensitive being must change with them. We could have no continuity of consciousness;

the memory of former sensations must perish. The contention that "the general form of the organs and the body persists throughout all changes" is only an admission of the existence of the soul under another name; for what but the soul gives the body its form? What but the soul preserves the organism,[1] notwithstanding the perpetual changes in the matter of which it is composed? The soul, which animates all its forces, and is present in every particle of the body, concentrates in itself the manifold bodily elements and forces, gathers them into itself, and, by imparting to them its own indivisible life, overcomes the material separation of space. The fact that if a nerve be dead, or its connection with the brain interrupted, sensation ceases, only proves the essential union of soul and body, by reason of which the soul feels through the body, not that the organ feels in itself.[2]

Identity of individual, though body in constant change.

[1] Against the Platonist doctrine of diverse souls, which are united by and in the body, St. Thomas says: "It is not the body which contains the soul, but the soul which contains the body, and gives it existence" (S. I., Qu. lxxvi. Art. 3). The ancients recognised the soul, the "*δύναμις εκτική*," the bond and sustenance of the life of the body. But the soul, though in every part of the body, is not therefore subject to conditions of space, for it acts, not by part in part, but by its efficacy (*per contactum virtutis*), just as God, though incorporeal, is everywhere as the cause and sustainer of all things in space. *Cf.* S. I., Qu. viii. Art. 2.

[2] "When I say," remarks Flourens (*De la Vie et de l'Intelligence*, Pt. ii. p. 156), "that sensation has its seat in the nerves and irritability in the muscles, I only state a perfectly certain fact of experience. But the sensitiveness and irritability of the nerves and muscles only last as long as life is present; they are therefore only there because life (the soul) is there. The life is the essential point; the sensitiveness of the

Hence we deduce the final termination of mere animal life, and its essential distinction from that of man. The soul of the animal feels, but all feeling belongs, as we have shown, to the compositum; that is, to body and soul conjoined. Where, then, the soul has no operation of its own, and cannot act independently of the body, neither can it exist apart from the same, for *operation follows life;*[1] that is, in every nature action and being correspond, for action is only "*esse*," or being, in act.

The soul of the animal, then, perishes with the body, and, in dying, the animal is wholly extinct.[2] That soul only survives which shows, by the immaterial action it exercises, apart from the body, that it is itself im-

nerves, the irritability of the muscles, are only modes of its activity." The twitchings of the muscles in the trunk immediately after decapitation are not organic and vital; they do not proceed from an internal principle, but are only the mechanical effects of an external impulse on the elastic body, and therefore only last while the body still remains supple. This disposes of one of Vogt's favourite arguments against the existence of the soul, drawn from the "contortions of decapitated frogs." "Sensation," says St. Thomas, "is not an attribute of the soul alone, or of the body alone, but of the whole man" (*conjuncti*) (S. I., Qu. lxxvii. Art. 5). *Cf.* Kant, *Träume eines Geisterschers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik,* where he ridicules the assumption that the seat of the soul was in the brain, "like a spider in the centre of its web," and supposes, on the contrary, a virtual omnipresence of the soul throughout the sensitive body.

[1] S. I., Qu. lxxxv. Art. 3.

[2] St. Thomas says that "although forms (such as the animal soul) do not consist of matter, that is, are in themselves immaterial, nevertheless they exist and act in matter, and out of its potentiality they are educed. Hence, even when they cease to exist they are not entirely annihilated, but remain in the potentiality of matter as before."

material, and has a self-subsistent life. And this leads us to our second proposition.

Man has a rational soul, and is therefore above the brute. Although man resembles the brute in his corporeal nature, even here his erect carriage, in an attitude of command, proclaims his superiority over the whole animal world. Hence the Greeks named him ἀνθρωπος, "the upward gazer,"[1] because his body, with its senses and faculties, is to be the expression and organ of a free spirit, not the mere instrument of blind instincts.[2] According to

Man has a rational soul.

[1] The upright attitude is natural to man. The infant, in the first year of its life, is always endeavouring to assume it, and its whole organism is prepared and intended for it.

[2] Burmeister, *Der menschliche Fuss als Character der Menscheit Geolog. Bilder*, i. p. 63. *Cf.* Meyer, *Ueber den Gorilla;* Reusch, *im Chilianeum*, 1864, vol. ii. In his feet and hands man has an immense advantage over the ape, which can only run, and climb, and hop on all-fours. The construction of the skull and of the teeth makes another important difference between them. The facial angle of the latter never exceeds 65°, while that of the former is never under 75°. "It must not be overlooked," says Huxley (*Evidence as to Man's Place in Nature*, 1863, pp. 102, 103), "that there is a very striking difference in absolute mass and weight between the lowest human brain and that of the highest ape, a difference which is all the more remarkable when we recollect that a full-grown gorilla is probably pretty nearly twice as heavy as a Bosjesman, or as many a European woman. It may be doubted whether a healthy adult human brain ever weighed less than 32 ounces, or that the heaviest gorilla brain has exceeded 20 ounces. . . . The latter difference is represented, say, by 12 ounces of cerebral substance absolutely, or by 32–20 relatively; but as the largest recorded human brain weighed between 65 and 66 ounces, the former difference is represented by more than 33 ounces absolutely, or by 65–32 relatively. . . . Every bone of a gorilla bears marks by which it might be distinguished from the corresponding bone of a man, and in the present creation, at any rate, no intermediate link bridges over the gap between Homo and

Comparative weight of skull.

Ovid,[1] man, even as to his bodily form, is made in the image of God. "And whereas other animals bend their looks downwards on the earth, to man He gave a countenance to look on high, and to behold the heavens, and to raise his face erect to the stars."

His erect attitude.

So also speaks Aristotle, "Man alone stands upright, because his nature and substance are divine."[2] Again while in all mere animals one sense always predominates, and for the sole end of self-preservation,[3] in man, on the contrary, the harmonious development of all the sensitive faculties denotes their noble purpose as the objects and instruments of thought. This distinction is especially noticeable in his hand, with its delicate sense of touch and adaptation for work. It is the hand and the head together which have made man the lord of creation,[4] for his erect carriage is

Troglodytes." At the same time, we must not forget that man as "a rational animal" must participate in the animal nature. If the resemblance were still greater than it really is, it would prove nothing, for it would only make the distinction by his faculty of speech and all the phenomena of his rational nature more striking.

[1] *Metamorph.*, Bk. i. 76–84, trans. H. J. Riley, B.O.

[2] *De Part. Anim.*, iv. 10. See also Seneca, *De Otio Sapient.*, 32; Gregory of Nyssa, *De Homin. Opific.*, i. p. 44 *seq.*; St. Augustine, Qq. lxxxiii. Qu. 51. St. Thomas (S. I., Qu. xcvi. Art. 3) remarks that man has the most capacious cranium, and holds his head erect because it is the organ of thought.

[3] Both the hare and the hound hear farther than man, but they have no sense of tone or music; the falcon sees farther, but has no sense of the distinction or combination of colours. Moreover, these senses in man can be developed by practice to an acuteness which equals and even excels that of the animals, as is the case with the Indian tribes.

[4] Aristotle, *De Anima*, iii. 8.

an indispensable condition of his manual dexterity. Again, though man has sense-appetites in common with the lower animals, yet by his free will he subjugates what is beyond their control. Finally, in the weakness and helplessness of man's early years, we see a striking contrast between him and the animals. Man's development depends wholly on acts of his own free will, thought, and energy, whereas nature provides everything for the animal from the very first.

If, however, man bears thus, in his body, the impress of his higher destiny, so that the animal instinctively quails at his gaze, his superiority is still more evident in his mental attributes. Beyond sensible impressions, he possesses thought. We mean that he apprehends necessary universal and eternal truths, which are not objects of the senses. Again, the thinking mind reveals a higher faculty, the object of which is the exact opposite to that of sensible perception. The object of the senses is the individual, such as, for example, the sensation of pain caused by a falling stone; that of the mind, on the contrary, is the universal; it apprehends from the same fact the law of gravitation. The senses deal with what is accidental, the corporeal sensation, and each sense is limited to its own province, whilst the mind deals with the essences of things, and the whole domain of truth, physical and metaphysical, is open to its view. But even this is not all.

He apprehends universal truth.

The perfection of sensible perception increases in

proportion to the perfection of the bodily organ, and diminishes as the organ degenerates; the more active the organ, the more correct will be the sensible representation of its object. On the other hand, the more the mind enters into itself, the more detached does it become from external objects, and from the influence of the senses; and thus mental power grows with advancing years, in spite of decay in the senses and sensitive powers, such as memory and imagination. "The energy of the soul," says Schleiermacher,[1] "is perennial; it does not diminish nor exhaust its force by its operations. Not only does it work and impart itself without suffering loss, but, on the contrary, the more active it is the stronger and healthier it grows, so that the failure of the senses and memory leaves the inner life untouched, and its fruitfulness in noble and holy thoughts unimpaired." The senses require a due proportion between their object and their powers; for instance, excess of light and defect of light alike diminish the power of vision. With the intellect, on the contrary, every increase of illumination increases its powers of apprehension. Under repeated excitements the senses grow weary and satiated; but with the mind activity and enjoyment go hand in hand.[2] The senses cannot feel their own sensations; the mind reflects on its own thoughts, and, by its self-consciousness, apprehends its own personality, its own indivisible

Mental action independent of body.

Power of reflection.

[1] *Ueber Jugend und Alter.*

[2] Aristotle, *De Anima*, iii. 4, 5.

unity, as the central point of all its operations, distinct from every other being. Hence Dante calls man [1]

> "An individual soul, that lives
> And feels, and bends reflective on itself."
> —*Purgat.*, xxv. 76.

But it is because he thinks that man speaks, for speech is, as the Greeks discovered, long ago,[2] nothing but the expression of reason and thought, the utterance of the spirit.

Finally, man is free; he knows in every action that he is so, that he bears within himself his power of self-determination. Man knows, and is convinced, that he degrades himself by yielding to his lower appetites; that, by his mind and free will, he has, if he wills, courage and strength to overcome them, and to strive after that higher and lasting good which his intellect apprehends. For desire follows apprehension. The senses crave for what the senses perceive; the knowledge of spiritual things begets spiritual yearnings, moral freedom. But no force can act in a contrary sense to the principle from which it springs; if, therefore, man has the power of resisting and overcoming sense, the sensitive faculties cannot possibly be the source of this

Free will commands lower appetites.

[1] *Cf.* Aristotle, *De Anima*, iii. 4, 12.

[2] Λογος, speech and thought. The word "man" comes from *Manu*, in Sanscrit *mâ*, to measure; hence *moon* (the time-measurer), and thence man, characterised as the thinker. The Latin *Homo*, according to Hoffmann (*Memorandum of the German Oriental Society*, i. p. 321 *ff.*), is equivalent to the ejaculator, the speaker.

power. Thus, St. Athanasius demonstrated,[1] from the dominion of the soul over the body, that it is distinct from and independent of the latter. Plato[2] makes Socrates say, in the dialogue which precedes his death, "If the soul were nothing but a harmony, a product of the body, it would always obey and never command. But the soul, as far as we can see, acts in direct opposition to the body, inasmuch as it governs the supposed source of its existence, and through the whole of life it fights against the body in various ways; now, with severity, chastising the body with gymnastics and physic; again, more mildly, by means of admonitions, chiding its cravings and its anger and fear, addressing itself as though it were another, as Homer says in the *Odyssey*:—

'Bear this evil, my soul; thou hast already borne others more cruel.'"

Instinct and reason contrasted.

Again, the animal has sensation, and its correlative, instinctive movement; that is to say, he moves, not impelled from without like a machine, but by the vital principle within; still, his acts are neither free nor self-conscious. Man is guided in his actions by reason, the animal by instinct, that is, by his nature, which predetermines all his movements and makes them necessary. The admirable skill of many animals is no proof that they possess reason; for this skill is specially mani-

[1] *Orat. C. Gentes*, ch. 31 *ss.*; St. Thomas, *loc. cit.*, Qu. lxxx. Art. 2; *C. Gentes*, ii. 47.

[2] *Phæd.*, p. 94.

fest in animals of the lower orders, as in the bee, the ant, the beaver, and that in a degree to which man can only attain by long experience and practice. But the young bee works as perfectly as the old one, consequently experience and practice are with him natural; that is, they are instinctive, an unconscious instinct, implanted by their Maker for a special purpose. Indeed, so perfect is the geometrical fitness of their work thus inspired by the Creator of geometry, that it is only within the last century that the progress of science has enabled us to appreciate and understand it. The water-spider possessed the diving-bell long before man had discovered it. The mill-hopper, a kind of cockchafer, works according to a mathematical law, first discovered by Huygens in 1673. And this explains why these creatures, in some respects so much more sagacious than men, are utterly senseless in others.[1] Hence there is no psychic progress in the animal kingdom. Progress

[1] St. Thomas had already pointed out that animals have not reason, but only instinct (*sensatio æstimativa*), a kind of objective understanding, because all their artistic skill is displayed in one direction only, and they are unable to employ it in any other; *e.g.*, nest-building in birds (*C. Gentes*, ii. 66). The stoat breaks the wings of dead birds as well as living ones, to prevent their escape before he begins to suck them. The bee stores up honey, the moth envelops her eggs in a warm covering from her own plumage, in anticipation of a winter which neither have ever experienced. The animal, therefore, does not know the purpose that it carries out. Instinct, subserving larger ends of animal life, may lead the individual animal to destruction, as the lemming in the high mountains of Sweden and Norway. The instinct of a duck was so strong that when, day by day, the egg she laid was removed from the nest, she continued sitting until she died of exhaustion.

can only be the result of reflection, comparison, and free development. All those well-known stories of exceptional sagacity in animals never, therefore, pass beyond the sphere of instinct, which, of course, like any other natural force, can be guided, directed, and developed by the superior intelligence of man, and made to subserve his purposes. As the poet says:—

Man develops; the brute does not.

"Ich sehe nicht die Spur
Von einem Geist, und alles ist Dressur."

All the terms by which we describe the actions of animals are derived from human conditions, and consequently, as St. Thomas remarks,[1] can only be applied to them by analogy. We belong to a different order of beings, and can no more realise the mind of the brute than we can now revert to that of our unconscious infancy.

The animal feels pleasure and pain, and has cries by which it can express both; but it has no thought, and therefore no speech. Hence the most highly developed animal ranks far below the most degraded savage, and is separated by one essential difference from him; for the savage, however degraded, possesses the faculty of speech, and speech is the sign of mind.[2] And speech was man's from the first.

"As far as we can trace back the footsteps of man, even on the lowest strata of history, we see that the

[1] S. I. ii., Qu. xiii. Art. 2.

[2] "If my horse were to say to me, 'I am,' I should dismount at once," says Kant.

Divine gift of a sound and sober intellect belonged to him from the very first; and the idea of a humanity emerging slowly from the depths of an animal brutality can never be maintained again in our century. The earliest work of art wrought by the human mind—more ancient than any literary document, and prior even to the first whisperings of tradition—the human language, forms one uninterrupted chain, from the first dawn of history down to our own times. We still speak the language of the first ancestors of our race; and this language, with its wonderful structure, bears witness against such gratuitous theories. The formation of language, the composition of roots, the gradual discrimination of meanings, the systematic elaboration of grammatic forms—all this working, which we can still see under the surface of our own speech, attests from the very first the presence of a rational mind, of an artist as great, at least, as his work." [1]

Speech, the expression of reason, peculiar to man alone.

The fact that originally every word was a predicate, that names, though now symbols of particular concepts, are all, without exception, derived from universal ideas, is one of the most important discoveries of philology. It proves the truth that universal ideas are the first in the order of human knowledge, the *primum cognitum* in the intellect.[2] This capacity manifest in language for grasping universal ideas

[1] Max Müller, *Essays*, vol. i. p. 306, "On Comparative Mythology."

[2] S. I., Qu. lxxxv. Art. 3; Werner, *Geschichte der neuzeitlichen Apologetik*, 1867, p. 473.

places an impassable gulf between man and the brute.[1]

Our third proposition, man has an immortal soul, and is therefore imperishable, flows as a corollary from our second. In all lower natures, without exception, from the simplest plant upwards, the individual, as such, has no significance. It is merely a specimen of its species, whose character it necessarily bears. Its end in the universe is attained by the conservation and propagation of its kind, and any other specimen might as well take its place. But with man it is far otherwise. His bodily life, indeed, belongs to visible nature, and is but one of a species, but the body is not the whole man. His self-consciousness gives him, further, the power of possessing himself, and of knowing himself, as distinct from all else. By his free will he determines his own action, even in opposition to his lower inclinations, and can use his natural power as an instrument for his own purposes. Thus even in this mortal existence man lives a life neither begotten from visible nature, nor dependent in its action on corporeal forces and organs. He possesses a world and life of

Soul immortal because subjectively self-subsisting.

[1] Universal ideas—that is, the essences of things abstracted from their sense-phenomena—alone beget that knowledge of cause, law, principles, relation, on which all intellectual development depends. Without these universal ideas we should be cognisant only of a multitude of phenomenal effects, presenting neither unity, order, nor purpose. This is so with the animals. "An ox," says Kant, "has a distinct image in its mind of its stable, and also of the door of its stable. It connects the two together, but never arrives at the conclusion that 'this door belongs to this stable.'"

his own. He bears within him the world of ideas, the life of thought. Hence, when the instrument perishes the master survives.[1]

Objectively. His ideas of truth necessary and eternal.

Again, the *object* of the intellectual functions is as little affected by the death of the body as is the soul itself, their subject. Thought and free will are not exercised upon sensible things, the particular or the concrete, the accidental or the temporal; their objects are universal, necessary, eternal ideas,[2] the realm of the true and the good. These existed before the visible world came into being, and will endure when it has passed away. Therefore they no more cease to exist at the

[1] Eschricht, *Das physische Leben*, p. 511. "The soul, then, is rational, not because of its simplicity, for the soul of the brute is also simple; nor because it is intellectual, for the intellect is only one of its faculties; but because it is self-subsistent, and can act independently of the bodily organs, is the soul rational and a spiritual substance" (St. Thomas, *De Spirit. Creat.*, Art. 2). "By a spiritual substance we understand that substance which is neither composed of matter, nor coextensive with it, nor dependent on it for being" (Suarez, *De Anim.*, loc. cit., 9).

[2] St. Thomas, *C. Gentes*, ii. 55. Of course, the sensible world, by means of sensible images (the phantasmata of the ancients), supplies the material and determines the mode in which the mind forms the ideas which are its proper objects. Intellectual acts, being human—that is, acts of a sensitive and rational being—are always accompanied by phantasms. *Cf.* Aristotle, *De Anima*, iii. 30; St. Thomas, *loc. cit.*, Qu. lxxxiv. Art. 7. But it by no means follows from this, as Ulrici thinks, "that consequently the human soul after death remains in an unconscious state, until its reunion with the body." All that follows really is, that as its mode of existence is different and no longer corporeal, so also will be its mode of action, for action follows life. It must not be forgotten that the life beyond the grave is only conceivable in and through God, and that He, Who gave us consciousness, is able to adjust it to other conditions besides those of the present life. *Cf.* the

death of the body than does the spirit itself, to which they are always present, and whose sustenance they are.

The soul of man, then, being rational and self-subsistent, can survive the body if only God preserves it. Will He do so? Or is the objection of Strauss valid?[1] If the soul has no end, he argues, it should have had no beginning. "A one-sided eternity," he says, "a being with a beginning and no end, is as absurd a notion as a thing which has an end but has had no beginning." But he had already

Soul, therefore, not necessarily mortal.

whole development of this subject in S. I., Qu. lxxxix. Art. 1. In *De Anima*, Art. 15, St. Thomas says:—"The soul after death understands in three ways. First, by species which it has received from things while in the body; secondly, by species divinely infused in the separation from the body; thirdly, by seeing other souls (*substantiæ separatæ*), and beholding the species of things in them. But this last mode is not subject to its will, but rather to the will of its fellow-souls, which manifests their intelligence by speech. What this speech is, and its quality, has been said elsewhere" (Qu. xix., *Inter. q. Quodlibet.*, *De Cognit. Animæ Post Mort.*, Art. 1). "As the angels know individual objects by species created with them, so also does the soul, by species infused into it in the moment of separation. For, since the ideas existing in the Divine Mind are creative of things both as to form and matter, of both they must be also the exemplars. And in these exemplars things are known not only in their genus and species, but individually, matter being the individualising principle. But the forms created with the angelic minds, and infused into the separated soul, are certain likenesses of the divine ideals; and as things, with their substance in form and matter, flow from these ideals, so from them also flow their species to those created minds which are capable of knowing them, both as to form and matter, and both as to their nature as universals, and as existing in individuals (*singularia*)" (*Ibid.*, Art. 2). That is, one and the same infused species represents Humanity in the abstract, and Peter and Paul as existing body and soul.

How the separated soul acquires knowledge.

[1] *Glaubenslehre*, ii. 737.

been thus answered by St. Thomas:[1] "Creatable means," he says, "not a passive faculty, but the active power of creating which can produce something out of nothing, just as perishable does not mean that the creature of itself can return to nothing, but that the Creator, by withholding His influx, has the power of annihilating it." A being, then, which has had a beginning must be capable of coming to an end, and therefore every creature is necessarily perishable, because it is created. "God alone hath immortality."[2] He alone preserves life in all that lives. Will He continue to preserve the soul for eternity? We answer, He will; and that the very idea of immortality which the soul possesses, and its intense longing for its possession, prove the fact. Unlike the animal, which, absorbed in the present, knows nothing of an hereafter, man cannot but dwell upon the future, and its anticipation is a necessary part of his nature. "The soul," says St. Athanasius,[3] "can conceive the thought of immortality; therefore it is an immortal being, distinct from the body." "The conviction of our immortality," says Goethe, "springs, in my mind, from the idea of activity; for if my mind is incessantly active to the last, nature is bound to supply me with another form of being, when this present one can no longer maintain my spirit."[4] If man were not himself im-

Desire of immortality proves its truth.

[1] S. I., Qu. lxxv. Art. 6 ad. 2.

[2] 1 Tim. vi. 16.

[3] *C. Gentes*, 81 *seq.*

[4] Eckermann, *Gespräche mit Goethe*, ii. p. 56. "The operations of the rational soul neither grow old nor out of date. 'In the ancient is

mortal, whence would he have gathered the notion of immortality, seeing nothing but mortality in the universe that surrounds him? How could he have imagined or desired it?

"I have read," observes Fechner,[1] "that the larva of the stag-beetle, when passing into the chrysalis state, constructs for itself a much larger cell than it requires at the time, in order to leave room for the horns which will presently make their appearance. What can the larva know about its future life or horns? Can we suppose that the same power which created stag-beetles and man, gave a true instinct to the beetle, and to man a lying faith? For belief in a future life, and preparation for it in the present, is as essential a part of man's nature, and as necessary to its development, as this instinct is to the beetle. True, the belief in immortality is not as uniformly and necessarily developed in every individual man, as this instinct is in every beetle. But mankind, as a whole, as necessarily regards immortality as the end of its life as the beetle, by its individual instinct, provides for its future growth, as the end of its animal life.[2]"

For the desire is universal.

wisdom, and in length of days prudence' (Job. xii.); we can gather its immortality from the manner of its operation" (Bonaventura, II. *Dist.*, xix. Art. 1).

[1] *Loc. cit.*, p. 115.

[2] *Cf.* St. Thomas, *C. Gentes*, ii. 79; also Goethe, *Z. Xen.* iii. :—

"Du hast Unsterblichkeit im Sinn,
Kannst du uns deine Gründe nennen?
Ja wohl, der Hauptgrund liegt darin,
Das wir sie nicht entbehren können."

After observing that the soul, when dragged by the body into the region of changeable things, reels like a drunkard, Plato continues, "But when, returning into herself, she reflects, then she passes into the realm of purity, of eternity, of immortality and unchangeableness, which are her kindred, and with them she ever lives, when she is by herself, and is not let or hindered. Then she ceases from her erring ways, and being in communion with the unchangeable, is unchanging; and this state of the soul is called wisdom." "Hence," he continues, "the soul is most like that which is divine, immortal, intelligent, uniform, indissoluble, and unchangeable; but the body, on the other hand, is most like that which is human, mortal, unintelligent, multiform, dissoluble, and changeable. And are we to suppose that this soul, which is invisible, in passing to the true Hades, which, like her, is invisible and pure and noble, and on her way to a good and wise God—whither, if God will, my soul is also soon to go—that the soul, I repeat, if this be her nature and origin, is blown away and perishes immediately on quitting the body, as many say. That can never be, my dear Simias and Cebes. The truth rather is, that the soul, which is pure at departing, draws after her no bodily taint, having never voluntarily had connection with the body, which she is ever avoiding, being gathered into herself, for such abstraction has been the study of her life. And what does this mean but that she has been a true disciple of philosophy, and has practised how to

The soul the image of God.

die easily? And is not philosophy the practice of death?"[1]

Deeply significant are the words of Christ: "God is not the God of the dead, but of the living."[2] In Him and for Him all live. The created spirit is the mirror which reflects the Divine Image in all its beauty, love, justice—the enduring witness to His eternal glory. God is the first purpose of its life, prior either to the world or itself. How would God and His providence be manifested in a vast Golgotha of annihilated spirits? For knowledge is the life of the spirit, and the end and aim of all our knowing is the knowledge of the First Cause. The only rest of the intellect is in God,[3] and God known not darkly through His works, but seen face to face. It is easier to conceive an immortality without God, than that there

[1] *Phæd.*, p. 79 *ss.*, Jowett's translation. "In the midst of the finite to be united with the infinite, and thus to be eternal in every moment of life; this is all that modern science can promise," says Strauss (*loc. cit.*, p. 739), as if this was something unknown to, and opposed to, the Christian belief in immortality; as if the immortality of the soul did not necessarily begin in this life, in the union of our spirit with the Divine Spirit. "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, Whom Thou hast sent" (John xvii. 3). "He that believeth in the Son hath life everlasting" (John iii. 36).

[2] Luke xx. 38. "God created things that they might be," says St. Thomas, *C. Gentes*, iv. 97.

[3] "Since man's final beatitude consists in the noblest operation he has, namely, that of the intellect, were the created intellect never to see the essence of God, it could never obtain beatitude, or its beatitude would consist in something else than God, which is contrary to faith, for it is of faith that his beatitude consists in God alone. Thus if man could never attain to the First Cause of all things, a desire implanted by nature would be ever purposeless" (S. I., Qu. xii. Art. 1).

should be a God, and the soul not immortal, and Lactantius[1] and Cicero are fully justified in deriving the immortality of the soul from the idea of God immanent within it.

The desire for happiness points to the same truth. "We all desire to be happy," says St. Augustine; we none of us desire to be unhappy; indeed we cannot."[2] Before man has ever heard of virtue, or duty, or sacrifice, he yearns for happiness. This may be egotism, but so it is. Man neither can nor ought to abjure his own personality. The desire of self-preservation prevails everywhere, from the angels' love of beatitude down to the cohesive force in the stone. The permanence of creation depends upon it. Not sacrifice, then, in itself, but the object for which man sacrifices himself ennobles him and renders him happy.[3] Man cannot perma-

The desire for happiness universal; and happiness to be perfect must be eternal.

[1] *Instit. Div.*, vii. 8. [2] *De Trinit.*, xiii. 4.

[3] Self-love is so necessarily part of man's nature that Holy Scripture contains no precepts enforcing it. But self-love may be moral or immoral. Eternal life in God being the predestined end of man, and his true, proper, and essential life, moral self-love consists in his desiring that life as the perfection of his individual nature. "When we are led to love God," says St. Thomas, "we are led to desire Him, and by this same act we love ourselves supremely (*maximé*) in wishing ourselves the highest good" (*De Car.*, Art. vii.). Self-love is immoral when we desire merely what pleases the feelings (*secundum naturam sensibilem*), and love ourselves without reference or subordination to our rational end in God (*secundum naturam rationalem*). All sin, in proportion to its gravity, bears the character of spiritual suicide, because it destroys our true life and is opposed to our true self-love. Hence our Lord tells us to fear, not the death of the body, but only that of the soul (Matt. x. 28). As we are bound to love ourselves most, the commandment to love our

True and false self-love.

nently forget himself. "The most fanatical enthusiast," says Schelling,[1] "would scarcely have been satisfied with the thought of absorption in the abyss of the Divine Essence, were it not that he unconsciously substituted himself for the Deity. When Spinoza imagined himself dissolved in the absolute object, it was himself still that he saw. In thinking of himself as annihilated, he was forced still to think of himself as existing." Again, if to desire eternal life be termed egotistical, so also is the desire for temporal life, and the use of food or medicine, in order to prolong it, even for a moment. Egotistical also is the desire for posthumous fame, so common with many writers, who yet deny personal immortality. Even suicide proves, by the effort it makes to escape from present misery, man's inherent craving for happiness.

But where is happiness to be found? Earthly happiness is but fleeting, as the gleams of sunshine

neighbour as ourselves (Matt. xxii. 39) does not mean that we are to love him as much as ourselves (S. II. ii., Qu. xxvi. Art. 4), but for the same motive of charity as belonging to God (S. II. ii., Qu. xxv. Art. 4). Again, since friends, possessions, and all temporal things are to be loved only in God, and as the means of gaining Him, for His sake they may be given up, unless justice or charity requires their retention; but such sacrifice is of counsel, and not precept, and constitutes perfect or heroic self-love. But even in the purest love of God, man neither can nor ought to exclude his own hope of eternal bliss. The Church, in condemning Quietism, which teaches the opposite doctrine (*Propp.* 68, *Damn. ab Innoc.* xi. d. 20, Nov. 1687, against Molinos, and *Propp.* 23, *Damn. ab Innoc.* xi. d. 12, Mar. 1699, against Fénélon), rendered a signal service to philosophy, and secured the foundations of sound morality.

[1] *Briefe über Dogmatism. und Kriticism.*, 8 Br.

on a cloudy day,[1] and even were it lasting it would fail to satisfy man's heart. Its rays gild only the soul's surface, and enlighten not the gloom within, which the remembrance of their transitoriness necessarily begets. True happiness must completely satisfy every desire, and must, therefore, be eternal.

But, further, the justice of God and the moral order, of which He is the beginning and end, demand the reward of virtue and the punishment of vice, neither of which necessarily happens in this life. Here men are often called upon to sacrifice all they have for the sake of truth and honesty, and thus only in a future life can God's justice be vindicated; and that future must be eternal, for the just soul demands unfading bliss as a reward of its perseverance; nor, on the other hand, would any temporal penalty deter sinful men from yielding in the violence of passion.

Moral order justified in eternity alone.

Moreover, God does not annihilate what He has once called into being. "In this world," says Gauss, "there are the joys of the understanding, which delights in knowledge, and there are the joys of the heart, which consist mainly in mutual solace and alleviation of each other's burdens. But for the Supreme Being to have created a certain number of existences, and stationed them in various spheres, in order to enjoy these pleasures for eighty or ninety

[1] "Happiness that can be lost," says Cicero (*De Fin.*, i. 326), "is not happiness, for there can be no felicity where there is a constant dread of its cessation."

years and then perish, would seem but a miserable plan. Whether the soul lives eighty or eighty millions of years, death is the end, and this space of life but a respite from the gallows; sooner or later the end surely comes. We are constrained, then, to believe, corroborated as it is in many other ways, that, besides our natural world, there exists another purely spiritual order of things, in which we shall have part." [1]

Virtue not its own reward.

And here we are met with the specious but worthless objection, that virtue is its own reward; that conscience, by its approval or sting, adequately rewards or chastises every human act; that it is pure egotism, and opposed to all true morality, to do right for the sake of recompense.[2]

[1] *Die Hauptformen des Glaubens an Unsterblichkeit*, 1874. H. Richter.

[2] So say Spinoza, Bayle, Kant, Hegel, Strauss (*Glaubenslehre*, ii. p. 711): "Any one who insists on the reverses that befall the good, and the successes of the wicked in this life, and thence argues that there must be a future life to set these things right, only shows that he has not yet learnt to distinguish the husk from the kernel, the shadow from the substance; he is spiritually immature, and not yet fit or worthy to discuss such questions. Equally, he who needs the hire of a future reward to induce him to act rightly has not got beyond the outer court of morality." Of what sort that morality is which knows neither God nor immortality is shown in materialism, which declares "consummate egotism to be the guiding principle" (*Büchner*, p. 285) of the whole mechanism of human society. If the hope of an eternal reward is a sign of "spiritual immaturity," we can only console ourselves with the thought that Christ Himself invites us to look forward to the future. "Fear ye not those that kill the body, . . . but rather fear Him, Who can destroy both soul and body in hell" (Matt. x. 28). "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments" (Matt. xix. 17). Moreover, it is utterly false to say

But, first, the remorse which follows a sin arises principally from fear of future punishment, just as the peace of a good conscience contains a pledge of heaven to come. Secondly, sensitiveness of conscience depends on our surroundings, on education, on reflection, and on many other conditions, and therefore its verdicts are variable and unequal, and hence necessarily often unjust. In fact, the moral sense becomes so dulled and blunted by habitual wrongdoing, that, were conscience our only judge, the most hardened sinner would suffer the least. And, on the other hand, as the conscience grows more sensitive by obedience to grace, the holiest souls, by the very consciousness of their sinfulness, would suffer the most.

Nor sin its own punishment.

Finally, how would he be rewarded who died for virtue's sake? "That virtue," says Lactantius,[1] "which is ready to sacrifice life rather than lose itself would be against nature if the soul died with the body." No! justice demands that man's reward or punishment should proceed from a superhuman principle, and be unchangeable as the moral law itself. That law requires the co-operation of man's free will, yet it is not dependent thereon. Man must yield to

that if we hope for reward, that becomes our only motive, and that we love, not God, but the reward and ourselves in it. Cannot man be urged by several motives at once? I love my friend, both for what he is in himself and for what he is to me. In loving God, man loves the source of all his bliss. Even the peace of a good conscience should equally be called egotism, because the satisfaction is my own, and its reproaches, when I have done wrong, give pain to me.

[1] *De Instit. Div.*, ii. 13.

the law, not the law to man; on his obedience his reward depends, and that reward is not here, but hereafter. "Be glad and rejoice," says Jesus Christ,[1] "for your reward is very great in heaven."[2] "If Christ be not risen again," says St. Paul, "we are of all men most miserable, for then we too shall not rise again."[3] If this temporal life is all that we have, then we should live for it and for its pleasures, be they refined or coarse, according to our bent.

The Stoic could, indeed, despise pain and scorn death; his system presented, so far, a high aim, but it was not human; it was imposing, but not true. He could ignore pain, but he could not get rid of it. He endeavoured to deify man, and make him self-sufficing by means of virtue, instead of by virtue raising him to God. Lactantius[4] pointed this out. "Virtue in itself is not," he says, "the highest good; it leads to the highest good, and becomes beatitude; but in itself it is not this, since it mostly consists in labour and conflict." And, before him, Aristotle had said, "The truly virtuous man endures all fortunes with dignity. He can, therefore, never be miserable, but neither can he be happy, if such a fate as Priam's befalls him."[5] In Stoicism we meet again that false Idealism which regards the real external world as a mere phantom, whereas its true

Stoicism, in denying immortality, false and impossible.

[1] "He who," Strauss himself confesses, "was, and ever will be, from the religious point of view, the first and greatest of men" (*Streitschrift*, iii. p. 158).

[2] St. Matt. v. 12.

[3] 1 Cor. xv. 17, 19.

[4] *Loc. cit.*, iii. 12.

[5] *Ethics, Nic.*, i. 11.

purpose is to express and realise visibly the divine ideal of right and justice. This man expects; but right and justice do not reign here supreme, and therefore we look for a future life, in which will be finally established the perfect harmony between the ideal and the real, man's inner heart and outward acts, his deeds and their consequences, his merit and reward, his crimes and their retribution. Here, in this mortal life, morality and happiness are separated; duty is the way, happiness the goal. Happiness of some kind man is constrained by his nature to seek, but perfect happiness is not for him in this life. What happiness he can attain to here is to be found under the form of virtue alone, for vice pleases but for a moment, and proves in the end but self-chosen misery—misery which results from seeking happiness where it does not really exist.

Virtue, then, is a good, because it leads to the supreme Good, which alone can make man happy. God alone, Who is the Cause and Object of virtue, and the living moral law, is also, therefore, the source of man's everlasting beatitude.[1] In Him virtue and happiness are reconciled and united, since He is the one Source of both. He is the supreme Good. In this life love for Him is manifested in virtue, morality, duty; in the future

Virtue good because of its reward.

[1] "Everything is perfect in proportion as it adheres to its beginning. In God is the last perfection of the rational creature, because He is the beginning of its being" (S. I., Qu. xii. Art. 1; I. ii., Qu. ii. Art. 7; St. Bonaventure in I. *Sent., Dist.* i., Qu. ii. Art. 3).

life, in beatitude, but in both it is the same Lord God, and He alone.

It is precisely this hope of a restored harmony between the inward and the outward, the spiritual and the natural life, between moral conditions and physical phenomena, which constitutes the motive-force of all human activity, whether in daily life or in the pursuit of knowledge. So, too, the creations of art are only an anticipation of this future state. In representing the ideal in a visible form their mission is to make the things of space and time express what is ideal, eternal, and spiritual; and the pleasure we derive from their contemplation is in proportion to the exactness with which this harmony is realised. And thus, again, we are taught to expect a time when nature will be so quickened by the Spirit as to become its perfect expression, and be in itself one magnificent work of art.

Belief in a future life is universal,[1] and in a future

[1] Disbelief in a higher state is confined to those who, by pride or sensuality, have stifled the thought of any higher state. The universality of a belief in immortality is proved by the reverence for the dead and the solemn obsequies which prevail in all parts of the world, and which is the certain test of a nation's civilisation. The most thoughtful people of the ancient world, the Egyptians, display a special reverence for their ancestors. In the law of Solon a malediction is pronounced on those who desecrate a grave; and by the Roman law graves were consecrated with a religious rite, which shielded them from profanation (Quintil., *Declam.*, vi.; Cicero, *In Verr.*, v. 51). For so-called savage nations *cf.* Waitz, *loc. cit.*, i. 322 *ff.*; ii., 167, 191 *ff.*; *Quæst. Tuscul.*, i. 15. Seneca (*Epist.* 117) calls this consensus a "popular conviction." *Cf.* Aristotle, *apud* Plutarch, *Consol. ad Apoll.*, 27; Homer, *Iliad*, iii. 276; Hesiod, *Op. et Dies.*, v. 154. The Egyptians, cf. *Diodor.*, i. 91, and Röth, *Ge-*

punishment or reward for all. Every ancient myth contains visions of Tartarus, as of Elysium,[1] and bears witness to that natural dread of the future which is thus powerfully expressed by the poet:[2]—

Idea of future reward and punishment universal.

"To die—to sleep—
To sleep—perchance to dream—ay, there's the rub—
For in that sleep of death what dreams may come,
When we have shuffled off this mortal coil,
Must give us pause: there's the respect,
That makes calamity of a long life.
For who would bear the whips and scorns of time,
Th' oppressor's wrong, the proud man's contumely,
The pangs of despised love, the law's delay,
The insolence of office, and the spurns
That patient merit of the unworthy takes,
When he himself might his quietus make
With a bare bodkin? Who would fardels bear
To grunt and sweat under a weary life,
But that the dread of something after death,
The undiscovered country, from whose bourn
No traveller returns—puzzles the will,
And makes us rather bear the ills we have,
Than fly to others that we know not of?"

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schichte der abendl. Philos., i. 176 *ff.* The Persians, Keuker, *Zendav.*, Part ii., p. 324. The Chinese, Rémusat., *Le Livre des Recompenses, Trad. du Chin.*, Paris, 1816, p. 8. The Germans, Grimm, *Mythologie*, 1st Edition, p. 484; *cf.* Lüken, *Die Traditionen des Menschen-Geschlechts*, pp. 407–440, Münster, 1856).

[1] At the close of his description of those terrible punishments which overtake the wicked in the lower world Virgil says: "Had I a hundred tongues, or a hundred months, a voice of iron, I could not express all the species of their crimes or enumerate their punishments" (*Æneid*, vi. 625; trans. Davidson, 242).

[2] Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, Act iii. sc. i.

"The body returns to the earth, from whence it came, and the spirit to God, Who gave it." But if the soul be so essentially united to the body as to constitute one whole, then their separation is contrary to the nature of the soul,[1] as is seen in man's fear of death and his horror at its approach.[2] But that which is against nature cannot last for ever, and this separation cannot be eternal. Death reigns over our mortal bodies because of sin, but in the end death will be destroyed, and this corruptible will put on incorruption, this mortal immortality.[3] But by the reunion of the soul with the body, we do not mean that the second body will be composed of all the same material elements[4] as the

Resurrection of the body.

[1] Although the human soul can subsist by itself, yet by itself it is not perfectly complete" (St. Thomas, *De Anim.*, Art. i. ad. 4). "As a light body remains light when it is separated from its proper place, betraying, however, an aptitude and inclination for that place; so the human soul remains in its own being when separated from the body, but has a natural aptitude and inclination for union with that body" (S. I., Qu. lxxvi. Art. 1). "The soul, being part of human nature, has not its natural perfection till united to the body" (*Ibid.*, Qu. xc., Art. 4).

[2] "Who, through fear of death, were all their lifetime subject to servitude" (Heb. ii. 15). The knowledge that he must die accompanies man throughout his life, and he regards it very differently from the animal, which lives only in the present, and knows neither death nor immortality. To have no fear of death may therefore be an act of frivolity and presumption, just as much as a fruit of greatness of soul, or of grace.

[3] 1 Cor. xv. 53.

[4] 1 Cor. xv. 35–38: "But some man will say, How do the dead rise again, or with what manner of body shall they come? Senseless man, that which thou sowest is not quickened, except it die first. And that which thou sowest, thou sowest not the body that shall be; but bare grain, as of wheat. . . . But God giveth it a body as He will."

first, since these are during this life in a constant state of change, and (as it were) merely pass through the body, and are constantly renewed. For these elements only constituted one body so long as they were interpenetrated and informed by the soul. As, therefore, in this life the identity of the soul determines the identity of the body, so is it after death, for the separated soul remains essentially the same. Its vegetative and sensitive faculties, the forces of the bodily life, are only dormant,[1] not destroyed; as in the profound simile of the Apostle, the whole plant, blade and ears, slumbers in the seed. Thus the risen body will be essentially the same with that which died, because of the sameness of the soul, its form, or formative principle. This formative principle, with the bodily faculties of the soul, will be reawakened in the day of the Resurrection to make from its material elements the body anew.[2]

By the immortal soul re-determining the matter.

Thus, by the wisdom and power of God, man's dearest desire is satisfied. He will live for ever, for

[1] "When the man as a whole," says St. Thomas (S. I., Qu. lxxvii. Art. 8), "is dissolved, these faculties remain no longer in act, but continue only virtually in the soul, as in their principle or root."

[2] *Cf.* St. Thomas's exhaustive and profound teaching on this subject, *C. Gentes*, iv. 81. The fourth Lateran Council, 1215, defined that all will rise again, with their own proper bodies which they now bear; and St. Thomas (*Supp.* lxxix. Art. 2) says "that it is heretical to deny the numerical identity of the body, which dies and rises again." As to the difficulties presented by the dissolution and disappearance of the bodily elements, St. Augustine says: "Should every part of the body's substance have been absolutely annihilated, the Almighty could restore it by such means as He saw fit" (*Civ. Dei.*, ii. 20).

his soul never dies, and his body rises again. The Resurrection is thus natural as regards its end, the reunion of body and soul; but it is supernatural as to its cause, being solely the effect of Divine omnipotence.[1] At the same time, the Resurrection will fully manifest the Divine justice by the rewards and punishments then meted to every man, body and soul, as his lot for ever.[2] For in this life it was the whole man, body and soul, which suffered patiently for justice' sake, or revelled in the perishable life of the senses; and the whole man, body and soul, must be punished or rewarded for eternity. And thus the consummation of all things waits for the Resurrection.

The Resurrection the completion of Christian dogma, of human desire.

But now we understand the closing words of the Creed, "I believe in the resurrection of the body, and the life everlasting." The doctrine of the Resurrection is the crown and completion of the whole edifice of Christian faith. What is man, and why has his Creator welded together in him spirit and body, angel and beast, in an indissoluble unity? His destiny is to occupy the borderland where matter and spirit meet, the lowest in the order of spirits, the highest of corporeal forms, in whom the marriage between spirit and nature is consummated.[3] Man was to be the key-

[1] St. Thomas thus illustrates the point, "A blind man, supernaturally (*miraculose*) cured, sees naturally" (S. iii. Qu. lxxvii. Art. 4, ad. 2).

[2] "To the labourer the reward is due; therefore man, consisting of body and soul, must as such be rewarded," says St. Thomas (IV. *Dist.* xliii., Qu. i. Art. 1).

[3] "How beautifully has God placed the marriage of the universe

stone in the arch of God's creation, binding together the two worlds of spirit and matter in a close and living union. Therefore he was not created for a momentary existence on earth, and then to disappear for ever, or only to survive as an incomplete being. He dies, but he will rise again to be the living link, the harmonising chord of these two great realms throughout eternity.

and the microcosm man in the supreme grade of sensible nature, and in the lowest of intelligent beings! Thus man connects in himself, as in a mean, the lower things of time and the higher things of eternity" (Nicol. Cusan., *De Venat. Sapient.*, c. 32). *Cf.* St. Thomas, *C. Gentes*, ii. 38.

CHAPTER VIII.

GOD AND MAN.

THE preceding chapters on the nature of God and the nature of man lead us to consider here more fully the relation in which man stands to God, what intercourse or communion exists between them, and how it is expressed and maintained.

The essential characteristics of man are, as we have seen, his faculty of thought and his freedom of will. What thought, then, stirs most powerfully the depths of his soul, and remains ever the fixed and ultimate goal of his desires? The thought of a Being Who is Eternal, the desire of a Good which is Infinite, and One only is at once Eternal and Infinite, and that One is God.

"My whole being," says Père Gratry, "tends and aspires to something better than myself, and this aspiration is no passing emotion, but must necessarily and always endure. That is, I necessarily seek something greater than any given greatness. But what exceeds all greatness known or assignable is the Infinite alone. Thus, my life leads ever to the Infinite, and it does so because, being in

Man's desire of God.

myself finite and imperfect,[1] I am drawn towards Him Who is infinite and all-perfect, as the primal centre of my being, and the source of my life." And these words only repeat the saying of Aristotle[2] that the First Mover, Himself immovable, impels all things to Himself by this attraction to what is desirable and intelligible.

Whence, then, is this thought of the Infinite, this desire of the Eternal? We cannot produce it ourselves, for we are but finite, and of time, and the finite cannot beget the infinite, nor time eternity. Has the outward world suggested the idea, or the nature around us, or the history of the past? But history, too, begins and ends in time. And so with nature. What marvels it contains in sea and sky! Yet the ocean has its limits, and the stars are reckoned. "For Thou hast created all things in number, weight, and measure."[3] Not without, then, but within, is the idea of God found. "The kingdom of God is within you."[4] "The light of Thy countenance is signed upon us."[5] Made in God's image, we bear within ourselves, in our reasonable souls, a ray of the light eternal, which draws us to Himself.

Man's relations with God

[1] "Our intellect, in the act of understanding, is extended towards the Infinite, as we see by the fact that when any finite quantity is named, our intellect can always think of an addition thereto. But this relation of our intellect to the Infinite would be useless were the Infinite itself unintelligible. There must, therefore, be something infinite and intelligible which is greater than all things, and this thing we call God. God, therefore, is infinite" (*C. Gentes*, i. 43).

[2] *Metaphys.* xii. 7: "κινεῖ ὡσ εσωμενον."

[3] Wisdom xi. 21.

[4] Luke xvii. 21.

[5] Psalm iv. 7.

Nor does the existence of atheists disprove our assertion that the idea of God is universal, and for this reason: every proposition contains a mental judgment, which judgment must be affirmative or negative; as, for instance, "God exists," or, "He does not." But every judgment presupposes an idea, on which it is formed.[1] Thus, a blind man can form no judgment as to whether the wall before him be red or blue, because he has no idea of colour. When, then, the sceptic predicates non-existence of God, he must have both an idea of existence and an idea of God.[2] But, further, since the idea of God is universal, and can be derived, as we have seen, only from God Himself, from the fact that the idea of God prevails everywhere, we have a right to infer that God exists.[3] The atheist, then, by his denial of God's existence, does violence to his own reason, to every law and need of his nature, and rejects at the same time the common verdict of humanity.

not disproved by atheism.

God then exists, and in Him we live and move. Further, He speaks to us Himself, and we speak to Him in return. He calls each of us by name.[4] He

[1] Every judgment really contains two ideas: that of which something is denied or affirmed, which is called the subject; and that which is denied or affirmed of that subject, which is called the predicate.

[2] "The atheist presupposes God in order to deny Him" (*De Maistre Soirées*, ii. p. 108). "Since the false is corruption of the truth, truth must necessarily precede what is false" (*Tertullian. c. Marc.*, iv. 4).

[3] The universal consent of men to any thesis represents a maximum of evidence in its support.

[4] Isaias xliii. 1: "Fear not, for I have redeemed thee, and called thee by thy name; thou art Mine."

calls us by the fact of our creation. He has brought us out of nothingness by pure love. We are His. His are our intellectual faculties, our bodily powers, our hearts' desires, our wills' resolves; and as He, Who created us, also sustains us in life,[1] apart from Him we sink into nothingness and death. Again, He speaks to us by the whisper of conscience, and, above all, as our one Consoler in sorrow and trial. What He says to each is, "Thou art My son, My creature, My image; thou art Mine."

What, then, can man give in return when he realises that he is sustained in the Arms and rests upon the Heart of his God? Poor though he is, he can acknowledge what he has received; he can exclaim, with a thrill of joy, "Thou art my Father, my Lord, and my God."

This return, this confession of praise, man can always make. He may be robbed of goods and property, of liberty or life; but three things are his, and his inalienably—his mind and heart, and his speech, the expression of both. These three he can give to God—his mind by faith, his heart by love, his speech by prayer. And faith, love, and prayer are dogma, morals and sacraments; the essence and summary of all religion.

Expressed by religion.

The relation of the creature to God as its principle and end is, then, the matter of religion. And the recognition and expression of this

[1] Psalm ciii. 29: "He upholds all things; if He take away their breath, they shall return to the dust."

end by the free, intelligent mind constitutes the essence of religion, properly so-called.[1]

Natural religion the basis of positive religion.

Religion, then, necessarily follows from the idea of God, and had God never revealed Himself to mankind, or established a positive form of creed and worship, religion would still have been the language of humanity; man, by his intelligent nature, would still have sought after God, and, with the divine assistance, longed to possess Him. Nay, further, positive religion presupposes natural religion, for the recognition of God in nature enables man to understand and accept the divine dealings in revelation and history. Nature and grace do not contradict each other, any more than the book of creation contradicts Holy Scripture, or the law of Sinai that written in the heart of man,[2] for they are both worship of one and the same God; they are both religions, though the revealed is of a higher kind.

What, then, is the act and expression of this virtue, religion? The ancients tell us of the mysterious statue of Memnon in the Egyptian desert, which stood

[1] "Religio materialiter, religio formaliter sumpta." According to Cicero, *religio* is from *relegere*, to read again. "Those, who diligently handled and, as it were, re-read all things concerning the worship of God" (*De Nat. Deorum*, ii. 28). Lactantius derives it (*Instit Div.*, iv. 28) from *religare*, to rebind; and St. Augustine (*Civ. Dei*, x. iii.) from *re-eligere*, to re-elect. A. Gellius (*Noctes Attic.*, iv. 9) gives its ascetic significance in deriving it from *relinquere*, to leave. St. Thomas defines religion "as the mode of knowing and worshipping God" (S. II. ii., Qu. lxxxi. Art. 1).

[2] Religion is, as a matter of fact, positive, but it is not necessarily positive. *Cf.* Suarez, *De Gratia, Prolegom.* iv.; *Thes. Cont. Traditionalism*, II. iii., dat. June 11, 1855.

mute in the midst of the vast solitude. At length, when the morning sun rose above the distant horizon, its first beams, as they illumined the statue, drew forth from it wondrous sounds. Thus it is with man's heart. Creation is for him silent and void, until his eye is enlightened by a ray from God, the Sun of eternity. Then divine harmonies thrill through his soul, and he exclaims in prayer, "Our Father, Who art in heaven."

"In the beginning of the Veda," says Max Müller, "we see man left to himself to solve the riddle of this world. . . . He is awakened from darkness and slumber by the light of the sun, and Him Whom his eyes cannot behold, and Who seems to grant him the daily pittance of his existence, he calls 'his life, his breath, his brilliant Lord and Protector.' He gives names to all the powers of nature. . . . He invokes them, he praises them, he worships them. . . . But in his own breast he has discovered a Power nearer to him than all the Gods of nature—a Power that is never mute when he prays, never absent when he fears and trembles. It seems to inspire his prayers, and yet to listen to them; it seems to live in him, and yet to support him and all around him. . . . That Power, which is nothing but itself, which supports the Gods, the heavens, and every living being, floats before his mind, conceived but not expressed."[1]

Prayer, then, is the utterance of religion, the ascent of the soul to God. Hegel well says that "among all nations religion has ever been regarded as the glory

[1] *Chips from a German Workshop*, p. 69.

and Sabbath of this life. In prayer we leave behind us, on the sandbanks of this mortal life, all doubt, trouble, and solicitude, all petty temporal interests. And, as from some lofty mountain-top, far removed from things below, we calmly survey the distant horizon of the landscape, so to the spiritual eye, elevated above the stern realities of life, earthly things appear a mere vision, and their lights and shadows, reflected in the pure beams of the true Sun, are softened into everlasting peace. In this realm of spirit flow the streams of oblivion, of which Psyche (the soul) drank, and the troubles of life are seen to be mere shadows, which only enhance the radiance of the eternal Light."[1] The body feels, the heart desires, the will resolves, the mind thinks; but prayer soars beyond all corporal sensations, all affections of the heart, all desires of the will, all thoughts of the mind, embracing, as it does, the whole man. In prayer all powers of the soul unite, all fountains of the inner life well forth and overflow. Thus religion is the most universal and efficient means of civilisation, and, by equally developing mind, heart, and will, religion alone educates the whole man. Without prayer, a man cannot be said to live; he simply vegetates. "He who prays ill, lives ill." A soul may be adorned with the richest gifts, yet without prayer it is like a face bereft of the organs of sight. The stone, which has no power of self-movement, ranks lower than the plant; the

Prayer is the highest act of man.

Dignity of prayer.

[1] *Works*, xi. p. 5.

plant, which has no sensations, is inferior to the animal; the animal, which does not think, is lower in the scale than man; so the man who does not pray is of a lower order than he who does. The mind of the gifted philosopher who does not pray is infinitely beneath the soul of the poor, ignorant peasant whose knees are worn with prayer; for prayer is the highest grade to which, in its upward flight, the created mind can attain. This act alone raises man toward God, and launches him on the current of the eternal stream; indeed, it is true to say that man only feels, thinks, and exists in order to pray.[1]

Even had God not required prayer, still man would have prayed. And when the unbeliever asks, "Why do you pray? It is all in vain, for between you and God there is an abyss over which your prayers cannot pass." "Still," the believer replies, "my heart prays." Or again, if he says, "Why do you pray? God is far too great to look upon such as you, a mere atom in the vast universe." "Still," the answer comes, "my heart prays; for I believe and know that when I pray, God looks down upon me and hears my prayer; and this just because my nothingness pleads in His sight, for His mercy increases with my needs."

And this conviction was universal. During the most flourishing epoch of classical antiquity prayer occupied an important place both in public and private life. Not only was it a part of religious ceremonial, but of all important acts and usages of

[1] "Man without prayer is a dumb beast" (St. Philip Neri, *Life*, p. 153).

daily life. Hence the numerous expressions for prayer current both among Greeks and Romans.[1] The Greeks opened all public assemblies, campaigns, combats, and public games, even the theatre, with prayer.[2] The same holds good of the Romans. Scipio Africanus never commenced any undertaking until he had prayed for some time in the Chapel of Jupiter, Stator Urbis et Imperii.[3] "For the good man," says Plato, "to hold converse with the Gods by means of prayers and offerings, and every kind of service, is the noblest and best of all things, and also most conducive to a happy life."[4]

Practised by Pagan nations.

Thus Plutarch says: "We may find states without walls, money, or writings, but a nation without God, without prayer, religious exercises, or sacrifice is unknown."[5] Therefore the most ancient history of a nation is also a history of religion.[6] Worship (*cultus*) and culture, as their Latin names show, are derived from the same root, and have their common origin in the sanctity of religious faith. Those races which have broken away from the traditions of

Religion the source of culture.

[1] *Preces, precatio, comprecatio, carmen, salutatio, adoratio, invocatio, supplicatio;* ἀρά, εὐχή, λιτή, εὐχαριστία, προσῳδός, προστροπή. κ. τ. λ. *Cf.* Lasaulx, *Studien des classischen Alterthums*, p. 139.

[2] Xenophon says (*Fragment*, xxi. 13, *ap. Athenæus*, xi. 7): "It is the duty of every well-conditioned man to praise God, and with salutary speech and a pure heart to invoke a blessing, and to pray that He will give us the strength needful to do right, for this is our first duty."

[3] *Valerius Maximus*, i. 2, 2.

[4] *De Legg*, iv. p. 356.

[5] *Adv. Colot.*, c. 31. See the opinions of the ancients on this subject in Fabricius, *Bibliograph. Antiqu.*, p. 304.

[6] Cf. *Études sur l'Histoire de l'Humanité, par M. Laurent, Preface.*

faith and worship have fallen from the civilisation which religion alone had produced. Tribes or people without religion are savages, and, among savages, the lower their religious status, the lower is their civilisation and morals. The Indian, who has retained purer ideas of God than the fetish-worshipping negro, is remarkably his superior. "The future task of history," says Schelling,[1] "will be to show by what catastrophes races now living in a savage state were isolated from intercourse with the rest of the world, and how, when thus deprived of their former means of civilisation, they sank into their present degradation. I maintain that civilisation was the primal condition of the human race, and that the origin of states, science, religion, and the arts was contemporaneous, or rather one and the same, so that these were not really separated, but interpenetrated each other, as they will again in their final development." "Far from agreeing," says F. v. Schlegel,[2] "with Rousseau and his followers, that the true commencement of humanity and the genuine basis of the social contract are to be found in the actual condition of even the best and noblest savages, we only see and recognise in it a barbarous and degraded state."[3] It is unquestionably true that,

First man civilised.

[1] *Vorlesungen über die Methode des academisch. Studien*, p. 167.

[2] *Philosophie der Geschichte*, Wien, 1829, i. p. 46 *ss.*

[3] At the meeting of the British Association in Glasgow in 1876 A. R. Wallace quoted (*Report*, p. 115) against the supposed degraded state of prehistoric man the following striking facts adduced by Mr. Albert Mott, in his Presidential Address to the Literary and Philosophical Society of Liverpool in 1873:—"1. The gigantic stone images found on one of the most remote islands of the Pacific, Easter

during the first ages, polytheism and idol-worship were unknown. Plutarch[1] expressly says that Pythagoras taught that the Universal Being was not subject to the senses nor to pain, but was invisible, uncreated, spiritual; that Numa therefore forbade the Romans to make any image of God in the form of man or animal. Nor, in the earlier ages, were there either painted or carved images. During the first hundred and seventy years temples and chapels were erected by the Romans, but they made no image of the Deity, because God, they said, could only be conceived

Monotheism the original religion.

Island, only thirty square miles in area, the largest images weighing over a hundred tons, thirty or forty feet high. The existence of such vast works imply a large population, abundance of food, and an established government, the power of regular communication with larger islands or a continent, the arts of navigation, and a civilisation much higher than exists in any part of the Pacific. 2. The ancient mounds and earthworks of the North American continent, over the greater part of the Mississippi valley. Four classes of these earthworks occur. Some are camps, or works of defence; others vast enclosures in the lowlands, often of geometrical forms, having attached to them roadways often miles in length; a third are mounds corresponding to our tumuli, often seventy or ninety feet high, covering acres of ground; whilst a fourth group consists of representations of animals, in relief, on a gigantic scale. . . . The sculptured heads are especially remarkable, because they present to us the features of an intellectual and civilised people. . . . Recent investigations show that in Mexico, Central America, and Peru the existing race of Indians has been preceded by a distinct and more civilised race. 3. The great Pyramid of Egypt; the wonderful perfection of its workmanship. Every part of it exhibits the highest structural science, yet it is universally admitted to be the oldest historical building in the world. See also Rink's *Tales and Traditions of the Esquimaux*, showing an earlier, higher civilisation among the Esquimaux, as also is the case with other North American races." *Cf.* Baldwin, *Ancient America*, New York, 1872.

[1] *Vit. Num.*, viii. p. 65. Cf. *Zonaras*, vii. 2.

by the mind. St. Augustine[1] confirms the above statement from Varus, who adds that those who first gave idols to the people taught them error instead of the fear of God. According to Lucian,[2] there were no idols in the Egyptian temples; and even in the time of Tacitus[3] the Deity was worshipped on Mount Carmel without temple or image. So, also, in the worship of Melkarth at Gades[4] and in the worship of the Persians,[5] sacrifices were offered upon the summits of lofty mountains without either temple or image. Tacitus,[6] again, says of the Germans, that they considered it derogatory to the grandeur of the Celestials to enclose them within the walls of temples or depict them under human form. According to Herodotus,[7] the Pelasgi sacrificed to divinities, and worshipped them under name and title only as rulers of the universe and dispensers of all benefits. "My investigations," says Creuzer,[8] "serve to prove that the ancient system, which held Pagan

Idol-worship unknown in earliest ages.

[1] *Civ. Dei*, iv. 21. Cf. *Arnob.*, vi. 24.

[2] *De Syr. Dea*, iii.

[3] *Histor.*, ii. 78.

[4] *Silius Italie*, iii. 30, 31.

[5] *Herodot.*, i. 31; *Strab.*, xv. 3; Xenophon, *Cyropæd.*, viii. 7.

[6] *German.*, ix. *Cf.* Lasaulx, *Studien des classischen Alterthums*, p. 110.

[7] *Histor.*, ii. 52. Eusebius (*Præpar. Evangel.*, xiii. 13) quotes a passage from Sophocles, in which he declares that the unity of God, Who rules over heaven and earth, is the ancient and true doctrine. Compare the Scripture statements in Gen. xii. 7, xiii. 4; Dan. iv. 31; Jon. iii.; Esther xvi. 16, 18, 21. *Cf.* also Movers, *Die Phönicier*, vol. i. p. 168.

[8] Preface to vol. iv. *Symb.* i. *Ausg.*

mythology to be a corruption of the revelation which God had made to His chosen people is, in its principle, much nearer the truth than that of those who, for example, find the primitive religion of the Greeks in Homer." "The more I investigate ancient history," says August. W. Schlegel,[1] "the more convinced I am that, among civilised nations, there existed at first a purer worship of the Supreme Being, that the magic power of nature gradually gave rise to polytheism, and finally wholly obscured the spiritual conception of religion in the popular mind." "The monotheistic form of religion," says Grimm,[2] "appears to be the original form out of which polytheism was subsequently developed." Otfrid Müller[3] owns the prior existence of monotheism. Von Bohlens[4] maintains the same among the Persians, as Maury[5] does writing of the Egyptians. Monotheism is still more manifest in the Schuking of the Chinese, the hymns of the Rig-Veda, and in the Shruta, one of the most ancient records of Brahminical dogma. "There is a monotheism," says Max Müller,[6] "which precedes the polytheism of the Veda, and, even in the invocation of their innumerable gods, the remembrance of a God, one and infinite, breaks through the mist of an idolatrous phraseology, like the

Eastern monotheism.

[1] Preface to translation of Prichard's *Egyptian Mythology*, p. 16.
[2] *Deutsche Mythol.* 3. *Aufl. Vorw.*, p. 66.
[3] *Orchomenos*, p. 457.
[4] *Altes Indien*, i. *Th.*, p. 145.
[5] *Des Travaux Modernes sur l'Egypt, Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1855.
[6] *A History of Ancient Literature*, Ed. 1885, p. 559, 568.

blue sky that is hidden by passing clouds." As their poet sings:

"The only One breathed breathless in itself.
Other than it, there nothing since has been.
Darkness there was, and all at first was veiled
In gloom profound,—an ocean without light,
The germ, that still lay covered in the husk,
Burst forth, one nature, from the fervent heat.
Then first came love upon it, the new spring
Of mind. Yea, poets in their hearts discerned,
Pondering, this bond between created things
And uncreated. Comes this spark from earth,
Piercing and all-pervading, or from heaven?
Then seeds were sown, and mighty power arose—
Nature below, and power and will above.
Who knows the secret? Who proclaimed it here,
Whence, whence this manifold creation sprang?
The Gods themselves came later into being—
Who knows from whence this great creation sprang?
He, from Whom all this great creation came."

St. Augustine traverses naturalism.

One evening, as the setting sun was sinking beneath the horizon, a noble, earnest soul wandered by the seashore. St. Augustine—for it was he—looked wistfully upon the vast sea outstretched before him, and as he listened to its mighty roar, he exclaimed, "Oh sea! oh nature! are you my God? Can you give peace to my soul?"[1] That

[1] *Confessions*, x. 6. "But what do I love when I love Thee? . . . This it is which I love, when I love my God. 'And what is this?' I asked the earth, and it answered me, 'I am not He.' And whatsoever are in it confessed the same. I asked the sea, and the deeps, and the living creeping things, and they answered, 'We are not thy God; seek above us.' I asked the moving air, and the whole air, with his inhabitants, answered, 'Anaximenes was deceived; I am not God.' I asked the heavens, sun, moon, stars; 'Nor,' say they, 'are we the God whom

is the religion of nature, the worship of natural forces, whether under the animal form of polytheism or that of modern science, *i.e.*, materialism, which, under aspects more or less gross, recognises nothing higher than natural enjoyment or sensual pleasure, and is advocated in so many literary and scientific writings of the present day. Enjoyment, and its necessary condition, money, is their God; to acquire riches, and to enjoy them, is their religion. But amid the roar of the billows sounded these words, "*Quære super nos! non sumus Deus tuus.*" "We are not thy God. Riches, pleasure, and nature are only His creatures. We cannot give thee peace; seek thy God higher!" Presently the sun disappeared, and thousands of bright stars illumined the bright, cloudless firmament. Then the saint raised his eyes to their radiant orbs and said, "Ye stars, are ye my God? Can ye give me peace?" He would try the religion of estheticism, the worship of the beautiful in poetry and art, the deification of form, as the panacea, according to many, for all the ills of life.[1]

Estheticism

thou seekest.' And I replied to all the things which encompass the door of my flesh, 'Ye have told me of my God, that you are not He; tell me something of Him.' And they cried out with a loud voice, 'He made us' (Ps. xcix. 3). . . . For truth said unto me, 'Neither heaven, nor earth, nor any other body is thy God;' this, their very nature, saith to him that seeth them; 'They are a mass; a mass is less in a part thereof than in the whole.' Now to thee I speak, oh my soul! Thou art my better part; for thou quickenest the mass of my body, giving it life, which no body can give to a body; but thy God is even unto thee the Life of thy life."

[1] As L. Bœrne somewhere says: "Centuries pass away; years roll by; the stages of this life mount and descend. Nothing is lasting but

Then a wonderful harmony seemed to pervade the starry firmament, and a voice replied to him, "We are not thy God; we are only His creatures. No created beauty can give thy heart peace. *Quære super nos.* Seek thy God yet higher." The saint obeyed the voice, and gazing upward, saw the blessed spirits who stand in the presence of God. "Mighty spirits," he exclaimed, "are ye my God? Can ye give peace to my soul?" Might he not worship at the shrine of genius, which some modern philosophers call the religion of the future?[1] From hence also a voice answered him, "We are not thy God; we are only His creatures. All intellectual greatness is His work alone. We cannot give peace to thy heart. *Quære super nos.* Seek thy God yet higher!" Then his soul soared still higher, above all nature, above all spirits, above all created things, until it reached the throne of God. Now the saint no longer asks, "Art thou my God?" He prays, and his heart is filled with peace, as the calm succeeds the storm, and he says, "My heart was restless, until it found rest in Thee. Thou alone hast given peace to

and intellectualism.

To find rest in God Himself.

change; nothing is constant but death. Every beat of our heart inflicts a wound; and if poetry did not exist, our life would be one of incessant suffering."

[1] Strauss (*Streitschr.*, iii. p. 72) says: "Moses and the prophets form a progressive series of religious agencies up to Christ, similar to that of the early poets up to Shakespeare." On the other hand, Rosenkranz (*Tagebuch*, p. 263) well observes: "The miserable idolatry which our age dignifies by the name of worship of genius is only the unconscious, ironical reverse of its atheism, which proves its pressing need of possessing some personal God."

my heart; therefore Thou art my God, and in Thee is my eternal rest."[1]

[1] *Confessions*, iv. c. 10, 11. "For whithersoever the soul of man turns itself, unless towards Thee, it is riveted upon sorrows; yea, though it is riveted on things beautiful. And yet they, out of Thee, and out of the soul, were not, unless they were from Thee. They rise and set; and, by rising, they begin, as it were, to be. They grow that they may be perfected; they wax old and wither; and all grow not old, but all wither. So then, when they rise and tend to be, the more quickly they grow, that they may be, so much more they haste not to be. . . . Out of all these things let my soul praise Thee, O God, Creator of all; yet let not my soul be riveted to these things with the glue of love, through the senses of the body. For they go whither they were to go, that they might not be; and they rend her with pestilent longings, because she longs to be, yet loves to repose in what she loves. But in these things is no place of repose; they abide not, they flee. . . . Behold, these things pass away, that others may replace them. . . . 'But do I depart any whither?' saith the Word of God."

CHAPTER IX.

THE END OF MAN.

MAN is led, we have seen, by his intelligent nature to seek God, and to express this desire by prayer; and as God, on one side, demands this worship from man, religion[1] becomes his first obligation and most important duty. As the master has a right to all the work of his servant, the farmer to all

Religion an universal law.

[1] Religion is here used in its wider sense, as embracing both natural and revealed religion. The former expresses the relation of man to God, arising from his natural knowledge and love of Him as his Creator and Rewarder, the reward being the eternal knowledge and love of God as the Author of nature. Supernatural religion signifies a knowledge of God and power of action alike superhuman, by which man can attain his supernatural end. The supernatural element, alike beyond sense and reason, in the domain of knowledge is termed mystery (*ὑπὲρ φύσιν, ὑπὲρ λόγον, καὶ ἔννοιαν.* Cf. *Joan. Damasc.* liv. iv. 3); the supernatural in the realm of external nature is termed miracle. The supernatural means of action is grace (*χάρις*), by which man attains to his supernatural end, and is raised to the likeness and contemplation of God, seen face to face (*θέωσις*). The supernatural order constitutes a second and higher world, a new order of things, to which man has no natural claim, and to which he only attains by his obediential faculty; *cf.* 1 Cor. ii. 7–9; St. Thomas in III. *Distinct.* xxiii., Qu. i. Art. 4; Schrader, *De Triplic. Ordin.*, p. 30 *sqq.*, though he finds his ultimate perfection therein (*complementum naturæ*). When Rationalists speak of a positive religion, they mean merely natural religion under a supernatural aspect (*supernaturale secundum modum, non quoad substantiam*). *Cf.* Kant, *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft.*, iv. p. 184; *Jacobi*, Tom. iii. p. 522.

the produce of his field, from the first buds of spring to the last autumn leaf, so God, as Creator, has a sacred claim upon every act of man's being, from his first thought in infancy to his expiring sigh. The just man, then, is the servant of the Lord.[1] But all things, and not men only, are from God. The Holy Scriptures, the Creed, every true philosophy, nature itself, opens with this primal truth, that from God they proceed, on Him again they alone depend,[2] and to Him they finally return.[3] For what is the universe but a mighty temple, built by the Eternal for Himself, in which a wondrous, silent, constant hymn of praise is offered up by the starry host, and day by day, and night by night, intoned in responsive choirs? "O ye sun and moon, bless the Lord! O ye stars of heaven, bless the Lord! O ye frost and cold, bless the Lord! O ye mountains and hills, bless the Lord! O all ye things that spring up in the earth, bless the Lord!"[4] "Behold how they

Binds even unconscious Nature;

[1] Isaias liii. 2, "My just servant."

[2] Psalm ciii. 29. "It does not necessarily follow that we shall be a moment hence, what we now are, if some Cause—that is, the Cause from whence we came—does not continue to bring us forth; that is, if it does not preserve us. We readily own that there is within us no inherent force by which we can subsist, or preserve ourselves for one single moment" (Descartes, *Principes de Philosophie*, i. ch. 21). *Cf.* Liebnitz, *Théodicée*, p. iii. n. 385.

[3] "God, Whom all things love, Whom we love, whether knowingly or unknowingly" (St. Augustine, *Soliloqu.*, i. 1). "Gravity itself, the principle by which everything is set in motion towards its natural place, can, because of this natural attraction, be called in a sense natural love" (S. I. ii., Qu. xlix. Art. i.).

[4] Daniel iii.

praise!" says St. Augustine. "Let none think that the dumb stone or dumb animal hath reason wherewith to comprehend God. They who have thought this have erred far from the truth. God ordered everything, and made everything; to some He hath given sense and understanding and immortality, as to the angels; to some He hath given sense and understanding, with mortality, as to man; to some He hath given bodily sense, yet gave them not understanding or immortality, as to cattle; to some he hath given neither sense, nor understanding, nor immortality, as to herbs, trees, stones; yet even these cannot be wanting in their kind, and by certain degrees He hath ordered His creation, from earth up to heaven, from visible to invisible, from mortal to immortal. This framework of creation, this most perfectly ordered beauty, ascending from lowest to highest, descending from highest to lowest, never broken, but tempered together of things unlike, all praiseth God. Wherefore, then, doth all praise God? Because, when thou considerest it, and seest its beauty, thou in it praisest God. The beauty of the earth is a kind of voice of the dumb earth. Thou observest and seest its beauty, thou seest its fruitfulness, thou seest its strength, how it receiveth seed, how it often bringeth forth what is not sown. Thou seest this, and by thy consideration of it thou, as it were, questioneth it; thy very inquiry into it is questioning it. But when thou hast inquired into it in thine admiration, and hast searched it out, and hast discovered its mighty strength and great beauty and

surpassing excellence, since it could not of itself and in itself have this excellence, it forthwith cometh into thy mind that it could not be of itself without Him, the Creator. And this, which thou hast found in it, is the very voice of its confession, that thou praise the Creator. When thou hast thought on the universal beauty of this world, doth not its very beauty, as it were with one voice, answer thee, 'I made not myself; God made me.'"[1]

and thus nature leads to religion.

Hence nature leads up to religion, and without it is a dead letter. Man, by the prerogative of his reason, is nature's lord.[2] The earth yields its fruits for his sustenance,[3] and is designed by its structure for his dwelling.[4] Yet, further, nature instructs his soul. It is her office to reveal in living

[1] Homily, Psalm cxlv. (Oxford trans.).

[2] "What is there so absurd in supposing that all things are made for me, if I alone know how to refer all things to Him?" (Rousseau, *Emile*, v. iii. p. 60).

[3] "And God blessed them, saying, Increase and multiply and fill the earth, and subdue it, and rule over the fishes of the sea and the fowls of the air, and all living things that move upon the earth. And God said, Behold I have given you every herb bearing seed upon the earth, and all trees that have in themselves seed of their own kind, to be your meat" (Genesis i. 28, 29). And at the beginning of the new race, after the flood, God repeats the same: "And let the *fear and dread* of you be upon all the beasts of the earth: all the fishes of the sea are delivered into your hand; and everything that moveth and liveth shall be meat for you" (Genesis ix. 2). *Cf.* Psalm viii. 8, 9. Aristotle, *Politic.*, "Εἰ οὖν ἡ φύσις μηδέν μήτε ἀτελὲς ποιεῖ, μήτε μάτην, ἀναγκαῖον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἕνεκα αὐτα πάντα πεποιηκέναι τὴν φύσιν" (Ed. Frankfort, 1809, v. i. c. 3 n. 7); and *Physic*, ii. 2, "καὶ χρώμεθα ὡς ἡμῶν ἕνεκα πάντων."

[4] "God," says St. Chrysostom, "made this earth a wonderful palace for the abode of man" (*Hom.* xvi. *in Genes.*).

forms and designs the thoughts of the Eternal,[1] to speak a language of holy symbolism so emphatic and solemn that all men not wilfully blind must learn therefrom the might, wisdom, and love of the Creator.

This spiritual teaching of nature has been marvellously reproduced in the Liturgy of the Church. She blesses and consecrates all earthly things, and, by thus dedicating all to God, gives a meaning and purpose to the world such as was never imagined by Paganism.[2] The flowers in meadow and forest become one vast legend; the seasons, days, and years become a framework for the divisions of the higher life in the supernatural order of the world.[3] Thus man's relation to nature becomes that of prophet and priest. As prophet, he is enlightened to decipher its mystic character, and to proclaim the glory of Him Who is manifest therein. As priest, he consecrates the earth's produce by assimilating it to himself, as the food of his body, and uniting it to his intelligent life. For that body is spiritualised by its union with the soul, and the earthly matter becomes both the temple whence his prayers ascend, and the altar on which he offers himself and all that is his to God.[4]

Of its revelation man, the interpreter, and by consumption of its produce its priest.

[1] "Nevertheless He left not Himself without testimony, doing good from heaven, giving rains and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness" (Acts xiv. 16).

[2] *Cf.* A. von Humboldt, *Kosmos*, ii. 257. 79.

[3] *Cf.* Wiseman, *Miscellaneous Writings*, vol. i. pp. 248, 285; Hettinger, *Die Liturgie der Kirche und die lateinische Sprache*, p. 71, Wurtzburg, 1856.

[4] Man is incorporated mind and spiritualised body. "Every cor-

"Thus do these organs of the world proceed,
As thou beholdest now, from step to step,
Their influence from above deriving,
And thence transmitting downwards."
—DANTE, *Parad.*, II. 121.

The purpose of nature, then, is not to minister to man's caprice, but to enable him to serve God. Used for any other end, nature revolts; man forfeits his sovereignty, and becomes its slave. He falls under the hard and cruel bondage of those passions which are developed in a merely natural life, apart from God. And the Nemesis is speedy and complete. As of old, in the hideous rites of Pagan nature-worship, men sacrificed their all to the pitiless and insatiable deity, to Moloch or Astarte, and never found peace, so is it now. To the animal man,

Abuse of nature makes man its slave.

poreal creature," says St. Thomas (II. *Dist.* i., Qu. ii. Art. 3), "whatever its size, is yet inferior to man, by reason of his intellect. Hence it is fitting that every such creature should tend to be assimilated with him, since they are thus assimilated to the supreme goodness." "This world," says Goethe (*Gespräche mit Eckerman*, ii. p. 37), "would be without meaning, if God had not conceived the plan of creating for Himself a world of spirits upon the material basis of this visible world." It is remarkable that Mr. Wallace thus states the result of his evolutionist theory:[1] "The whole purpose, the only *raison d'être* of the world, with all its complexities of physical structure, with its grand geological progress, the slow evolution of the vegetable and animal kingdoms, and the ultimate appearance of man, was the development of the human spirit in association with the human body." He also states:[2] "There are three stages in the development of the organic world, when some new cause or power must necessarily have come into action." "That the unconscious, conscious, and intellectual life point clearly to an unseen universe, a world of spirit, to which the world of matter is altogether subordinate."[3]

[1] *Darwinism*, p. 477, 1889. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 474.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 475, 476

who makes this world his end, nature is, spiritually, but an insoluble enigma, and materially a monster which, by pampering his evil passions, plunges him ever deeper into the abyss.[1]

As nature, then, only exists as a means by which man attains to God, it will endure only as long as that purpose remains. When the last of the elect shall have entered into eternal rest, then the end will come, and the scene of man's trial pilgrimage, the earth itself, will disappear. But, as man dies to rise again, so with him will arise "a new heaven and a new earth,"[2] and this visible creation will be remade, to share for eternity in the glory of the just.

Visible creation to be glorified with man.

As religion consists in the recognition of God as our Creator and the end of all creatures, so its immediate and formal expression is adoration.[3] Man naturally pays homage to real greatness, wherever found; he is naturally attracted by goodness and love, of which he is the object; he naturally admires genius in works which bear its

Adoration first act of prayer.

[1] Wisdom v. 8. "But all men are vain in whom there is not the knowledge of God, and who, by those good things that are seen, could not understand *Him that is*, neither, by attending to the work, have acknowledged Who was the Workman." . . . "With whose beauty, if they, being delighted, took them to be gods, let them know how much the Lord of them is more beautiful than they; for the first Author of beauty made all those things" (Wisdom xiii. 1, 3).

[2] Apocalypse xxi. 1.

[3] "Adoration," says Cousin (*Du Vrai, du Beau, et du Bien*, Lec. xvi.), "is an universal sentiment. Differing in degree in different natures, it takes the most diverse forms: often it is unconscious of itself; now it betrays itself by some heartfelt exclamation, called

impress. But God is the plenitude of Life, Love, and Power; when, therefore, man reads His greatness in the marvels of creation, His love and goodness in the order of nature and the pages of history, His providence in the ordering of his own life and in that of others, then he falls prostrate, and exclaims with childlike awe, "*Sanctus, sanctus, sanctus, Dominus Deus Sabaoth!*" He confesses that both himself and all things are from God, by his prayer, "Our Father, Who art in heaven;" that all things live and move in God, and are sustained by His might, by the "Hallowed be Thy Name;" that he and all creatures are destined to serve God here, and to share in His glory, by the prayer, "Thy Kingdom come." And as long as man is man, so long will religion endure, and, with it, the obligation of worship. The more profound and true his knowledge of God, the more full and abundant is man's prayer; and the more he prays, the more real is his life, and the better does he fulfil its task, and the better is he prepared for eternal bliss. For what is the beatitude of the redeemed but perpetual adoration, the full harmony of heaven, instinct with wondering praise, homage, and joy, which is echoed and re-echoed

The more perfect prayer begets a more perfect life.

forth by some great event of nature or of life; now it is awakened in the stillness of a soul that is stirred to its very depths. It may vary in outward expression, but in its essence it is ever the same. Adoration is an irresistible, spontaneous impulse of the soul, and reason examines into it, and approves it as just and legitimate. . . . Adoration is a natural and intuitive emotion; reason elevates it into a duty."

throughout eternity?[1] From the act of adoration the other forms of prayer are naturally derived. When man recognises his own nothingness, and the Divine Majesty, he prays for all he needs. Hence he begs as the blind man for light, the beggar for food, the dying for life.[2] Again, when man looks into himself, and sees the outrage of his sin as the act of a rebel, in which he measures his weakness with the Omnipotent, his folly with the All-wise, his malice with the Divine Mercy; then, filled with contrition, he implores pardon of Him, Whose mercies are infinite. Prayer, then, prepares the soul for reconciliation with God, and by the ease with which it turns to him, even in the hour of its shame, the soul proves its noble and immortal nature and attests its divine origin. Prayer is the bridge between this life and the life to come, upon which the Creator and the creature meet. Prayer breaks down the barrier between time and eternity, and becomes an act of that union and communion with God which constitutes the very essence of religion. For religion contains essentially two ideas—the descent of God to man, God taking a human form, that is, Incarnation in the widest sense, and the elevation of man to God, the

Petition.

Reconciliation.

Communion.

[1] Apocalypse v. 13.

[2] Hence the following proposition of Molinos was condemned:—"He who is resigned to the Divine will ought not (*non convenit*) to ask aught of God; for to ask is an imperfection, being an act of self-will and individual choice, and manifests the desire that the Divine will should be conformed to ours, and not ours to the will of God" (*Prop. Damn. Molin.*, xiv.).

"Theosis," the deification of humanity. Hence the Holy Eucharist, in which, under the appearance of bread, mortal man receives God Himself, is both the most perfect communion between the soul and God and the highest act of prayer and religion.

But if prayer be a religious and truly human act, it must, like all complete human acts, find outward expression; for man is a composite being, he comes, body and soul, from God, and depends for his existence on Him. Hence religion could never be purely interior, but must proceed from the whole man. The modern objection urged against those external acts of prayer which are found in all religions has been long since refuted. "The demeanour of those who pray," says St. Augustine,[1] "is externally that of supplicants who appear before another. They bend the knee, stretch forth their hands, prostrate themselves on the ground, and otherwise express their feelings. True, God knows their will and their dispositions without sensible signs, but man by these signs excites himself to more fervent and humble prayer; and as the movements of the body necessarily follow the affections of the heart, so its interior, invisible emotions are heightened by those which are visible." "It is according to our nature," says St. Thomas, "to proceed from things of sense to things intelligible; and thus external, visible worship is adoration in spirit and in truth, since it proceeds from what is spiritual, and is referred

Worship external as well as internal.

St. Augustine.

St. Thomas.

[1] *De Cura Gerend. pro Mortuis*, c. 2.

thereto. Doubtless we cannot apprehend God by our senses, but by these sensible signs our soul is incited to aspire to Him."[1] We have the highest authority for outward worship in the example of the Son of God, Who, when He blessed the Bread of Eternal Life, lifted up His eyes to heaven; Who, again, when He began to fear, and to be in heaviness, fell prostrate to the ground. The absence of external devotion only cramps the soul and deprives the body of its means of sanctification. A merely interior religion is the sure sign of a cold heart and unreal faith.

Sacrifice universal.

Again, by outward worship man daily consecrates nature. First, he consecrates his own natural body by placing it in a penitential position. Again, he consecrates nature's gifts by employing them in the Divine service. Through him the earth sacrifices its riches and precious metals for the building of the temple, the sea its pearls, the springtide its flowers for altar and shrine. Thus every religion, however degraded, has its outward worship; and of all religions sacrifice is the central act, and its universal use proves the traditional belief of all nations in the existence of God as Creator and Rewarder, and in the need of redemption. Thirdly, union in external acts of worship is also the one visible bond of union in faith;[2] for the faithful, gathered together in visible congregation,

[1] S. II. ii., Qu. lxxxiv. Art. 2, ad. 1, 3.

[2] It was reserved for Protestantism to establish an invisible Church, a theory as unphilosophical as it is unhistorical, and which therefore, as a matter of fact, never gained acceptance.

manifest to the world the one visible, undivided Church.

Prayer source of moral life.

But prayer is not only the expression of faith, it contains, as in germ, the whole moral life, which is the second effect of true religion, and the second form of Divine worship.

Döllinger.

"When the attention," says Döllinger, "of a thinking heathen was directed to the new religion spreading in the Roman Empire, the first thing to strike him as extraordinary would be, that a religion of prayer was superseding the religion of ceremonies and invocations of gods; that it encouraged all, even the humblest and most uneducated, to pray, or, in other words, to meditate and exercise the mind in self-scrutiny and contemplation of God. . . . This region of Christian metaphysics was open even to the mind of one who had no intellectual culture before conversion. In this school of prayer he learned what philosophy had declared to be as necessary as it was difficult, and only attainable by few—to know himself as God knew him. And from that self-knowledge, prayer carried him on to self-mastery. If the heathen called upon his gods to satisfy his passions, for the Christian, tranquillity of soul, moderation, and purifying of the affections was at once the preparation and the fruit of prayer. And thus prayer became a motive-power of moral renewal and inward civilisation, to which nothing else could be compared for efficacy." [1]

[1] *Christenthum und Kirche*, p. 136; *The First Age of the Church*, vol. ii. pp. 216, 217, translated by Oxenham.

By prayer, then, man places himself in the presence of God, and in the light of the Divine holiness recognises, as he can nowhere else, the malice of sin and the corruption of nature. He learns to measure his actions by no defective test of human make, but by this one inviolable standard, the all-holy will of God. Thus religion and morality are inseparable. Without religion morality is like a tree torn from its root. With many persons in our day the question no longer is, whether Christian faith or Christian morality is to be our guide in life, but whether we are to find this guidance in Christian morality, or in some new force corresponding to our present intellectual development. But as morality divorced from religion necessarily dies, so religion without morality becomes a lifeless and withered form, which lowers the ideal of God, degrades human nature, and makes prayer itself a lie.[1] The history of error proves both these facts. While the first Reformers, with their doctrine of faith without works, inculcated a religion of faith apart from morals, and discredited the value of the latter, the later Rationalist school of Kant and Fichte emphasised as exclusively the moral idea, and asserted its absolute independence of all religion or faith, which, they maintained, was a matter of indiffer-

Prayer alone teaches us to know and do God's will.

Religion and morality inseparable.

Contra Kant.

[1] "Religion, clean and undefiled before God and the Father, is this: to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation, and to keep oneself unspotted from this world" (James i. 27).

ence, or, at most, only to be tolerated as the popular expression of the moral idea.[1]

The shallowness and fallacy of this teaching, which looks only to results, without regard to first principles, is easily seen. As God is, such our duty to Him will be; as is our creed, such will be our sense of justice and morals. Now, justice is a virtue, which gives to each his due, and is one of the great cardinal virtues which control and direct the whole realm of morals. But our first debt and duty is owing to God, as our Creator and Preserver,[2] and religion is only the discharge of that duty of justice. But if our relations with God be ignored, and our duties flowing therefrom unheeded, how is any truly moral life possible? The omission of the primary obligation of justice entails not only the neglect of that one duty, but of that from which all other moral duties derive their highest significance and value.[3] A moral man, then, without

For religion, or justice towards God, specifies every other moral act.

[1] "We describe this theory as 'moralism.' Of course, this word, properly speaking, only represents one direction of this doctrine, and the one specially advocated by Kant; namely, that the moral subject possesses, in and by himself, the supreme principle of morality" (Coignet, *La Morale Independente dans son Principe et dans son Objet*). The other direction of "independent morals" appears in the Endämonism and Utilitarianism of the morality of enlightenment, founded by Hume, Locke, and especially by Bentham, and, more recently, most strenuously advocated by Socialism.

[2] "For piety is justice towards the gods," says Cicero (*De Nat. Deorum.*, i. 41). And Plato describes piety towards God as a part of justice (*Euthyphr.*, p. 13).

[3] "Religion contains two sets of acts; first, those proper to itself and immediate, which it elicits, and by these man is ordained to God, as

religion, that is, who does not confess his dependence on his Creator by adoration, thanksgiving, and petition, is in the highest degree immoral, inasmuch as each act of his terminates in himself, the creature, and not in God. Doubtless, the essential glory of the Infinite God is neither diminished nor increased by the homage of any creature, but God claims it, because man can only attain his end thereby; that is, by the constant public submission of himself in acknowledgment of the supremacy of his God. The theory, then, that morality is the supreme end of life, that religion, worship, and, above all, prayer are a merely subjective sentiment, is, in other terms, simply atheism.[1]

Morals without religion really atheism.

Again, how can moral order or law exist without a supreme, personal lawgiver, that is, without God? Every ideal is derived from a real personal prototype, and just as ideal, eternal truth points necessarily to the essential, existing truth, and ideal good to the supreme living good,[2]

Morals imply a lawgiver.

sacrifice, prayer, and other acts of that kind; secondly, those which it produces by means of virtues, which it impetrates, and thus ordains to pay homage to God" (S. II. ii., Qu. lxxxi. Art. 1).

[1] Kant says (*Religion, innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, p. 267) that a man with limited ideas of religion found in the attitude of prayer would feel the kind of shame which another does when detected talking to himself. For, as we regard a soliloquist as slightly crazed, so a man in prayer seems, though erroneously, to be speaking without a hearer. According to Kant, religion is only "the representation of the moral law as the will of God." According to Fichte, it is "a living, active faith in the moral order of the world."

[2] "As in every artist the idea pre-exists of what his art will effect, so also in every ruler there pre-exists the idea of the order of those

so does the moral ideal point to One Who is Himself ideal and reality; that is, God. God is the essential, eternal moral order: man bears the moral law stamped upon his soul, because that soul is created in the image of God; and as he fulfils that law he grows in likeness to God. There is then no moral order without God, no morals without religion,[1] and the necessary result of the negation of religion has always been, and always will be, the rejection of the moral law. The poetic orgies of "young Germany," the deification of matter and of mere sensual enjoyment, both in theory and practice, have abundantly proved this fact. "As the empirical thinker," says Ritter, "imagines it possible that creatures may exist without a Creator, so empirical moralists contend that moral actions may be perfect without any relation to the basis and end

things which his subjects are to do. And as the idea of the artist's works is called the art or the type of his work, so also the idea of the ruler, as regards his subjects, finds expression in law. And as the idea of Divine Wisdom, as the cause of all creation, is regarded as their art, exemplar, or type, so the idea of the Divine Wisdom, as guiding all things to their due end, is taken as law. Hence the eternal law is no other than the idea of the Divine Wisdom guiding every act and movement to its proper end" (S. I. ii., Qu. xciii. Art. 1).

[1] Kant gives a so-called moral proof of the existence of God. In order to establish the relation between morality and happiness, which man seeks but cannot find, a Being must be admitted, he says, who is all-powerful to render to each one the happiness which is his due, and who, as all-holy, is thus in perfect accord with the moral law; and this Being is God. But this Being is Himself subject to the moral law, that is, to a pure idea, a dead abstraction, of whose decrees this deity of Kant's is only the executor. Fichte was more logical when he said, "The living, moral order itself is God. We require none other, nor can we comprehend any other God" (*Philosoph. Journal*, 1798, p. 15).

of the moral law. In both cases such reasoning is both specious and superficial."[1] It is the motive, the inner hidden intention which alone determines the moral value of a life, and this motive religion alone can furnish. That a certain degree of morality is possible without religion, we do not, indeed, deny, but even in this limited sense it is untrustworthy and of no supernatural worth. Besides, in many cases the religious principle acts unconsciously, so that what appears to be a purely human act is often the result of religious habit, the echo of some utterance of the faith which in earlier days was wont to stir the soul.

Again, religion alone gives to morals their binding force, for a law is not an act of the intellect, but of the will, and therefore necessarily implies a pre-existent lawgiver, a personal being, who has the right to command. There is, therefore, no moral obligation without God. Again, the moral law offers no adequate motive for obedience, except as the expression of the Divine Will, for God alone can bestow such a measure of happiness upon its fulfilment as will outweigh the pain of self-renunciation which a higher moral interest demands; and so, also, He alone can inflict such punishment upon the sinner as will exceed the pleasure procured by his evil-doing. Only thus can the moral order in the world be protected against the terrible assaults of the passions. As, then, every other law derives its force from the authority which promulgates it, so does the natural

No binding force in morals apart from religion.

[1] *Encyclopædie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, iii. p. 46.

law, which is the foundation of all positive legislation.

"Attempts have been made," says Rousseau, "to make reason the basis of virtue, but I find that religion is the only solid foundation for morality. Virtue, it is said, is the love of order. But am I bound to sacrifice my happiness to this order? . . . Granted that wherever intelligence exists there is a certain moral order; but the difference is, *that the just man subjects himself to the whole moral order, while the evil man subordinates the whole moral order to himself, and constitutes himself the centre of all things.* If God does not exist, then the unjust man reasons rightly in thus regarding himself."[1] Thus religion preserves morality, gives a support and a centre to man, and protects him and his better nature from himself.

Statistics show, coincident with the spread of unbelief, a marked and disquieting increase in crime.[2] The number of suicides alone reveals a moral corruption which is eating, like a canker, into the very core of our social life. Nor could it be otherwise. "God," says Mirabeau, "is as necessary to a people as freedom." As long as men are taught to know no higher law than their own wills

Denial of morals follows that of religion.

[1] *Emile*, iii.

[2] "The highest statistics which have ever been reached in the annals of suicide were recorded at Berlin during the last month. Fifty-nine persons (in a population of 1,300,000) attempted to quit 'this mortal life,' and thirty-eight among them were successful. One boy, twenty women, and thirty-eight men made up the number. Twenty-two sought death in the water, fourteen by hanging, twelve through bullets, and

and pleasure, preachers and instructors of any creed who attempt to enforce the claims of true morality will find their words unheeded.

And as this is true of individuals, so is it also of society. As it is the first duty of a State or government to express by its legislation the idea of right, and to defend that idea as sacred and inviolable in every rank of society, that duty will only be fulfilled in a State which makes religion the basis of its rule. Plato, addressing the citizens of his ideal State, says: "God, as the old tradition declares, holding in His hand the beginning, middle, and end of all that is, moves, according to His nature, in a straight line towards the accomplishment of His end. Justice always follows Him, and is the punisher of those who fall short of the Divine law. To that law he who would be happy holds fast, and follows it in all humility and order; but he who is lifted up with pride, or money, or honour, or beauty, who has a soul hot with folly and youth and insolence, and thinks that he has no need of a guide or ruler, but is able himself to be the guide of others, he, I say, is left deserted of God; and being thus deserted, he takes to himself others who are like himself, and dances about, throwing all things into confusion; and many think that he is a great man; but in a short time he pays a penalty which justice cannot but approve, and is utterly

Without morals, no order or society.

Plato.

two by jumping from windows" (*Pall-Mall Budget*, July 4, 1889, No. 1084). *Cf.* G. Schmoller, *Ueber die Resultate der Bevölkerungs-und Moralstatistik*, 1871, p. 12.

destroyed, and his family and city with him. Wherefore, seeing human things are thus ordered, . . . every man ought to make up his mind that he will be one of the followers of God. Henceforth all citizens must be profoundly convinced that the gods are lords and rulers of all that exists, that all events depend upon their word and will, and that mankind is largely indebted to them." [1]

Aristotle pronounces worship [2] to be the first of the six leading administrations, agriculture, commerce, war, finance, worship, justice, without which the State cannot subsist. He assigns the first rank in the State to the priesthood.[3] Special edifices are to be dedicated to worship,[4] and the fourth part of the soil and land devoted to purposes of religion.[5] St. Justin, in his first apology (No. 12) describes the influence of religion on political life. "We Christians contribute most to the tranquillity of the State, since we teach that God governs all; that the evil-doer, the avaricious, the assassin, as well as the virtuous man, are known to Him; that each one who passes out of this life will receive an eternal reward or an eternal punishment, according to his deserts. Now, if all believed these truths, assuredly none would continue a moment longer in sin, but all would restrain themselves, and strive to do right, in order finally to obtain the promised reward and to escape punishment.

Aristotle.

St. Justin.

[1] *De Legg*, iv. p. 288. Cf. *De Repub.*, iv. p. 716.
[2] *Polit.*, vii. 8.
[3] *Ibid.*, vii. 9.
[4] *Ibid.*, vii. 12.
[5] *Ibid.*, vii. 11.

For those who do evil know that they can escape from your laws; but if they had learnt, and were fully convinced, that nothing, not an action, nor even a thought, can remain hidden from God, they would, at least from fear of punishment, strive to do right."

Civil law, then, has its deepest roots and its highest standard in morality, and this, again, in religion. The State, moreover, has never been developed from a purely abstract theory of law, but States have always and everywhere been established upon an historical basis, and are therefore necessarily bound up with the national character, morals, and religion. The State does not create religion; rather it finds religion already existing, and builds upon it, as on a divine foundation. As Montesquieu remarks, "The fall of the Roman Empire was the necessary consequence of the moral and religious disintegration which had begun;" and he gives as the result of his researches that the violation of morals has ruined more States than the infringement of the laws. Ever since the fall of Paganism, all the principles of civil legislation have been based upon Christianity; as, for instance, the principle of authority, of loyalty in subjects, of civil and individual liberty, in opposition to the slavery of Pagan times. Christianity has maintained the right of punishment as an attribute of justice against a false sentimentality and materialistic fatalism, and has upheld the sanctity of marriage, of the family, and the rights of property, in opposition to the

Hence religion necessary for the State.

theories of Socialism.[1] Although these principles of law may be regarded by those who have thrown off the yoke of religion as purely humanitarian, yet they are in fact the mature fruits of religion, which can alone guarantee their stability. Other obligations of public life, such as the oath with which, as a final means of proof, the law cannot dispense, are immediately dependent upon religious conviction.[2]

The effect of religion in a State is thus admirably described by Walter.[3] "No State," says he, "can subsist without religion, which fills and interpenetrates every sphere of life with the sense of the obligation of duty. Religion, which respects and maintains every right, both of high and low, strong and weak, is the conservative element of society. She hallows by oath the bonds of attachment and fidelity which bind prince and people to one another. With her softening and enlightening influences, she places herself at the side of the supreme power, whose abuses she averts by her earnest admonition, whilst she teaches subjects the virtue of free obedience. By

Walter.

[1] "The modern State," says Bluntschli (*Staatsrecht*, München, 1852), "is really Christian." "Our civilisation," says Cæsar Balbo (*De la Destruction du Pouvoir Temporel des Papes*, p. 11), "is a Christian civilisation, a daughter of the Christian religion. All that weakens the Christian religion retards progress, and hinders our civilisation."

[2] "How much more widely does the rule of duty extend than that of law! How much does piety, humanity, liberality, justice, good faith, require which is beyond public enactments!" (Seneca, *De Ira.*, ii. c. xxxvii.). "Human precepts," says Lactantius (*Instit. Div.*, iii. 27), "are of no weight."

Religion more comprehensive than law.

[3] *Naturrecht und Politik*, p. 237.

the strength of character which she forms, she preserves the youth of nations, and when they fall away and decay, keeps them from the withering-up of mind and heart. Religion is the groundwork of family life, and of the purity and piety nurtured therein. By the use of the oath she provides courts of justice with an indispensable aid for arriving at the truth. She inspires the soldiers with true courage to meet death on the battlefield. She brings rich and poor nearer together, urging upon the rich sympathy and active help to the poor, and instilling into the poor gratitude and consolation. Thus she softens every condition of life, and teaches man that he can be elevated and ennobled by submission. Religion is, then, the true bond which holds the State together, makes it strong, and saves it from degeneracy."

"Nor," remarks Montesquieu, "is it any argument against religion to enumerate a long list of the evils, which have followed from its abuse by human malice, whilst all its benefits to mankind are omitted. Who could reckon up the terrible crimes caused in the world by civil legislation, by monarchies and republics? . . . The question is simply this: Which is the lesser evil, that religion should be sometimes abused, or that there should be no religion?"[1]

Montesquieu. The abuse of religion no argument against it.

Thus religion perfects alike society and the individual, and takes possession of the whole man. It

[1] *Esprit des Lois*, xxiv. c. ii.

calls into play, and brings alike to perfection, the three faculties, the three dimensions of his nature, his mind, will, and heart. Religion, natural or supernatural, is founded upon dogma, and possesses a creed. Yet religion is not solely a scheme of doctrine; it is also an act of the will, and manifests itself continuously in daily life. True religion is known by its fruits,[1] and he who does God's will "shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God."[2] Nor, again, is religion confined only to doctrine and morality, for its presence is felt in the heart.[3] When man acknowledges that God is at once the beginning and end of his own existence, and of that of all creatures, he consecrates himself wholly to God's service, and religion becomes the "fear of the Lord,"[4] and man attains his end.

Religion embraces the whole man.

[1] Matthew xvii. 16. [2] John vii. 17.

[3] Holy Scripture (Acts xvi. 14; Jeremias xxxi. 33) describes the heart as the centre of the spiritual life, inasmuch as it is the seat, not only of sensual, still less only of æsthetic feelings, but of spiritual affections. Religious sentiment is only purified when enlightened by the understanding and upheld by action. "If religion," said Hegel, "is nothing but a feeling of dependence, then a dog is the most religious of beings." "*Religio spectat et ad intellectum et ad affectum, seu voluntatem*" (Suarez, *Disput. Theolog.*, T. x. L. 1; *Disp.* i. ch. 1). Although in one respect we admit, indeed, that religion is a feeling of dependence (Matthew vii. 7, xv. 21–28), yet, in another, we maintain that it is the source of true freedom, through union with God, and the strength derived from Him (St. John viii. 32). The truth in God makes us free, and the Church declares that "*Deo servire, regnare est.*" "When we revere and honour God our mind is subject to Him, and in this our perfection consists. For everything is perfected by its subjection to that which is above it, as the body when it is vivified by the soul" (S. II. ii., Qu. xxxi. Art. 7).

[4] Ecclesiasticus i. 16: "The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom."

By religion, then, man loses himself to find himself in God. And as God is the essential Truth, Goodness, and Beauty, religion alone inspires just conceptions of what is true, good, or fair, and is thus the only home of art, the sole source of every high ideal which man has ever conceived or expressed.[1]

Thus in religion man fulfils the idea of himself and returns to the First Cause from whence he came, in order to be finally perfected in Him. The spiritual man alone is the true, the educated, and perfect man;[2] for "man was created," says St. Augustine,[3] "to know God, and knowing, to love Him, loving, to possess Him, and in possessing Him, to be for ever blessed. . . . Beatitude itself is the peace of the soul, founded upon the Eternal Order."

In religion man attains his end.

[1] "The interior bond," says Schelling, "which unites art and religion, the utter impossibility, on the one hand, of finding any poetical world, except in and by means of religion, and, on the other, the impossibility of representing religion adequately and objectively, except by art, make a scientific knowledge of art essential to a truly religious mind" (*Vorlesungen über die Methode des academ. Studien*, 1813, p. 321).

[2] "Fear God, and keep His commandments: for this is all man" (Ecclesiastes xii. 13).

[3] *Civ. Dei.*, xix. 13. *Pax tranquillitas ordinis.*

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